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INTRODUCTION 
So far, after literally thousands of studies, no consensus has been reached whether financial 
markets are efficient (Lo, 1997, p.6). In the eyes of many researchers, the Efficient Markets 
Hypothesis (EMH) is “one of the most controversial and well-studied propositions in all the 
social sciences” (Lo, 1997, p.11). A market can be considered “efficient” if stock prices always 
“fully reflect” all available information. This definition goes back to Fama (1970) who 
differentiates between three important sets of information. A market can be “weak form 
efficient” if the information set just consists of historical prices and volume information, it can 
be “semi-strong form efficient” if stock prices fully include all information that are publicly 
available or a market can be considered “strong form efficient” if prices adjust to any 
information that can either be public or private (see Fama and French, 1970, p.383). A challenge 
to the Efficient Market Hypothesis is called an “anomaly”, which is defined as “a regular 
pattern in an asset’s return which is reliable, widely known and inexplicable” (Lo, 1997, p.13). 
Researchers have discovered many pricing anomalies such as the size effect (Banz, 1981), the 
January effect (Keim, 1983, Roll, 1983), the relation between price/earnings ratios and expected 
returns (Basu, 1977), the Value Line enigma (Copeland and Meyers, 1982) or calendar effects 
(Lakonishok and Smidt, 1988). However, many market anomalies related to profit opportunities 
have disappeared after their discovery (see e.g. Schwert, 2003) or are shown to be captured by 
rational risk models such as the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model (Fama and French, 
1996).  
A pattern that is still consistent with the definition of an anomaly is the intermediate-term 
continuation of stock prices. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) are the first to examine the stock price 
momentum effect, which implies that stocks with high returns over the past 3 to 12 months 
continue to outperform stocks with a poor past performance within the next 3 to 12 months. This 
implies that strategies long in past winners and short in past losers generate significant abnormal 
returns. Its profits are not captured by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) 
and Lintner (1965) or by the three-factor model of Fama and French (Fama and French, 1996). 
Unless researchers do not find a richer asset-pricing model or other risk factors that explain 
momentum profits, or if researchers document that they are not a compensation for risk, the 
effect would be in conflict with the weak form market efficiency hypothesis according to which 
excess returns cannot be earned by simple strategies building on historical stock prices. Given 
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the potential of stock price momentum to question the efficiency of markets, this field of 
research is especially interesting, important and controversial.  
 
Therefore, the research topic of my thesis is the stock price momentum effect. My work is 
structured into three main parts. The first one gives an overview about the present stand of the 
literature. It becomes clear that the profitability of momentum strategies is documented in many 
studies, for different samples and for different periods. However, it is worth to mention that most 
of the studies employ a similar methodology. While this indicates on a broad agreement of the 
literature how to measure momentum returns, it might also be the cause for systematic 
measurement errors. Therefore, a substantial fraction of Part I presents, discusses and evaluates 
the common methodology.  
 
In the search for an explanation for the profitability of momentum strategies, the literature has 
not come to a consensus: One the one hand, according to the rational-based approach, 
momentum profits represent a compensation for risk and is consistent with the EMH. On the 
other hand, the behavioral finance theories attempts to explain the existence of the momentum 
effect with a non-rational behavior of at least some investors. In the remainder of Part I, I discuss 
and structure the different proposals and show that so far, none of the two groups has brought 
forward a convincing theory that cannot be challenged by other studies.  
 
The second and the third part of my thesis are closely linked1 and examine the behavioral 
explanation approach that stock price momentum can be explained by the anchoring bias – a 
specific form of non-rational behavior. It states that investors orientate too much on a reference 
point when forming estimates. This idea goes back to George and Hwang (2004) documenting 
that the momentum effect can be explained by profits to the 52-week high strategy, which itself 
is assumed to be driven by the anchoring bias. Based on this theory, the null hypothesis of both 
parts of my thesis states: Stock price momentum cannot be explained by anchoring. In Part II, I 
propose three tests to examine the relation between momentum and the 52-week high strategy 
and between the 52-week high strategy and anchoring. These are conducted for a sample 
composed of all stocks traded in Germany between 1980 and 2008. My results present evidence 
to reject the null and point on anchoring as the driving force behind the momentum effect.  
 

1
 Although the same null hypothesis is examined in Part II and Part III, I have nevertheless decided not to integrate them into one 
major part because of the differing approach to test the null hypothesis and because of the different sample. 
- 3 - 

In Part III, a different approach is chosen to test the null hypothesis. An insight of the 
psychological literature states that behavioral biases have more room when uncertainty is large. 
Motivated by this, I examine whether the ranking criterion of the 52-week high strategy and of 
the momentum strategy have more predictive power when information uncertainty is larger. This 
should be the case if anchoring is behind the 52-week high and behind the momentum strategy. 
This examination is conducted for a sample that includes all UK stocks between 1989 and 2008. 
As in Part II, this investigation supports anchoring as the explanation of the momentum effect.  
 
Finally, Part III is succeeded by a summary and a conclusion of my work.  
 
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Part I 
 
 
An Overview about the Existing Explanation Attempts for the 
Stock Price Momentum Effect 
 
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1. Introduction 
The first part of my thesis presents the current stand of the literature about the stock price 
momentum effect and about the causes for its existence. Chapter 2 focuses on the methods to 
document the existence of the effect (Section 2.1). In Section 2.2 and 2.3, the stand of the 
literature about the profitability of momentum strategies is presented for the U.S. market and for 
other countries. Section 2.4 relates to the profitability of momentum strategies after 
consideration of transaction costs, while Section 2.5 concludes the chapter with a brief 
discussion whether short-sale constraints can hint investors from implementing the strategy.  
 
In opposite to Chapter 2, in which the focus is more on the measurement and on the existence of 
the momentum effect, Chapter 3 introduces, compares and evaluates the different explanation 
attempts for the existence of the price momentum effect. They can be mainly subdivided into 
three groups: data mining, which is already discussed in Chapter 2, the rational approach 
(Section 3.1) and the behavioral proposals (Section 3.2). The rational theory views momentum 
profits as a compensation of investors for bearing risk and attempts to explain its profitability 
with a risk-based theory. With a theoretical decomposition of momentum returns, I classify the 
various rational-based theories in one of four potential risk categories. The behavioral finance 
literature, however, argues that momentum strategies are profitable since at least some investors 
show a non-rational behavior. It is shown that the multiple proposals can be arranged under four 
main hypotheses, an approach that is new to my knowledge to structure the behavioral 
momentum literature. While others (e.g. Ding, 2007) sort the behavioral studies based on the 
assumed non-rational behavior and therefore according to their employed assumptions, my four 
hypotheses offer the advantage that it arranges the theories according to their explanations. It 
becomes clear that some studies assume a different non-rational behavior but are quite similar as 
they find support for the same hypothesis for the existence of the momentum effect. This shows 
one of the biggest disadvantages of the behavioral finance literature: the variability of judgment 
biases that can be employed to come to a similar conclusion. 
 
In Chapter 4, both, the rational and the behavioral approaches, are compared. It becomes obvious 
that, so far, no consensus has been reached about the driver of momentum. Neither the rational-
based proposals nor the behavioral approaches have yet succeeded in identifying the driver(s) of 
the momentum effect. Section 5 summarizes the insights and concludes the first part of my 
thesis. 
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2. The Profitability of Momentum Strategies 
2.1 Momentum Portfolio Characteristics 
While some methods might seem straightforward, it is nevertheless inevitable to examine the 
methodology in detail, to analyze its strengths and weaknesses and to compare different 
approaches. Otherwise, a model can be employed that delivers biased results. An extreme 
example how results are influenced by using an inappropriate method can be observed in the 
Journal of Finance paper of Chordia and Shivakumar (2002). Their core finding is strongly 
doubted by Cooper et al. (2004) (also JoF) showing that the results of Chordia and Shivakumar 
(2002) are biased by missing methodological adjustments of their portfolios to mitigate 
microstructure concerns. 2  While the latter believe to have found a model explaining the 
momentum effect, Cooper et al. (2004) documents that it almost has no explanatory power at all 
under consideration of the adjustments.  
 
To examine stock price momentum returns, the literature typically differentiates between three 
periods: the formation period, the investment period and the skip period. These three periods will 
be discussed now in more detail. 
 
Formation Period 
Momentum strategies invest in stocks with a high return in the past and sell stocks with low past 
return. The formation period determines the length of “the past”. Stocks are ranked based on 
their buy-and hold return during the formation period and assigned to different portfolios. 
According to the literature, the profitability of momentum strategies is largest for a formation 
period between six and 12 months (see Table 1 and Table 2). 
  

2
 Cooper et al. (2004) argue that Chordia and Shivakumar’s (2002) results are biased for several reasons: First, stocks with a price 
below $1 are not excluded in order to eliminate illiquid stocks or stocks with high trading costs. Secondly, they do not include a 
skip period between the formation period and the investment period. Such a skip is necessary to reduce spurious reversals due to 
bid-ask bounce. These problems will be discussed on the next pages. 
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Investment Period 
At the beginning of the investment period, a momentum portfolio is constructed that is long in 
stocks with a good performance during the formation period and short in stocks with a bad 
performance. Such a strategy is self-financing since the acquisition of winner stocks is financed 
by the sale of loser stocks. The portfolio is then held over the investment period. There are two 
methods commonly employed in the literature to form momentum portfolios: the “Quantile 
Method” and the “Weighted Relative Strength Strategy” (WRSS). 
 
“Quantile Method” 
The “Quantile Method” ranks stocks in ascending order based on their buy-and hold return 
during the formation period. The top quantile of stocks is assigned to the winner portfolio and 
the bottom quantile of stocks forms the loser portfolio. The momentum strategy is long in the 
winner portfolio and short in the loser portfolio. Hence, this strategy only considers stocks with 
an extreme past performance, while stocks that are not in the top or in bottom quantile are not 
taken into consideration by the strategy. Studies about price momentum use different quantiles to 
form winner and loser portfolios. In Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) for example, the winner 
portfolio consists of the 10% of stocks with the highest past returns over the formation period 
and the loser portfolio includes the 10% of stocks with the lowest past returns. Many studies 
employ these breakpoints (Rouwenhorst, 1998, Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001, Chordia and 
Shivakumar, 2002, Korajczyk and Sadka, 2004, among others). Other empirical work examines 
the top (winner) and bottom (loser) 20 percent of stock returns (i.e. Nagel, 2001, Griffin et al., 
2003) or even document momentum profits for a portfolio that is long in the top 30 percent of 
stocks and short in the bottom 30 percent of stocks (i.e. Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999 and 
Hong and Stein, 2000). 
 
The main reason to include more than 10 percent of the stocks in the winner and loser portfolio 
(as proposed by Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) is lack of data. Griffin et al. (2003), for example, 
consider momentum profits for different countries across the world. For some markets, not more 
than 50 stocks are available which implies that a portfolio, which includes the top decile would 
only contain five stocks in total. A portfolio with such a small number of stocks is not well 
diversified and its performance might be influenced by a single stock. Furthermore, a small 
number of stocks lead to large standard error in the test statistics. This lack of data problem does 
not only exist if the total data sample is small but it is also present if the momentum strategy is 
examined across subsamples. Hong and Stein (2000) for example examine momentum returns 
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within size groups. Therefore, the sample is divided into ten classes by size and then into three 
portfolios based on the momentum criterion.3 Such a sorting procedure increases the number of 
subsamples and reduces the number of stocks within each subportfolio even if the total sample is 
large. To reduce this problem, less subsamples can be created either by sorting stocks into fewer 
groups based on the momentum or by the second criterion. Hence, including more stocks in the 
winner and loser portfolios than the top and bottom decile increases the number of stocks within 
each portfolio. 
 
Momentum profits measured by the “Quantile Method” depend on the weighting scheme. Stocks 
within the winner and loser portfolios can be either equally weighted or value weighted.4 Most 
studies concentrate on equally weighted strategies (e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, 2001, Fama 
and French, 1996, Grundy and Martin, 2001). However, the weighting method has influences on 
the obtained returns (Lewellen, 2004 and Korajczyk and Sadka, 2004). Korajczyk and Sadka 
(2004) show that momentum returns (before trading costs) are in general larger when stocks are 
equal-weighted than when stocks are value-weighted. This is because momentum is stronger in 
stocks with a small market capitalization (e.g. Hong and Stein, 1999, Hong et al., 2000). The 
portion of stocks with a small market value is larger in equal-weighted portfolios than in value-
weighted portfolios. Moreover, equal-weighted and value weighted portfolios do also differ with 
respect to potential biases: Lo and Mac Kinlay (1988, p. 56-57) argue that, compared to equally 
weighted portfolios, value weighting is more robust to lead-lag effects5 associated with firm size 
or volume (as a proxy for liquidity). 
 
To increase the power of the tests, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) examine portfolios with 
overlapping holding periods, a strategy subsequently followed by other papers as well (e.g. 
Rouwenhorst (1998, p.269), Chordia and Shivakumar (2002, p.990), Griffin (2003, p.2518) 
among others). Let ܬ be the length of the formation period, ܵ the length of the skip interval andܭ
the investment period. At the end of each month ݐ, a portfolio is formed that is long in winners 

3
 In Hong and Stein (2000), the lack of data problem becomes even more severe in a further test, where the sample is first 
subdivided into four size categories and then each size category is further subdivided into three residual coverage classes. 
Momentum returns of each of the 16 different portfolios are then compared. The larger the number of portfolios gets, the smaller 
becomes the number of assets within each portfolio (see Subsection 3.2.1 for further information about the work of Hong and 
Stein, 2000). 
4
 Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) weight stocks based on a liquidity measure. Since this weighting method is only used in this paper, 
it is not discussed here in further detail. Yet, the work of Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) is presented in Section 2.4. 
5Among others, Lo and MacKinlay (1990, p.178) show that stock price reactions of smaller stocks are correlated with former 
stock price reactions of larger stocks. This dependence is called “lead-lag” structure in the literature. See the next subsection for 
further details.
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and short in losers according to their performance during the formation interval ܬ. If the holding 
period is longer than one month, the total momentum portfolio in month ݐ consists of a series of ܭ portfolios of equal size each starting one month apart between ݐ െ ݇ and ݐ െ ݏ. In order to 
illustrate the composition of a momentum portfolio with overlapping holding periods, consider 
an example with a formation interval of six months ሺܬ ൌ  ?ሻ, a skip of one month ሺܵ ൌ  ?ሻ and an 
investment period of three months ሺܭ ൌ  ?ሻ. Figure 1 presents the formation, skip and investment 
periods for the three components of an overlapping portfolio with an investment period ܭ ൌ  ?. 
The first component, portfolio ܲሺݐ െ  ?ሻ is formed in ݐ െ  ?, the second portfolio  ܲሺݐ െ  ?ሻ in ݐ െ  ? and the third portfolio ܲሺݐ െ  ?ሻ is implemented in ݐ െ  ?. Each portfolio buys winner 
stocks and sells loser stocks based on their performance over the previous six months. Hence, the 
formation period for ܲሺݐ െ  ?ሻ is between ݐ െ  ? and ݐ െ  ?, that for ܲሺݐ െ  ?ሻ between ݐ െ  ? and ݐ െ  ? and that forܲሺݐ െ  ?ሻ between ݐ െ  ? and ݐ െ  ? (thin lines in Figure 1). These portfolios are 
held over the 3-month investment period (thick lines). The gap between the thin line (formation 
period) and thick line (investment period) represents the skip or waiting period of one month. 
Consequently, at time ݐ , the momentum portfolio consists of the three portfolios ܲሺݐ െ  ?ሻ , ܲሺݐ െ  ?ሻ and ܲሺݐ െ  ?ሻ. At the end of month ݐ, the portfolio ܲሺݐ െ  ?ሻ is liquidated and replaced 
by a portfolio formed in ݐ. Hence, in ݐ ൅  ?, the overlapping momentum portfolio is composed of 
portfolios formed in ݐ െ  ?, ݐ െ  ? and ݐ. Therefore, from one month to the next, only one third of 
the assets in the momentum portfolio is revised whereas the rest is carried over from the previous 
month. To be more general, given an investment period of ܭ months, only  ? ܭ  of the assets in 
the momentum portfolio is altered per month. 
 
Figure 1 
Portfolios with Overlapping Holding Periods 
The formation period is six months (J=6), the skip between the formation and investment period is one month (S=1) and the 
investment period is of length 3 months (K=3). 
 
 

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A portfolio with overlapping holding periods increases the power of momentum tests and allows 
using simple t-statistics for monthly returns (Lee and Swaminathan, 2000, p.2022). Moreover, 
even without a skip interval between the ranking and investment period, the risk of getting 
spurious results due to the lead-lag effect is reduced since only a fraction of  ? ܭ  of stocks was 
recently picked by the ranking criterion. 
 
Weighted Relative Strength Strategy (WRRS) 
Beside the “Quantile Method”, returns to momentum strategies are also measured with the 
“Weighted Relative Strength Strategy” (WRRS) (see Conrad and Kaul, 1998, Chan et al., 2000, 
Jegadeesh and Titman, 2002 and Lewellen, 2004), where momentum portfolios are formed that 
hold assets in proportion to their market-adjusted returns. This method allows a formal 
decomposition of momentum profits into different components that could be responsible for the 
significant momentum returns (see Section 3.1). To get an idea how momentum portfolios are 
formed according to the WRRS, suppose that stocks are ranked based on their performance 
during the ݇-month lasting formation period ending in ݐ െ  ?. Then at time ݐ , a momentum 
portfolio is formed that invests the fraction ߱H?ǡH? in stock ݅. It depends on the market excess return 
of stock ݅ during the formation period. Specifically, a stock’s portfolio weight in month ݐ is: 
߱H?ǡH?ൌ ܴH?ǡH?H?H?H? െ തܴH?H?H?H? ሺ ?ሻ
where ܴH?ǡH?H?H?H?  is the return on stock ݅ during the formation period that lasts ݇ months and ends in ݐ െ  ? and തܴH?H?H?H?  denotes the cross-sectional average return during that period. A portfolio 
implemented following Equation (1) buys all stocks with a positive market excess return during 
the formation period ሺܴH?ǡH?H?H?H? െ തܴH?H?H?H? ൐  ?ሻ. Yet, in opposite to the “Quantile Method”, the 
weighting of stocks within the portfolios is based on the excess returns: The larger the difference 
between ܴH?ǡH?H?H?H?  and തܴH?H?H?H? , the larger is the fraction ߱H?ǡH?. In other words, the WRRS invests more 
in stocks that heavily outperformed the market during the formation period while stocks with a 
return that only weakly exceeded the average during the same period receive only a minor 
weight. The same is true for the short side of the portfolio: all assets with a negative market 
excess return are sold ሺܴH?ǡH?H?H?H? െ തܴH?H?H?H? ൏  ?ሻ. The strategy holds the largest short position in stocks 
that heavily underperformed the market. It is easy to show that the weights of the WRRS sum to 
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zero:  ? ߱H?ǡH?ൌ  ?H?H?H?H?  which implies that – as the “Quantile Method” – the WRRS is a self-
financing (zero-cost) strategy. 

The main difference between the WRRS and the “Quantile Method” is the weighting scheme. 
The WRRS weights stocks based on their past performance: The strategy denotes a greater 
portfolio fraction to stocks with a more extreme performance during the formation period while 
stocks with a return similar to the cross-sectional average get only a minor weight. For the 
“Quantile-Method”, however, the performance of a stock during the formation period serves 
only as a criterion whether the stock is included in the portfolio or not. The weighting of stocks 
that are assigned to the momentum portfolio is independent from past returns since assets are 
either equal- or value-weighted. The two methods do also differ in the fraction of assets 
considered. A momentum portfolio formed according to the “Quantile Method” only comprises 
stocks in the top and bottom quantile while the majority of stocks are excluded. A WRSS 
portfolio in contrast invests in all stocks (except for those with an excess return of exactly zero) 
and not just in assets with extreme past returns. The WRSS portfolio is mainly employed in 
theoretical studies as in contrast to the “Quantile” method, the WRRS can be used for a 
theoretical decomposition of momentum profits in different potential drivers (Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 1993, Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999 and Chordia and Shivakumar, 2002, among 
others). This allows structuring the search for potential sources of this phenomenon. Such a 
theoretical decomposition with the WRRS is carried out in Section 3.1. 
 
Skip Period 
To obtain unbiased results, it has become a common practice to skip a short time period between 
the formation and the investment period in order to avoid some of the microstructure concerns 
documented in Jegadeesh (1990, p.895-896), Lehmann (1990, p. 9-11) and Lo and MacKinlay 
(1990, p.191-192). Since stock returns are normally measured close-to-close and trade at the bid 
or at the ask price, a momentum strategy may spuriously appear to earn abnormal returns 
because of the bid-ask bounce which can be illustrated with a small example: Suppose that the 
price of a stock remains constant between ݐ െ  ? and ݐ ൅  ?. The stock closes at time ݐ at the bid 
price while the probability that the stock closes at the ask price at the end of ݐ െ  ? and ݐ ൅  ? is 
roughly 50%. If a constant bid-ask spread is assumed, it is obvious that the measured return for ݐ 
is either zero or negative and for ݐ ൅  ? either zero or positive. Consequently, if returns are 
measured over closing prices, they can appear to be negatively correlated. This might lead to the 
wrong conclusion that past prices predict future prices although they are completely uncorrelated 
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(see Roll (1984) for a formal analysis of the bid-ask spread). In light of the momentum effect, the 
bid-ask bounce should bias momentum returns towards zero.  
 
Estimates of momentum abnormal returns can also be biased by the lead-lag effect. According to 
the common intuition, small capitalization stocks trade less frequently than larger stocks. 
Therefore, new information first influences the prices of larger stocks. Then afterwards, it is 
finally impounded into small capitalization stocks. This lag can lead to a positive correlation in 
an equally weighted portfolio (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990, p.178).  
 
A skip period between the formation and investment period helps to avoid some of these 
microstructure distortions and lead to a better estimation of momentum profits. Most studies on 
stock price momentum chose a length of one month for this gap.6 How important it is to consider 
a skip period in the tests can be seen in the work of Chordia and Shivakumar (2002). While 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) present a model and show that some macroeconomic variables 
can explain the momentum effect, Cooper et al. (2004, p.1355-1357) argue that the results are 
biased as no skip period is included in the tests and since stocks with a price below $1 are not 
excluded from the sample7. Taking these aspects into consideration, Cooper et al. (2004) show 
that the variables do not have any explanatory power of momentum returns (p.1356). This does 
also indirectly challenge the results of Nelles et al. (2007) examining the momentum effect for 
the German market, but also do not consider a skip period between the ranking and holding 
period. It might be the case that their results are also heavily influenced and biased by 
microstructure effects. 
2.2 Momentum Returns and the US Market 
Table 1 presents the most important studies related to momentum returns in the U.S. Column 1 
gives information about the paper in which the respective results are published. Column 2 reports 
the length of the formation period, ܬ, the investment period, ܭ, and the skip period, ܵ, expressed 
in months. For example, ܬ ൌ  ? ?/ܵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?/ܭ ൌ  ? means that stocks are sorted based on their 
past 12 months return (ܬ ൌ  ? ?). The portfolios are formed one week ( ?Ǥ ? ? months) after the 
ranking period ended (ܵ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?) and are then held for 3 months (ܭ ൌ  ?). Column 3 documents 
which of the two methods (the “Quantile Method” and the WRRS) are employed to calculate 

6
 Famous exceptions are Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Lee and Swaminathan (2000) with a shorter skip of one week. 
7
 Stocks priced below $1 are excluded since these stocks are highly illiquid and have high trading costs. 
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momentum returns. If the “Quantile Method” is chosen, column 3 additionally informs about 
whether the stocks are equally weighted or value weighted and which quantiles are chosen to 
form winner and loser portfolios. Column 5 gives information about the sample period and the 
last column documents the (average) momentum return per month net of trading costs. If a study 
examines the performance of several momentums strategies, the one with the highest significant 
returns is presented in Table 1.8 
 
Table 1 
Overview of Momentum Returns Documented for the U.S. Market 
 
Paper Interval  Data Portfolio formation Sample Period Momentum 
return per month 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) J=12/S=0.25/K=3 NYSE/AMEX stocks 10% winners / 10% losers     Equal-weighting 1965-1989 1,96% 
Conrad and Kaul (1998) J=9/S=0/K=9 NYSE/AMEX stocks WRRS 1962-1989 0,71% 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) J=6/S=0/K=6 NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq 
stocks 
30% winners / 30% losers 
1963-1995 0,78% 
Equal-weighting 
Hong et al. (2000) J=6/S=0/K=6 NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq 
stocks 
30% winners / 30% losers 
1980-1996 0,53% 
Equal-weighting 
Lee and Swaminathan (2000) J=9/S=0/K=9 NYSE/AMEX stocks 10% winners / 10% losers 1965-1995 1,15% 
Equal-weighting 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) J=6/S=0/K=6 NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq 
stocks 
10% winners / 10% losers 
1965-1998 1,23% 
Equal-weighting 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) J=6/S=0/K=6 NYSE/AMEX stocks 
10% winners / 10% losers 1951-1963 0,83% 
Equal-weighting 1963-1994 0,73% 
Only non-January months     
Jegadeesh and Titman (2002) J=6/S=0/K=6 NYSE/AMEX stocks WRRS 1965-1997 0,37% 
Griffin et al. (2003) J=6/S=1/K=6 NYSE/AMEX stocks 20% winners / 20% losers 1926-2000 0,59% 
Equal-weighting 
Avramov et al. (2007) J=6/S=1/K=6 NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq 
stocks 
10% winners / 10% losers 
1985-2003 1,49% 
Equal-weighting 
 
Table 1 shows that momentum returns are positive during different sample periods between 1926 
and 2003. Each study in Table 1 reports momentum returns that are statistically significant on 
conventional levels. It is especially remarkable that momentum strategies remain profitable after 
their discovery in 1993 (see among others Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001). Other anomalies in 
contrast have disappeared after they became public (see Schwert, 2003)9. Moreover, Table 1 

8
 Note that not all papers try to find the momentum strategy with the highest abnormal returns. 
9
 In the sample period precedent of the publication of Banz (1981) between 1965 and 1981, the average Fama-French size factor 
was 0.53% per month (t-statistic: 2.34) while the average size factor was only -0.18% (t-statistic: -1.01) in the 1982 to 1998 
sample period. A similar effect is documented for the book-to-market factor return. 
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shows that there is not any study reporting statistically insignificant momentum returns for a 
similar methodology and similar ܬȀܵȀܭ  intervals over a longer period. Only for some 
subperiods, it is shown that momentum strategies are not profitable: Between 1926 and 1951, 
momentum returns are measured that are not significant (Chordia and Shivakumar, 2002, p.990). 
Henker et al. (2006) and Hwang and Rubesam (2007) measure non-significant momentum 
returns after 2001. Yet, the literature does not consider this as evidence that the momentum 
effect has disappeared as its profitability is documented for other samples after 2001 (e.g. 
Dimson, 2008 and this work for the German and U.K. stocks). 
 
While there seems to be strong evidence for the existence of momentum in the U.S., one needs to 
be aware that all studies are quite similar with respect to the methodology employed. It has 
become a common practice to form zero-cost portfolios, which are long in past winner stocks 
and short in past loser stocks. Furthermore, most studies employ the “Quantile Method” and 
calculate returns on an overlapping investment period basis. All papers in Table 1 estimate 
profits to momentum strategies before trading costs, use a similar data set and make related 
adjustments: All studies presented in Table 1 employ monthly data10. Moreover, it has become a 
common practice to exclude stocks with a price and/or a market value below a specific value. It 
is argued that these adjustments are necessary in order to ensure that results are not driven by 
low priced and extremely illiquid stocks. All these adjustments seem straightforward and useful. 
The fact that all studies employ a similar methodology indicates that there is a broad consensus 
in the literature how to measure momentum returns. Yet, one needs to be aware that evidence for 
the momentum effect crucially depends on the correctness of this methodology.  
 
Table 1 also shows that the profitability of momentum strategies substantially differs across the 
studies. Four empirical studies report average monthly momentum returns well above one 
percent whereas others obtain much lower momentum returns. These differences can at least 
partly be explained by the construction of momentum portfolios. It is a common view that 
momentum strategies are more profitable when limited to stocks with an extreme past 
performance (see e.g. Hong et al., 2000, p.274), while strategies with larger quantiles generate 
lower returns. Studies, reporting monthly momentum returns above one percent, only assign the 
top and bottom 10% of stocks to their winner and loser portfolios. Papers with lower momentum 
returns however do also consider stocks with a less extreme performance in theportfolios; either 

10
 It is argued that using daily data, momentum returns could be overstated due to the bid-ask spread and thin trading. This 
potential bias is likely to be reduced substantially with monthly returns (Jegadeesh, 1990, p.896). 
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by including the top and bottom 20% or 30% of assets or by employing the WRRS, where all 
stocks are considered. The weighting scheme of stocks in the momentum portfolio can also 
influence its performance. Compared to equally weighted portfolios, value-weighting seems to 
reduce the average return and volatility of the strategy (see Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999, 
p.1259, Korajczyk and Sadka, 2004). 
2.3 Momentum Returns and non-US Markets 
An overview of studies examining momentum profits outside the U.S. is given in Table 2. It can 
be seen that the momentum effect is examined for European countries, emerging markets, 
African markets, American countries and Asian stock markets. 
 
Rouwenhorst (1998), Griffin et al. (2003) and Doukas and McKnight (2005) present evidence for 
the existence of the momentum effect in Europe. Rouwenhorst (1998) uses a sample that consists 
of stocks from 12 European countries between 1978 and 1995.11 Irrespective of the origin, the 
top 10% of stocks is bought while the bottom 10% of stocks is sold. Rouwenhorst (1998, p.271) 
find that for each formation and investment interval between 3 and 12 months, past winners 
outperform past losers by about one percent per month. Furthermore, it is shown that momentum 
strategies work in all 12 countries except Sweden. Other studies focus on a specific European 
country when examining momentum returns: Among other markets, significant profits to 
momentum strategies are reported for UK stocks (Liu et al., 1999, Hon and Tonks, 2003, Agyei-
Ampomah, 2007, Dimson, 2008) for the Spanish market (Forner and Marhuenda, 2003), for 
Greek stocks (Tsouknidis, 2006) and for the German market between 1973 and 1997 (August et 
al., 2000) and between 1999 and 2006 (Nelles 2007). 
  

11
 The 12 countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 
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Table 2 
Overview of Momentum Returns Documented for Non-U.S. Markets 
 
Paper Strategy Portfolio Formation Country/Region Sample Period 
Momentum 
Return per month 
Rouwenhorst (1998) J=9 / S=1 / K=6 
10% Winners / 10% losers  
Europe             
(12 countries) 1978-1995 1.45% 
Equal-weighting 
Rouwenhorst (1999) J=6 / S=1 / K=6 
30% winners / 30% losers 
Emerging Markets    
(20 countries) 1982-1997 0.39% (0.58%)
12
 
Equal-weighting 
Chui et al. (2000) J=6 / S=1 / K=6 
30% winners / 30% losers 
Asian market        
(8 countries) 1975-2000 
0.38%             
(not significant) 
Equal-weighting 
August et al. (2000) J=6 / S=0 / K=12 10% winners /10% losers German market 1973-1997 1,03% 
Equal-weighting 
Griffin et al. (2003) J=6 / S=1 / K=6 
20% winners / 20% losers 
International        
(39 countries) 1975-2000 0.49% 
Equal-weighting 
Forner and Marhuenda (2003) J=12 / S=0 / K=12 WRRS Spanish market 1967-1997 0.133% 
Doukas and McKnight (2005) J=12 / S=0 / K=12 
30% winners / 30% losers 
Europe             
(13 countries) 1998-2001 0.73% 
Equal-weighting 
Agyei-Ampomah (2007) J=12 / S=1 / K=1 
10% winners / 10% losers 
UK market 1998-2003 0.446% 
Equal-weighting 
Dimson (2008) J=12 / S=1 / K=12 
20% winners / 20% losers 
UK market 1900-2007 0,90% 
Value-weighting 
 
 
The continuation phenomenon is not limited to the U.S. and the European market. Griffin et al. 
(2003, p.2518-2520) examine the existence of momentum returns for individual African and 
south American markets. Data is available for two African countries and six American countries. 
Past winners outperform past losers in both African countries and five of six American markets 
(However, not for all examined markets, the momentum returns are significant.). Moreover, 
Rouwenhorst (1999) shows that momentum returns are also positive in 17 out of 20 emerging 
markets between 198213 and 199714. 

12
 The average monthly return of a momentum portfolio in which stocks of all 20 countries are equally weighted is 0.39%. If 
however, the 20 countries are equal-weighted in the portfolio, it yields 0.58% per month. 
13
 To be specific, the starting dates vary for the individual countries: While data is available for Argentina, Brazil and Chile by 
1982, for Turkey the sample does not start until 1990. 
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However, in Asian markets, past winner stocks do not significantly outperform past loser stocks. 
Using data of eight different Asian countries between 1976 and 2000, Chui et al. (2000, p.14) 
find significant positive momentum returns only for Hong Kong. They explain the lack of 
significance with a high volatility of momentum returns during the financial crises in 1997. Yet, 
even after excluding the period of the crisis, momentum portfolios generate significant positive 
returns only in about half of the examined Asian countries. Insignificant momentum returns are 
also reported in Griffin et al. (2003, pp.2518) where the continuation effect is examined for 14 
Asian countries during 1975 and 200015. Even for all Asian countries, momentum returns have a 
t-statistic of 1.64 and are not significant on conventional levels. Further evidence for momentum 
strategies not being significant in Asia is given by Haugen and Baker (1996, p.433) documented 
weak and insignificant momentum in Japan. 
 
Griffin et al. (2003, p.2322-2524) extends the research on momentum profits and examines 
whether momentum returns are correlated across regions (Africa, America (ex. U.S.), Asia (ex. 
Japan), Europe, Japan, U.S.). They find only low intraregional and interregional correlations for 
their data sample. The highest correlation is documented for the United States and the countries 
of Europe. This finding is in line with Rouwenhorst (1998, p.282) documenting that the 
continuation effects in Europe and the U.S. are not uncorrelated (correlation of 0.43). 
 
The biggest difference between empirical momentum studies for the U.S. market and for non-
U.S. markets lies in the sample size. Researchers of the U.S. market dispose of a much larger 
data sample when examining stock price momentum – both in the cross-sectional and the time-
series dimension. While about 3000 to 4600 stocks are available for the U.S. market (e.g. 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999, p.1252, Grundy and Martin, 2001, p.32, Avramov et al., 2007, 
p.2505), the number is much smaller for other markets: Research on momentum in European 
countries is based on data sets with often less than 500 firms for an individual country (e.g. 
Rouwenhorst, 1998, Forner and Marhuenda, 2003 and Doukas and McKnight, 2005). However, 
lack of data in the cross-sectional dimension is not only limited to European markets. Examining 
the momentum effect in Africa, Griffin et al. (2003) disposes of data of only two countries and to 

14
 In Rouwenhorst (1999), positive momentum returns during the sample period are observed for the following countries: Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Greece, India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Thailand, Turkey, 
Venezuela and Zimbabwe. Returns are significantly different from zero in Chile, Colombia, Greece, India, Jordan, Nigeria and 
Portugal. Rouwenhorst (1999, p.1450) cannot find positive momentum returns for Argentina, Indonesia and Taiwan. 
15
 The starting dates for the sample of each country vary: By 1975, data are available for Australia and Japan. Coverage for the 
other 12 Asian countries begins between 1983 and 1993. 
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a total number of only 280 stocks. Rouwenhorst (1998, p.1444) is confronted with the same 
problem for emerging markets. For each country, not more than 100 stocks are available. In the 
time dimension, U.S. data cover a much longer period than the datasets for non-U.S. markets. 
While recorded returns for U.S. stocks date back until 1926 (e.g. Chordia and Shivakumar, 2002, 
p.990, Cooper et al., 2004, p.1348), most studies for non-U.S. markets cover a much shorter 
period (see Table 2).16 
 
Empirical results critically depend on the quality and on the size of the available data set. 
Therefore, one should take into consideration the time history and the number of stocks available 
when drawing conclusions about the existence of momentum. For example, the evidence for a 
rejection of the hypothesis “price momentum does not exist for the U.S. market” is based on 
3000 to 4600 stocks, on different time periods and on a couple of different studies. This cannot 
be compared to the evidence for a rejection of the hypothesis “price momentum exists for 
African countries” based on only one study (Griffin et al., 2003) and a total sample size of 280 
stocks. Yet, this does not mean that the existence of price momentum for non-U.S. markets 
should be questioned in general. As Table 2 states, a large number of studies report significant 
momentum returns for various data samples outside the U.S and hereby confirm that the 
momentum effect is not a U.S. specific phenomenon. Nevertheless, I rather recommend taking 
into consideration the size of the data set when interpreting the results; one should at least be 
aware that these findings are based on a much smaller data sample than those for the U.S. 
market. 
2.4. Momentum Profits net Transaction Costs 
The Efficient Markets Hypothesis requires that “prices fully reflect all available information” 
(Fama 1970, p.383) and is based on the assumption that trading costs are zero. Yet, according to 
the literature, trading frictions in stock markets are non-zero. Therefore, Fama (1991) defines 
that markets are efficient if “… prices reflect information to the point where the marginal 
benefits of acting on information (the profits to be made) do not exceed the marginal costs” 
(p.1575)17 This definition allows delays or friction in the price adjustment process in a fully 
rational market even if there are no zero cost arbitrage opportunities. Hence, according to this 
definition, one cannot conclude from the existence of momentum profits that are net of trading 

16
 The study of Dimson (2008) represents an exception with a sample dating back until 1900. However, the number of stocks 
available for the ranking procedure is so small in the first decades that it seems questionable to consider such a long period. 
17
 See also Goldsmith (1976) and Jensen (1978) among others. 
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costs on the invalidity of the market efficiency. Trading costs need to be taken into 
consideration. While there has been much research on the profitability of momentum strategies 
before trading costs, much controversy exists about the magnitude of trading costs. Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993, p.77) refer to Berkowitz et al. (1998) and assume a one-way cost of 0.50%. 
Yet, this estimate does not take into account the type of stock that goes into momentum 
portfolios. While the transaction cost estimate of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) is based on the 
trading costs for large liquid stocks, Lesmond et al. (2004, p.354-356) document that momentum 
portfolios (and especially the loser portfolios) are composed of small, low price and high beta 
stocks. Hence, momentum profits are generated by assets that seem to be relatively less liquid. 
Furthermore, Jegadeesh and Titman’s transaction cost estimate does not consider the frequency 
of trades from rebalancing the momentum portfolio (Agyei-Ampomah, 2007, p.777). 
 
Therefore, a couple of studies examine the costs of trading momentum portfolios (Lesmond et 
al., 2004, Korajczyk and Sadka, 2004, Hanna and Ready, 2003, Keim, 2003) and show that they 
are much higher than previously assumed. However, mixed evidence is found whether 
momentum strategies generate profits after consideration of transaction costs. While Korajcyk 
and Sadka (2004) argue that transaction costs are substantial but not large enough to explain the 
existence of the momentum anomaly, Lesmond et al. (2004) suggest that momentum profits are 
subsumed by the costs of trading. Agyei-Ampomah (2005) examines momentums strategies for 
the U.K. and find profitable momentum returns net of transaction costs for longer horizons 
(formation and investment period longer than six months), whereas for shorter periods 
(formation and investment periods that do not exceed three to six months), the costs of 
transaction costs dominate momentum profits. In summary, although trading costs are substantial 
for momentum strategies, there is no clear evidence that momentum profits are subsumed by 
trading costs. 
2.5 Momentum Profits and Short-sale Constraints 
Beside trading costs, short-sale constraints can also make it difficult to realize profit 
opportunities of momentum strategies. Momentum portfolios are long in past winner stocks and 
short in past loser stocks. Therefore, momentum returns can be driven by the positive returns of 
the winner portfolio or by the negative returns of the loser portfolio. The findings of Hong et al. 
(2000) indicate that momentum profits are largely generated by loser stocks. For their 
NYSE/AMEX sample from 1965 to 1989, they examine the returns of winners and loser 
portfolios separately and show that loser stocks contribute to approximately three quarters of 
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total momentum returns (see Hong et al., 2000, Table III, p.275). They obtain this percentage by 
calculating the fraction of the return difference between the loser portfolio (bottom 30 percent of 
past returns) and the middle return portfolio (middle 40 percent of past returns) to the total 
momentum returns. Similar findings are reported for other markets (Doukas and McKnight, 
2005, p.323, Lesmond et al., 2004, p.352, Korajczyk and Sadka, 2004, p.1043 and Agyei-
Ampomah, 2007, p.784). These observations indicate that any short-selling constraints may 
affect the viability of momentum strategies. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) argue that not all 
stocks can be borrowed that easily for short sales. Further, margins from short sales are often less 
than the market rate of return (p.1272). Consequently, given that momentum profits largely arise 
from loser stocks, short-selling constraints can make momentum profits difficult to be realized. 
Yet, the literature has not yet found a possibility to model the effect of short-selling constraints 
on the realization of momentum profits. 
3. Potential Explanations for the Momentum Phenomenon 
3.1 Momentum and the Fama French Three Factor Model 
Fama and French (1993) identify three stock market factors that seem to explain much of cross-
sectional variation in average stock returns: the market excess return, ܴH?െ Hܴ?, the return 
difference between a portfolio composed of small stocks and a portfolio of large stocks,ܵܯܤ 
(small minus big), which represents the size premium, and the return difference between a 
portfolio composed of high book-to-market stocks and a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks, ܪܯܮ (high minus low), that represents the value premium. To estimate the factor sensitivities, 
the excess market return, the size factor and the book-to-market factor are regressed on the return 
of a portfolio݅in excess of the risk-free-rate, ܴH?െ Hܴ?: 
ܴH?െ Hܴ?ൌ  ߙH?൅ ߚH?ሺܴH?െ Hܴ?ሻ ൅ ݏH? ൅ ݄H? ൅ ߝH?ሺ ?ሻ
If the three factor model is able to explain the cross-sectional variation in stock returns, ߙH? 
should be close to zero. The intercept can be interpreted as the risk-adjusted return of the 
portfolio relative to the three factors. Fama and French (1996) document that their model can 
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explain most Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) anomalies18, but have to admit that the three 
factors fail to capture the momentum effect (Fama and French, 1996, p.68). Beside the three-
factor model, other traditional pricing measures as the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) are 
also not able to explain this phenomenon (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, pp.73).  
 
Since standard asset-pricing models do not explain the profitability of momentum strategies, two 
different types of theories are discussed in the literature beside data mining. First, asset-pricing is 
irrational and the profits to momentum strategies cannot be explained in the framework of the 
traditional assumptions that investors are strictly rational and that they dispose of an unlimited 
computational capacity (Hong and Stein, 1999, p.2144). This relatively young field of research 
argues that some of the financial phenomena can only be understood by using models in which at 
least some investors are not completely rational and exhibit various psychological biases. 
Second, asset pricing is rational and the standard asset-pricing theories are not complete. 
Therefore, it is necessary to find further risk factors and/or to look for a better model within the 
traditional framework. This theory is called the “rational approach” in this work since the 
assumption of complete rationality is not dismissed. Both attempts to explain the intermediate-
term stock price momentum – the rational proposals and the behavioral based theories – are 
presented in the next two sections. 
3.2. Rational Explanation Attempts 
3.2.1 Overview 
A momentum portfolio is constructed according to the Weighted Relative Strength Strategy 
(WRRS)19. This method implements self-financing portfolios (with ? ߱H?ǡH?ൌ  ?H?H?H?H? ) and invests 
the fraction߱H?ǡH?in stock݅ , which depends on the market excess return of stock݅  during the 
formation period. For simplicity, the formation and the investment period are assumed to be of 
length one month (According to Lewellen (2004, p.542), results can be easily adapted to longer 
formation and investment periods). Therefore, in Equation (1), ݇ is equal to one and the WRRS 
invests the fraction ߱H?ǡH? in stock ݅: 

18
 Researchers have identified many patterns in stock returns. For example, it is shown that stock returns depend on firm 
characteristics such as long-term past return, size, earnings/price ratio (E/P), cash flow/price ratio, the ratio of the book value of 
common stocks to their market value and past sales growth (see: Banz, 1981, Basu, 1983, Rosenberg et al., 1985, DeBondt and 
Thaler, 1985, Lakonishok et al., 1994). Fama and French (1996, p.57) argue that their model can explain many of these so-called 
CAPM anomalies. 
19
 See for further details Section 2.1 and Equation (1). 
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߱H?ǡH?ൌ ܴH?ǡH?H?H?െ തܴH?H?H?ሺ ?ሻ
where തܴH?H?H? denotes the cross-sectional average return in periodݐ െ  ?. As mentioned in Section 
2.1, a portfolio constructed in line with the WRRS is long in stocks that outperformed the market 
during the formation period ൫߱H?ǡH?ൌ ܴH?ǡH?H?H?െ തܴH?H?H?൐  ?൯and short in stocks with a negative 
market excess return during the formation period ൫߱H?ǡH?ൌ ܴH?ǡH?H?H?െ തܴH?H?H?൏  ?൯. The momentum 
strategy is profitable when past winner stocks continue to outperform and when past loser 
continue to underperform the markets. In other words:  
ܧൣ߱H?ǡH?൫ܴH?ǡH?െ തܴH?൯൧ ൌ ܧൣ൫ܴH?ǡH?H?H?െ തܴH?H?H?൯൫ܴH?ǡH?െ തܴH?൯൧ ൐  ?ሺ ?ሻ
In order to identify potential sources of momentum returns, it has become common practice to 
decompose expected profits with a simple model (see e.g. Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999, 
pp.1253, Chordia and Shivakumar, 2002, pp.1009). Therefore, the following multifactor linear 
process is considered: 
ܴH?ǡH?ൌ ߤH?ǡH?൅ ෍ ߚH?ǡH?H݂�?H?൅H?H�?H? ෍ ߠH?ǡH?ݖH?H?൅H?H?H? ݁H?ǡH?ǡሺ ?ሻ
with  ܴH?ǡH?: Return on stock݅ at time ݐ ߤH?ǡH?: Expected return on stock݅conditional on information available at timeݐ  H݂�?H?: Return on a zero-cost portfolio݇ mimicking the most important factors (e.g. the 
three Fama-French factors) at timeݐ ߚH?ǡH?: Stock݅’s sensitivity to factor݇ ݖH?H?: Industry portfolio returns orthogonal to theܮfactors at dateݐ ߠH?ǡH?: Stock݅’s sensitivity to component݉ ݁H?ǡH?: Stock݅’s firm specific component 
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Further, it is assumed that the firm-specific components, the industry terms and the factor 
portfolios are contemporaneously uncorrelated, as well as: 
ܧ൫ H݂�?H?݂ ǡH?H?H?൯ ൌ  ?,for all ݈ ് ݇;  ܧ൫ݖH?H?H݂?ǡH?H?H?൯ ൌ  ?, for all݉ǡ ݈and݄ ൌ േ ?; ܧ൫݁H?ǡH?݁ ǡH?H?H?൯ ൌ  ?, for all ݅ ് ݆;  ܧ൫݁H?ǡH?݂ �?H?H?H?൯ ൌ  ?, for all݅ǡ ݇and݄ ൌ േ ?; ܧ൫ݖH?H?ݖH?ǡH?H?H?൯ ൌ  ?, for all ݉ ് ݊;  ܧ൫݁H?ǡH?ݖH?H?H?H?൯ ൌ  ?, for all݅ǡ ݉and݄ ൌ േ ?; 
with ܧ൫ݖH?H?൯ ൌ  ? for all ݉  and ܧ൫݁H?ǡH?൯ ൌ  ? for all ݅ . According to these assumptions, the 
variables are allowed to be autocorrelated but not cross-autocorrelated. Moreover, it is assumed 
that sensitivities to the factor portfolios (the book-to-market, the size, the excess market 
portfolios etc.) do not change over time. Therefore, time subscripts are lacked in the factor 
sensitivities of Equation (5). Given the assumed return-generating process from Equation (5), the 
expected return in Equation (4) can be decomposed as follows: 
ܧൣ൫ܴH?ǡH?H?H?െ തܴH?H?H?൯൫ܴH?ǡH?െ തܴH?൯൧ ൌ  ൫ߤH?ǡH?H?H?െ ߤҧH?H?H?൯൫ߤH?ǡH?െ ߤҧH?൯ൌ ൅ ෍൫ߚH?ǡH?െߚҧH?൯ܥ݋ݒ൫ H݂�?H?H?H?ǡ H݂� H?൯H?H�?H? ൌ ൅ ෍൫ߠH?ǡH?െߠҧH?൯ܥ݋ݒ൫ݖH?H?H?H?ǡ ݖ ?H?൯ ൅ ܥ݋ݒ൫݁H?ǡH?H?H?ǡ ݁H?ǡH?൯Ǥሺ ?ሻH?H�?H? 
The average momentum profits across allܰstocks are equal 
ൌ  ?ܰ෍൫ߤH?ǡH?H?H?െߤҧ H?H?൯൫ߤH?ǡH?െߤҧH?൯ ൅ ෍ ߪఉೖH?ܥ݋ݒ൫ H݂�?H?H?H?ǡ H݂�?H?൯H?H�?H?H?H?H?H? ൌ ൅ ෍ ߪఏ೘H?ܥ݋ݒ൫ݖH?H?H?H?ǡ ݖ ?H?൯H?H?H? ൅  ?ܰ෍ ܥ݋ݒ൫݁H?ǡH?H?H?ǡ ݁ ǡH?൯H?H?H?H? ǡሺ ?ሻ
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where the cross-sectional variances of the portfolio loadings and the industry sensitivities are 
denoted with ߪఉೖH? and ߪఏ೘H? . The above decomposition in Equation (7) suggests four potential 
sources of momentum profits: 
 
1. The variation in expected returns: ? ܰ ?  ?൫ߤH?ǡH?H?H?െߤҧ H?H?൯൫ߤH?ǡH?െߤҧH?൯H?H?H?H?  
This component leads to positive momentum returns if the conditionally expected return 
of stock݅is larger than the expected return across all stocks during the formationሺݐ െ ?ሻand the holding periodሺݐሻ. 
 
2. The serial correlation in the factors: ? ߪఉೖH?ܥ݋ݒ൫ H݂�?H?H?H?ǡ H݂�?H?൯H?H�?H?  
If the factor portfolio returns are positively serially correlated, the second term is 
positive. It is useful to think that the݂ƍݏare well proxied by the three Fama-French factor 
portfolios. So, if the correlation of the profits from a market-beta, size or book-to market 
portfolio is positive, momentum portfolios are generated by this term. 
 
3. The serial correlation in industry return components: ? ߪఏ೘H?ܥ݋ݒ൫ݖH?H?H?H?ǡ ݖ ?H?൯H?H?H?  
This term contributes to momentum profits when industry components are positively 
serially correlated. 
 
4. The serial correlation in the idiosyncratic components: ? ܰ ?  ?ܥ݋ݒ൫݁H?ǡH?H?H?ǡ ݁ ǡH?൯H?H?H?H?  
 
I will now focus in further detail on the four potential components and classify the existing 
rational explanations into one of the four groups. 
3.2.2. Momentum Profits due to Variation in Expected Returns 
Studies finding evidence for the first component in Equation (7) can be subdivided into two 
groups. The first one assumes stationary mean returns while the second body does not rely on 
this assumption and claims that dispersion in time-varying expected returns is responsible for the 
profitability of momentum strategy. 

Cross-sectional dispersion in time-invariant mean returns 
Conrad and Kaul (1998) find support for the first term in Equation (7) to be the main determinant 
of momentum profits. While in Equation (7), expected returns are considered time variant, 
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Conrad and Kaul rely on the assumption that mean returns of individual stocks are stationary 
over the period momentum strategies are implemented.20 Their work presents theoretical and 
empirical evidence that cross-sectional dispersion in mean returns is an important component of 
the profitability of momentum strategies. Instead of using the decomposition of momentum 
profits in Equation (7), they follow the framework of Lehmann (1990, pp.3) and Lo and 
MacKinlay (1990, p.182-184) and decompose the expected profits of the momentum strategy 
with a holding period of length ݇, denoted with ܧሾߨH?ሺ݇ሻሿ, into two components: The first one is 
time-series predictability in stock returns, which is denoted with ܲሺ݇ሻ. It consists of the negative 
of the first-order autocovariance of the market portfolio and the average of the first-order 
autocovariances of all ܰ individual stocks that are included in the momentum portfolio. Conrad 
and Kaul (1998, p.498) name ܲሺ݇ሻ the “predictability-profitability index”21 since it is completely 
determined by return predictability. The second source of the total expected momentum profits is ߪH?ሾߤሺ݇ሻሿ and represents the cross-sectional dispersion in mean returns of stocks. 
 
In order to prove theoretically that momentum strategies remain profitable even if stock returns 
are completely unpredictable, Conrad and Kaul (1998, p.499) introduce a benchmark model 
where stock prices are assumed to follow a random walk. In the random walk framework, 
strategies that rely on time-series predictability are not profitable by construction first since stock 
returns are assumed to be not autocorrelated and secondly, since returns are not predictable 
across different assets. This framework demonstrates that momentum strategies can generate 
profits even if stock prices are entirely unpredictable as it is assumed by the random walk model. 
The momentum strategy is profitable simply by being long in high-mean stocks and short in low-
mean assets22, but not by exploiting time series patterns. Given the theoretical background, 
Conrad and Kaul (1998, pp.502) use a sample of all NYSE/AMEX stocks between 1926 and 
1989 and estimate the total average profits, ܧ෠ሾߨH?ሺ݇ሻሿ , and the two components of the 
decomposition, ෠ܲሺ݇ሻ and ߪH?ሾߤƸሺ݇ሻሿ, for five different time periods (1962-1989, 1926-1989, and 
three subperiods) and eight different holding periods݇(between 1 week and 3 years). If stock 
prices follow random walks, ߪH?ሾߤƸሺ݇ሻሿ should be constant and represent 100 percent of total 
profits. This hypothesis cannot be rejected: The cross-sectional variance of mean returns has a 

20
 Conrad and Kaul’s (1998) study also critically depends on the assumption that the cross-sectional distribution of the in-sample 
mean returns is an accurate measure of the true cross-sectional variation in the mean returns. 
21
 Lo and MacKinlay (1990), as well, name this term the “predictability-profitability index”. 
22
 Winner stocks can have high returns either because they are high-mean stocks or because they have experienced a high current 
shock. On average however, winner stocks will be high-mean stocks and loser stocks will be low-mean stocks (Conrad and Kaul, 
1998, pp.501). 
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significant effect on ܧ෠ሾߨH?ሺ݇ሻሿ and contributes more than 100 percent to the expected momentum 
profits in 16 out of 20 cases where positive momentum returns were observed. The time-series 
component ෠ܲሺ݇ሻ in contrast is either negative or, if positive, not significantly different from 
zero. Therefore, Conrad and Kaul (1998) cannot reject the hypothesis that the main determinant 
of momentum profits is the cross-sectional variation in mean returns. Their study implies that the 
momentum effect and the random walk hypothesis might not be conflicting theories; momentum 
strategies can be profitable even if stock prices do follow random walks (with drifts). According 
to these findings, momentum may not be a price continuation effect generated by market 
inefficiencies but a strategy that exploits the cross-sectional differences in mean returns by being 
long in high-mean stocks and short in low-mean assets. 
 
However, some papers do not agree with Conrad and Kaul (1998). With Moskowitz and 
Grinblatt (1999), Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), Jegadeesh and Titman (2002), Grundy and 
Martin (2001) and Lewellen (2002)23, several researches do not support the hypothesis of Conrad 
and Kaul (1998). 
 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999, pp.1257) use a similar decomposition of momentum returns as 
in Equation (7), but assume like Conrad and Kaul (1998, p.489) time invariant mean returns. For 
a CRSP and COMPUSTAT data file for between 1963 and 1995, Moskowitz and Grinblatt 
(1999) find that the profitability of momentum strategies largely arises from the third term, the 
serial correlation in industry components,  ? ߪఏ೘H?ܥ݋ݒ൫ݖH?H?H?H?ǡ ݖ ?H?൯H?H?H? Ǥ The dispersion in 
unconditional mean returns in contrast does not seem to determine trading profits of individual 
momentum strategies (Moskowitz and Grinblatt 1999, p.1262). They argue that if the first term 
is the main determinant of momentum, individual momentum profits should be significantly 
larger than industry momentum profits since the cross-sectional variation in mean returns for 
individual stocks is much larger than the cross-sectional variation in mean industry returns. Yet, 
comparing equal-weighted momentum returns for individual stocks to equal-weighted industry 
momentum returns, Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999, p.1262) find industry momentum profits 
being 90 basis points larger than momentum returns for the individual stocks. 
 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) use a different approach to reject Conrad and Kaul’s (1998) 
hypothesis. They argue that according to the theory of Conrad and Kaul (1998), returns of a 

23
 The study of Lewellen (2002, p.556) is not discussed here in further detail since its method to find evidence against the Conrad 
and Kaul (1998) conjecture is similar to that of other papers presented here (e.g. Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999). 
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momentum portfolio must remain positive in the long run since the success of winner stocks is 
determined by high unconditional expected rates of return that is assumed to remain unchanged 
over time. In other words, stocks that were initially bought by the momentum strategy should 
continue to outperform stocks that were initially sold in any postranking period. Jegadeesh and 
Titman (2001) examine the postholding period returns of momentum portfolios for NYSE and 
AMEX stock data over the 1990 to 1998 sample period and find substantial return reversals in 
the years two to five after portfolio formation. At the end of month 12 after the formation date, 
cumulative momentum profits peak at 12.17% while they decline to -0.44% by the end of month 
60. Hence, the findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (2001, p.711) are clearly inconsistent with the 
Conrad and Kaul (1998) hypothesis. 
 
Grundy and Martin (2001) also do not find evidence for the Conrad and Kaul (1998) hypothesis. 
Using data of all NYSE and AMEX-listed stocks between 1926 and 1995, they measure 
momentum returns that are adjusted for the estimated Fama and French three factors and learn 
that, compared to raw returns, the average momentum payoff increases. If the three-factor model 
adequately documents differences in mean returns, this finding is clearly at odds with the Conrad 
and Kaul (1998) theory predicting that the cross-sectional variance in mean returns is the main 
determinant of momentum profits. As an additional test for the Conrad and Kaul (1998) 
conjecture, Grundy and Martin (2001, pp.57) use each stock as its own risk control and adjust 
each stock’s investment month return by its time-series mean. However, even after this 
adjustment, momentum returns remain significantly and economically large what is clearly 
against the hypothesis of Conrad and Kaul (1998). 
 
Opposition against Conrad and Kaul’s (1998) theory is also presented in Jegadeesh and Titman 
(2002). They argue that the Conrad and Kaul bootstrap results are biased. After controlling for 
the small sample bias, unconditional expected returns seems to explain only very little, if any, of 
the momentum returns (pp.152). 
 
Cross-sectional dispersion in time-varying mean returns 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) test the hypothesis that momentum payoffs are derived from 
cross-sectional differences in time-varying expected returns.24 The theoretical models of Berk et 
al. (1999) and Johnson (2002) offer the intuition for the study of Chordia and Shivakumar 

24
 It is necessary to note that there is concern in the literature over how to adequately modeling time variation in risk. Ghysels 
(1998), for example, shows that methods of modeling variations in risk do not improve static risk models. 
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(2002). Both models show that momentum can be explained by economic risk factors. In the 
study of Johnson (2002), a positive relationship between firm growth rates and expected returns 
generate momentum profits. Momentum profits in the model of Berk et al. (1999) arise from 
changes in the firm’s asset portfolio over its life cycle and from the interaction between these 
changes and interest rates. Although the theory of Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) differs from 
the hypothesis of Conrad and Kaul (1998) which states that it is dispersion in time-invariant 
expected returns what generates momentum profits, both theories have in common to view 
systematic variation in expected returns as the main driver of momentum profits. 
 
The analysis of Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) shows time-variation in momentum returns: It is 
documented that a large portion of the six-month momentum profits can be explained by 
commonly used macroeconomic variables that are linked to the business cycle. These are default 
spread, dividend yield, yield on three-month T-bills and term structure spread. Their lag is used 
to predict one-month-ahead stock returns. After controlling 25  for these predicted returns, 
momentum portfolios do not generate significant profits anymore. In other words, according to 
these results standard macroeconomic variables related to the business cycle seem to explain the 
profitability of momentum strategies. In the eyes of Chordia and Shivakumar (2002), this finding 
indicates time-varying expected returns to be the driver of momentum profits. They argue that if 
these macroeconomic variables are able to capture time-varying risk, differences in conditionally 
expected returns across stocks determine the momentum phenomenon. This interpretation is 
consistent with recent theoretical and empirical work creating a link between cross-sectional 
variation in expected returns and macroeconomic variables (e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1989, 
Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997, Berk et al., 1999)26.  
 
Yet, the work of Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) is heavily criticized by Cooper et al. (2004, 
pp.1354). They replicate the analysis of Chordia and Shivakumar (2002), but cannot find any 
explanatory power of their proposed macroeconomic model of returns. Cooper et al. (2004, 
pp.1356) argue that the findings of Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) are biased due to missing 
methodological adjustments: First, illiquid and high-trading cost stocks are not excluded from 

25
 Chordia and Shivakumar (2002, pp.1003) control for the predicted returns by employing a two-way dependent sort: First, they 
sort all stocks into quintiles according to the past six month buy and hold raw returns and then they sort each quintile further into 
quintiles according to the predicted returns (They also report results when stocks first are sorted by predicted returns and then by 
raw returns). 
26
 Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) document that changing credit market conditions can differently 
influence the risks of small and large firms and their expected returns. Berk et al. (1999) present a theoretical model predicting 
that expected stock returns of firms are differently affected by changing interest rates. In this theoretical work, interest rates can 
be viewed as a macroeconomic proxy. 
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their sample and secondly no skip period between formation and investment period is 
implemented to reduce spurious reversals driven by bid-ask bounce. 27  Considering these 
common screens to reduce microstructure-induced biases, the macroeconomic model shows little 
or no ability to explain momentum returns (Cooper et al., 2004, pp.1364). Beside Cooper et al. 
(2004), the macroeconomic variables as driver of the momentum effect are also questioned by 
the study of Griffin et al. (2003, pp.2530) showing that the model28 fails to explain momentum in 
markets outside the U.S.29. 
 
Griffin et al. (2003, p.2536) state that if macroeconomic risk is the driver of relative strength 
returns, momentum strategies should underperform in at least some states of the world (when the 
marginal utility of returns is higher). Therefore, their work examines and compares the 
profitability of momentum portfolios during strong and poor economic states. Griffin et al. 
(2003, p.2536) argue that negative (positive) returns of relative strength strategies during bad 
economic states (good economic states) support the hypothesis that the momentum phenomenon 
is driven by macroeconomic risk.30 Griffin et al. (2003) use stock price data from 22 markets 
around the world31. Choosing seasonally adjusted real GDP, aggregate stock market movements 
and states of industrial production growth as indicator for the business cycle state, Griffin et al. 
(2003) find significant positive momentum payoffs during both expansionary and recessionary 
periods and conclude that momentum profits cannot at all be explained by compensation for 
bearing macroeconomic risk. This is at odds with the findings of Chordia and Shivakumar (2002, 
pp.992) for U.S. stocks between 1926 and 1994 that document significantly positive returns on 
momentum portfolios only during expansionary periods, whereas payoffs are negative but not 
significant during recessions. The dependence of momentum returns on the state of the economy 
is also documented in Cooper et al. (2004), Avramov (2006) and Avramov (2007). As Cooper et 
al. (2004), Griffin et al. (2003) attribute the results in Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) to the 
missing skip period between the formation and the investment period. 
 

27
 For further details, see Section 2.1. 
28
 Griffin et al. (2003) omit the credit quality spread (DEF) variable from the regression model since the bond markets outside the 
U.S. are not well developed for low quality credits. The exclusion of DEF however is not expected to affect the results (Griffin et 
al., 2003, p.2530). 
29
 To be more precise, Griffin et al. (2003) examine momentum profits for stocks from two African countries, 6 American 
countries (except the U.S.), 14 Asian markets and 17 European markets. 
30
 Supporters of the behavioral finance literature view interpret high momentum returns during expansionary periods and low or 
insignificant momentum returns during deflationary periods as evidence for their theory and do not link this to risk. See Chapter 
4 for a more detailed comparison between rational and behavioral explanation attempts for the momentum effect. 
31
 In their study, Griffin et al. (2003) examine more than 22 markets around the world. Yet, for this test, only markets are 
excluded for which the OECD provides GDP data. 
- 30 - 

As shown, literature does not agree whether momentum returns depend on the state of the 
economy or not. Hence, researchers are far from a conclusion about whether momentum 
represents a compensation for macroeconomic risk. Even worse, if it was conclusively shown 
that momentum strategies are only profitable during expansionary periods for different markets 
and time periods, not all researchers would then interpret this finding as evidence for momentum 
profits being a compensation for bearing macroeconomic risk. Supporters of the behavioral 
finance literature view a relationship between momentum profits and the state of the economy as 
confirmation for their overreaction hypothesis: Traders overreact to news and this is more likely 
during periods with high stock returns. This hypothesis is discussed in detail in the next section. 
 
This relationship between the business cycle and momentum profits found by Chordia and 
Shivakumar (2002) and Cooper et al. (2004) is the starting point for another important study 
about intermediate-term stock price momentum. Avramov et al. (2007) argue that credit risk 
varies with the business cycle and focus on the relationship between credit risk and the 
profitability of momentum strategies. The study documents a close connection between 
momentum payoffs and the credit-risk of firms. Based on a sample of NYSE, AMEX and 
Nasdaq firms over the 1985 to 2003 period, they examine momentum strategies with different 
formation periods and analyze momentum winner and loser stocks. Avramov et al. (2007) show 
that the momentum portfolios mainly consist of high credit-risk firms: While the average S&P 
credit risk rating is BBB for the entire sample, it is on average substantially lower for the loser 
(BB-) and for the winner portfolio (BB+). Sorting all ranked stocks on three credit rating groups 
and on 10 past six-month returns, they show that the profitability of momentum increases with 
credit risk. While momentum strategies generate large and significant profits for high credit risk 
firms, they appear to be not profitable for firms with low credit risk: For the best credit quality 
tercile, momentum portfolios yield an insignificant 0.27% per month, but for the worst quality 
group, the strategy generates a high and significant monthly return of 2.35%. This significant 
positive return for low-grade firms is largely due to loser stocks. Avramov et al. (2007) also 
show that the low-graded firms that generate the momentum profits represent less than four 
percent of the overall market capitalization of all rated firms. This is documented by measuring 
momentum payoffs for subsamples when sequentially worst rated firms are dropped. After the 
exclusion of firms with a rating of BB- and worse, momentum returns of the remaining stocks 
(representing 96.6% of the overall market capitalization and 78.8% of the total number of rated 
firms) are not significantly different from zero anymore. The finding that momentum is mainly 
derived from a small fraction of firms with the poorest quality of outstanding debt leads to the 
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assumption that momentum payoffs should be larger during recessionary periods. However, 
inconsistent with this idea, some papers (e.g. Chordia and Shivakumar, 2002, Cooper et al., 
2004) show that momentum profits are economically and statistically significant only during 
expansions. Avramov et al. (2007) cannot explain this discrepancy and leaves it open for future 
research. 
3.2.3. Momentum due to Serial Factor Correlation 
According to the analytical decomposition of momentum profits in Equation (7), the 
intermediate-term stock price momentum effect might also be due to the second term, the serial 
correlation in the factors,  ? ߪఉೖH?ܥ݋ݒ൫ H݂�?H?H?H?ǡ H݂�?H?൯H?H�?H? . Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999, p.1259) 
use a portfolio of all CRSP-listed stocks to analyze the contribution of the second source to the 
profitability of momentum strategies. The portfolio is equally weighted and monthly rebalanced. 
It is employed for two reasons: First, the firm-specific risk component is close to zero 
(݁becomes arbitrarily small as the number of stocks becomes arbitrarily large) and secondly, the 
sensitivity of the return of this equal-weighted portfolio to the returns of any single industry is 
close to zero (ߠҧH?is negligible for all݉industries). Hence, the serial covariance of the portfolio 
returns is approximately32: 
ܥ݋ݒሺ തܴH?ǡ തܴH?H?H?ሻ ൌ ෍ ߚҧH?H?ܥ݋ݒሺ H݂�?H?ǡH?H�?H? H݂�?H?H?H?ሻǡሺ ?ሻ
whereݎҧH?H?H?represents the cross-sectional average return of all stocks in period ݐ െ  ?ǡ as before. 
Thus, Equation (8) allows examining the influence of the serial factor portfolio correlation on 
momentum returns. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999, p.1259) measure the covariance of 
consecutive and nonoverlapping six-month returns (where ݐdenotes a six-month period) and 
find that ܥ݋ݒሺ തܴH?ǡ തܴH?H?H?ሻ is െ ?Ǥ ? ? ?and does not significantly differ from zero. This result is 
similar to that of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, p.73) who document a weakly negative ሺെ ?Ǥ ? ? ? ?ሻserial portfolio covariance. According to Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999, p.1262), 
this portfolio has historically a high risk premium. Hence, some of theߚҧH?’s should be large. 

32
 Since all CRSP-listed stocks are included, it is intuitive that the first term in Equation (7) is also zero: the expected return of 
this all-stocks portfolio ߤ݅ is equal to ߤത. 
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Consequently, in terms of Equation (8), an insignificantܥ݋ݒሺ തܴH?ǡ തܴH?H?H?ሻ combined with at least 
some large ߚҧH?’s means that the serial covariance in at least some of the factor portfolios does not 
contribute to the profitability of relative strength strategies. Moreover, Moskowitz and Grinblatt 
(1999, p.1262) document that the serial covariance for each of the three Fama-French (1993) 
factor-mimicking portfolios is not significantly different from zero.33 Grundy and Martin (2001, 
p.49) come to a similar conclusion for a two factor model (with the excess return on an equal-
weighted market portfolio as the first factor and the difference in returns in the first and tenth 
deciles of equity values as the second factor) by regressing the realization of factor ݆ in month ݐ 
on the cumulative factor realization during the formation period and a constant. 
 
In summary, Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Grundy and 
Martin (2001) find almost zero serial covariation in returns 34  on the Fama-French factor 
mimicking portfolios and on the equal-weighted market index. Hence, according to the findings, 
the second component in Equation (7) does not seem to be a driver of the profitability of 
momentum strategies. However, some (e.g. Grundy and Martin, 2001, p.72) argue it might be 
possible that the right cross-sectional risk factors have not yet been detected and that the serial 
covariance in these factors is the main driver of momentum returns.
3.2.4. Momentum due to Serial Correlation in Industry Return Components 
According to the decomposition of momentum profits in Equation (7), the third component is  ? ߪఏ೘H?ܥ݋ݒ൫ݖH?H?H?H?ǡ ݖ ?H?൯H?H?H?  and represents serial covariance in industry return components. 
The work of Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) is the most important paper claiming that this 
component is the main driver of the individual momentum phenomenon. They show that for 
NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq stocks between 1963 and 1995, an industry momentum strategy 
yields profits that are identical in magnitude compared to the profits of an individual momentum 
strategy35. Industry momentum returns are obtained by sorting 20 industry portfolios (in which 
stocks of the same industry are value weighted) according to their past six-month returns. The 

33ܥ݋ݒ ቀൣܴH?െ Hܴ?൧H?ǡ ൣܴH?െ Hܴ?൧H?H?H?ቁ ൌ െ ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ?,ܥ݋ݒሺܵܯܤH?ǡ ܵܯܤH?H?H?ሻ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ?andܥ݋ݒሺܪܯܮH?ǡ ܪܯܮH?H?H?ሻ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ? and 
the serial correlation is -0.038 for the excess market portfolio, 0.102 for the SMB portfolio and 0.061 for the HML portfolio 
(Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999, p.1262). 
34
 To be specific, the mentioned returns are consecutive nonoverlapping six-month returns. 
35
 This individual momentum strategy ranks stocks based on their past six-month performance, buys the top 30 percent of stocks, 
and sells the bottom 30 percent of stocks. Assets are value-weighted and held for an investment period of six months. Moskowitz 
and Grinblatt (1999) follow Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and use the “overlapping holding period” technique presented in 
Chapter 2. 
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strategy is long in the top three industries and short in the bottom three industries. Within the 
portfolio, industries are equally weighted.  
 
The finding that industry momentum strategies are as profitable as individual momentum 
strategies does not necessarily mean that (industry and/or individual) momentum profits are 
driven by the third term in Equation (7) and might also be caused by the variation in expected 
returns across industries36. With a decomposition similar to that in Equation (5), Moskowitz and 
Grinblatt (1999) document that the cross-sectional variation in industry mean returns and the 
factor serial correlation is small which implies that the serial correlation in industry components 
does mainly contribute to industry momentum profits. 
 
To exclude the possibility that the industry momentum effect is generated by individual stock 
momentum returns, Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) use the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and 
Wermers (1997), henceforth DGTW, adjustments in order to show that industry momentum 
profits do exist after accounting for individual stock momentum profits: Individual stock returns 
are adjusted for size, book-to-market equity and for individual momentum profits. Whereas 
DGTW-adjusted profits are not significantly different from zero for individual stock returns, 
DGTW-industry momentum profits (measured using the DGTW-adjusted individual stock 
returns) are still significantly positive.37  
 
To show that the third term of Equation 7 does also explain the profitability of individual 
momentum strategies, Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) analyze the contribution of the four 
potential sources to momentum profits according to the decomposition profits in Equation (7). 
Whereas Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) document that serial covariance in factor portfolios is 
almost zero and the dispersion in average mean returns 38  is negligible, the firm-specific 
component might also drive momentum profits. To show that the fourth component in Equation 
(8) is not the main determinant, Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) report industry-adjusted 

36
 Industry momentum returns cannot be caused by the firm-specific component (the last term of Equation 7) since well-
diversified portfolios do not exhibit substantial firm-specific risk. 
37
 DGTW-adjusted profits are only used for the investment period, but not for the formation period. To form portfolios, past raw 
returns are taken. Hence, the “winner” and “loser” stock selection remains the same. 
38
 As mentioned earlier, in contrast to Equation (7), in the study of Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), mean returns are assumed 
constant over time. 
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individual stock momentum profits (that are also adjusted for size and BE/ME39), ܴH?ǡH?H?H?ǡH?ǡ that are 
defined as follows (Moskowitz and Grinblatt; 1999, Equation 15): 
ܴH?ǡH?H?H?ǡH?ؠ ܴH?ǡH?H?H?െ ܴH?ǡH?H?H?݅ B? ܫሺ ?ሻ
where ܴH?ǡH?H?H? is size and BE/ME characteristic-adjusted return of stock ݅ (following Daniel and 
Titman, 1997) and ܴH?ǡH?H?H? is the size- and book-to-market adjusted return on industry ܫ. The size-, 
BE/ME-, and industry-adjusted profits generated by the individual momentum strategy can be 
written as (analogue to Moskowitz and Grinblatt 1999, Equation 16):40 
 ?ܰ෍ ܧൣ൫ܴH?ǡH?H?H?െ ܴH?ǡH?H?H?൯൫ܴH?ǡH?H?H?െ തܴH?H?H?൯൧H?H?H?H? ൌ ෍ ߪఉೖH?ܥ݋ݒ൫ H݂�?H?H?H?ǡ H݂�?H?൯H?H�?H? ൅  ?ܰ෍ ܥ݋ݒ൫݁H?ǡH?H?H?ǡ ݁ ?ǡH?൯H?H?H?H? ሺ ? ?ሻ
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) find only negligible profits for the individual stock momentum 
strategy when returns are adjusted for size, BE/ME and industry effects.41 Since the first term on 
the right hand side in Equation (10) is shown to be zero (see Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999, 
pp.1259 and Section 3.2.3), this finding indicates that ܥ݋ݒ൫݁H?ǡH?H?H?ǡ ݁ ?ǡH?൯ must also be zero. Hence, 
individual momentum seems to be primarily driven by the serial covariance in industry 
components.42 

39
 This is done to control for potential dispersion of mean returns across industries. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) show that 
this adjustment does not significantly reduce individual momentum profits (pp.1263). 
40
 Since the returns are size-, BE/ME-, and industry adjusted, the decomposition in Equation (10) does not include the first term 
of Equation (7) (the cross-sectional dispersion in mean returns) as well as the third term of Equation (7) (the serial covariance in 
industry components). 
41
 Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) further examine this finding with Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions and 
document that industry momentum strategies do capture the profits for individual stock momentum except for the 12-month-
individual relative-strength strategies (see Moskowitz and Grinblatt 1999, pp.1278). 
42
 This point is further examined by Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999): They form “random” industry portfolios where each stock 
in industry I is replaced by another stock that had a similar past six-month performance. Momentum profits are nonexistent for 
these “random” industry portfolios. This is further evidence that individual stock momentum is mainly driven by industry 
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The theory of Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) is confronted with substantial opposition (Grundy 
and Martin, 2001, Chordia and Shivakumar, 2002 and Nijman et al., 2004). Grundy and Martin 
(2001, p.31) argue that the profits to industry momentum portfolios is due to an intra-industry 
lead-lag effect and that it is too early to conclude that “the true industry [is] the important 
component behind momentum profits” (Moskowitz and Grinblatt 1999, p.1268). They find that 
much of the observed industry momentum profit arises in the first month immediately following 
the formation period. In their study, industry momentum profits are compared to a value-
weighted “random” industry strategy, which replaces each asset in industry ܫ with another asset 
that has a similar past six-month performance. This method ensures that each “random” industry 
portfolio includes stocks from various industries, but has the same momentum attributes than the 
real industry momentum portfolio. Therefore, if momentum is only driven by industry 
components, the “random” industry portfolio should not exhibit any profits. Grundy and Martin 
(2001) use NYSE and AMEX stocks between 1963 and 1995 and focus on strategies with a six-
month formation and a one-month investment period. Once included a one-month skip between 
the formation and investment period to control for short-term reversals, neither the industry 
momentum strategies nor the “random” industry strategies are profitable and the difference in the 
profits of the two strategies is insignificant. Yet, repeating these tests without a skip month, 
Grundy and Martin (2001) show that industry momentum portfolios yield significant returns 
whereas “random” industry ones do not and that the return difference between both a 
significantly different from zero. Thus, this implies that the returns in the month immediately 
following the formation period are crucial to determine whether the (value-weighted) industry 
momentum portfolio outperforms the “random” industry momentum portfolio. 43  Therefore, 
Grundy and Martin (2001) suppose that industry momentum profits are driven by lead-lag 
effects. 
 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999, p.1279) show that industry momentum profits are nearly 
unaffected by lead-lag effects measured by size, liquidity or microstructure effects 44. Although 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) have to admit that momentum may be generated by other lead-

components. The importance of industry components for the profitability is also shown by forming industry-neutral portfolios 
(see Moskowitz and Grinblatt 1999, pp.1267). 
43
 Grundy and Martin (2001) however have to admit that the real industry momentum portfolio significantly outperforms the 
“random” industry portfolio when equal-weighted strategies are compared. Yet, when equal-weighted, the “random industry” 
portfolio does exhibit significant returns in non-January month what is at odds with the theory that momentum is exclusively due 
to serial covariation in industry components. 
44
 Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) refer to the working paper of Grundy and Martin from 1999, which was however not 
published before 2001 in the Review of Financial Studies. 
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lag relations than size, liquidity or microstructure effects, they do not view industry momentum 
to be a spurious finding (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999, p.1279). 
 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) also doubt the findings of Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) and 
claim that data mining is the reason for the profitability of industry momentum strategies. To 
examine whether individual momentum is subsumed by industry momentum returns, Chordia 
and Shivakumar (2002, pp.1007) follow Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) and calculate the 
difference between raw returns of individual stocks and their industry returns; these industry-
adjusted stock returns are used to form momentum portfolios. Yet, in contrast to Moskowitz and 
Grinblatt (1999), Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) employ a different data sample and limit their 
tests to stocks that experienced more extreme returns during the formation period: While 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) include Nasdaq stocks in their sample and construct momentum 
portfolios that are long in the top 30 percent and short in the bottom 30 percent, Chordia and 
Shivakumar (2002) use only NYSE and AMEX stocks for their research and form portfolios that 
are long in the top decile and short in the bottom decile. The findings of Chordia and 
Shivakumar (2002) conflict the observations of Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999): Between 1951 
and 1994, momentum profits remain significantly positive even after adjusting for industry 
returns. This leads them to the conclusion that industry momentum and individual stock 
momentum are two distinct and independent phenomena. 
 
Nijman et al. (2004) also do not support the hypothesis that intermediate-term stock price 
continuation is subsumed by industry momentum. For a data sample of European stocks between 
1990 and 2000, they determine the influence of country, industry and individual momentum on 
the intermediate-term stock price continuation effect with the help of a portfolio-based 
regression technique.45 
3.2.5. Momentum due to Serial Correlation in Firm-specific Components 
With Grundy and Martin (2001) and Nijman et al. (2004), two papers view serial covariation in 
firm-specific components as the main determinant of the momentum effect since both studies fail 
to identify other (risk-related) sources. Grundy and Martin (2001) compare profits of a total 
return momentum strategy to two momentum strategies with different ranking criteria. Each 
strategy sorts stocks according to its specific ranking criterion and attributes the top decile of 

45
 The study and the portfolio-based regression technique of Nijman et al. (2004) is presented in Subsection 3.2.5. 
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stocks to the winner portfolio and the bottom decile to the loser portfolio. The ranking period is 
between ݐ െ  ? and ݐ െ  ?. The first alternate strategy is called the “factor related return 
momentum strategy”. It sorts stocks based on an estimate of the factor components of the 
ranking period returns. The second alternate strategy is named the “stock-specific return 
momentum strategy” and sorts stocks according to an estimate, which is a component of the 
ranking period returns in excess of the three Fama-French (1993) factors. 
 
To implement the two strategies, the parameters of the following variation of the Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor model have to be estimated. The following regression is undertaken 
for each investment month ݐ and for each NYSE and AMEX stock ݅. It is conducted over a 
period between ߬ ൌ maxሺݐ െ  ? ?ǡ ݐ െfirst observationሻ and ߬ ൌ ݐ െ  ? or over a time window of 
at least 36 months between ݐ െ  ? ? and ݐ െ  ? (Grundy and Martin 2001, p.64): 
ܴH?ǡఛൌ ߙH?ǡH?ܦఛ ൅ ߙH?ǡH?ሺ ? െ ܦఛሻ ൅ ߚH?ܴH?H?൅ ݏH?ܵܯܤఛ ൅ ݄H?ܪܯܮఛ ൅ ݁H?ǡఛǡሺ ? ?ሻ
where 
ܦఛ ൌ ൜ ?ǡ ߬ B?ሼݐ െ  ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ݐ െ  ?Ǣሽ ?ǡ ǡ 
ݎH?ǡఛ is the return on stock ݅ in excess of the risk free rate, ݎH?H? represents the excess return on the 
Fama-French market index in month ߬, ܵܯܤఛ (Small minus Big) is the return on the size factor, 
and ܪܯܮఛ (High minus Low) is the return on a distress factor. The “stock specific return 
momentum strategy” ranks stocks according to the estimate of ߙH?ǡH? whereas the “factor-related 
return momentum strategy” chooses winner and loser stocks based on  ? ൫ߚመH?ܴH?ǡఛ൅H?H?H?ఛH?H?H?ݏƸH?ܵܯܤఛ ൅ ෠݄H?ܪܯܮఛ൯. For their data sample between 1965 and 1995, Grundy and Martin (2001) 
find that the “stock-specific return strategy” generates marginally higher profits than the total 
return strategy and notably larger returns than the “factor related return strategy”.  
 
This finding leads Grundy and Martin (2001) to the conclusion that the profitability of the 
momentum effect is (at least in part) driven by momentum in the stock-specific component of 
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returns.46 Grundy and Martin (2001) define the “stock-specific component” as the component of 
returns that is not related to the Fama-French factor realization. However, this part might also 
include exposure to common factors not captured by the Fama-French model. To be more 
precise, this term should be called the “non-Fama-French-factor-related component of returns”. 
 
Like Grundy and Martin (2001), Nijman et al. (2004) also find empirical evidence that 
momentum is driven by idiosyncratic stock effects. Analyzing 1581 large European stocks 
between 1990 and 2000, they employ a portfolio-based regression technique in order to evaluate 
the influence of country, industry and individual momentum on the intermediate-term stock price 
continuation effect. Compared to the traditional methods, this technique has two major 
advantages: First, traditional sorting approaches might produce imprecise estimates when stocks 
are sorted based on numerous characteristics since they deliver many cells (portfolios) with only 
few observations. Therefore, results might be distorted by idiosyncratic firm effects. The 
portfolio-based regression technique, however, produces more precise results as it requires 
ranking on at most two dimensions even if a larger number of characteristics are investigated. 
This will become obvious in the light of the portfolio-based regression equation below. 
Secondly, more powerful and reliable tools are available for the regressions technique than for 
the traditional methods to compare the influence of different effects on the momentum effect. 
Using the double sort or the two-way sort, the relative importance of effects can only be 
measured by comparing the average returns of sorted portfolios. In contrast, for the regression 
technique, several widely used statistical methods are available and can be employed to compare 
the influence of effects on the momentum phenomenon. 
 
Following this regression method, Nijman et al. (2004, p.475) distinguish country (COU), 
industry (IND) and individual stock (STOCK) momentum and use the following regression 
equation:  
ܴH?H?H?H? ൌ ߙ ൅ ෍ ߚH?H?H?H?H?H?H?H? ܺH?H?ሺܽǡȉǡȉሻ൅ ෍ ߚH?H?H?H?H?H?H?H? ܺH?H?ሺȉǡ ܾǡȉሻ൅ ෍ ߚH?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H? ܺH?H?ሺȉǡȉǡ ܿሻ ൅ ߝH?H?H?H? ǡሺ ? ?ሻ

46
 Empirically, patterns in stock price reactions to firm-specific information are also documented in the work of Bernard (1992), 
Chan et al. (1996) and La Porta (1996). 
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where ܴH?H?H?H?  is the expected return on portfolio݌in period ݐ ൅  ?. ܺH?H? denotes the holdings of 
portfolio ݌ in a specific momentum portfolio. For example, ܺH?H?ሺܽǡȉǡȉሻ represents the share of 
stocks in portfolio ݌ that is included in the country momentum portfolio ܽ . There are three 
country-momentum portfolios (second term on the right-hand side), three industry momentum 
portfolios (third term) and ten individual momentum portfolios (forth term). The last termߝH?H?H?H?  is 
assumed to be uncorrelated with the regressors by construction. ߙ is the expected return on a 
reference portfolio in which stocks are included that are in the bottom country ሺܽ ൌ  ?), bottom 
industry ሺܾ ൌ  ?ሻ  and bottom individual stock ሺܿ ൌ  ?ሻ  momentum portfolio. The additional 
expected return of portfolio ݌  for being in another momentum portfolio than the reference 
portfolio is captured in the parameters ߚH?H?H?, ߚH?H?H? and ߚH?H?H?H?H?. With the estimated betas, one 
can determine the expected return of an individual stock being in specific momentum portfolios. 
For example, the expected return of a stock that is in the bottom country, bottom industry and 
bottom individual stock momentum portfolio yields a return of ߙ. The expected return of a stock 
however, that is in the top country and the top industry and the top individual momentum 
portfolio consists of ߙ plus the country winner return ߚH?H?H?H? plus the industry winner return ߚH?H?H?H? 
plus the individual winner return ߚH?H?H?H?H?H?. 
 
Using this portfolio-based regression technique, Nijman et al. (2004) find for their available 
dataset that the momentum phenomenon is primarily driven by individual momentum which 
accounts for about 55 percent (ߚH?H?H?H?H?H?H?ൌ  ?ǡ ? ?), while industry momentum with about 30 percent 
(ߚH?H?H?H?ൌ  ?ǡ ? ?) and country momentum with 10 percent (ߚH?H?H?H?ൌ  ?ǡ ? ?) have only a weak effect. 
In order to ensure that these results are not driven by size and value effects, these are also 
included in the model, but the conclusion of Nijman et al.(2004) that industry and country effects 
do not explain momentum remains unchanged (Nijman et al., 2004, p.477). In summary, Nijman 
et al. (2004) view these results as evidence for idiosyncratic stock effects to be the driving force 
behind the momentum effect. 
 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002, pp.1016) however present evidence against the thesis that the 
momentum phenomenon is generated by serial covariation in the firm-specific returns. Using a 
simple return-generating process, they measure the serial correlation (ߩ) in the firm-specific 
components of returns, but cannot find plausible estimates for ߩ  in their sample. Therefore, 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) consider it unlikely that the forth term in Equation (7) is the 
main driver of momentum profits. Lewellen (2004) also do not attribute momentum to firm-
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specific returns. They form size and B/M portfolios and document that these portfolios do exhibit 
momentum as strong as (and in some cases even stronger than) individual stock momentum or 
industry momentum. Since the size and B/M portfolios contain on average 350 stocks for the 
sample period 1941-1999, they can be considered as well diversified. Therefore, they conclude 
that these portfolios should not contain much idiosyncratic risk. As the returns of size and B/M 
portfolios reflect systematic risk, momentum seems not to be driven by firm-specific news 
(Lewellen, 2002, p.538). 
3.2.6 Summary 
In this section, attempts to explain the momentum phenomenon with the classical rational 
approach are presented. Based on a simple return-generating model, momentum profits are 
decomposed in four potential components (Equation 7) and the studies are classified into one of 
the four categories. It becomes clear that researchers have not yet come to an agreement about 
the main driver of relative-strength profits. Table 3 gives an overview about the main studies 
examining the relevance of the four components proposed by Equation (7) on the profitability of 
momentum strategies. 
 
So far, attempts to explain the momentum phenomenon with risk factors have been made. 
However, this seems to be a “tremendously difficult task” (Nagel, 2001, p.1). Since this effort 
seems so unpromising “that asset pricing theories have mostly seen the task as simply one of 
deciding which sort of investor irrationality is at work” (Johnson, 2002, p.585). This field of 
explanation will be discussed in further detail in the next section.  
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Table 3 
Overview of the Main Rational-based Studies 
 
This table gives an overview about the papers finding support for or against one of the four potential components of momentum 
profits from Equation (7). 
 
 First component ૚ ࡺ ?  ?൫ࣆ࢏ǡ࢚H?૚െࣆഥ࢚H?૚൯൫ࣆ࢏ǡ࢚െࣆഥ࢚൯ࡺ࢏H?૚  Second component  ? ࣌ࢼ࢑૛ ࡯࢕࢜൫ࢌ࢑ǡ࢚H?૚ǡ ࢌ࢑ǡ࢚൯ࡸ࢑H?૚ . Third component  ? ࣌ࣂ࢓૛ ࡯࢕࢜൫ࢠ࢓ǡ࢚H?૚ǡ ࢠ࢓ǡ࢚൯ࡹ࢓H?૚  Forth component ૚ ࡺ ?  ?࡯࢕࢜൫ࢋ࢏ǡ࢚H?૚ǡ ࢋ࢏ǡ࢚൯ࡺ࢏H?૚  
Support 
Conrad/Kaul (1998)   Moskowitz/Grinblatt (1999) Conrad/Kaul (2001) 
Berk et al. (1999)   O’Neal (2000) Nijman et al. (2004) 
Chordia/Shivakumar (2002)   Swinkels (2002) Scowcroft/Sefton (2005): 
Johnson et al. (2002) Scowcroft/Sefton (2005):  (for small stocks) 
Avramov et al. (2007)    (for large stocks)   
Contradiction 
Moskowitz/Grinblatt (1999) Jegadeesh/Titman (1993) Chordia/Shivakumar (2002) Chordia/Shivakumar (2002) 
Jegdeesh/Titman (2001) Moskowitz/Grinblatt (1999) Grundy/Martin (2001) Lewellen (2002) 
Grundy/Martin (2001) Grundy/Martin (2001) Lewellen (2002)   
Lewellen (2002)   Nijman et al. (2004)   
Griffin et al. (2003)       
Cooper et al. (2004)       
 
 
3.3. Behavioral Explanation Attempts 
3.3.1 Overview 
In the traditional finance literature, there are no frictions and subjects are assumed Rationality 
first implies that agents update their beliefs in a correct manner according to the Bayes’ law after 
the arrival of new information. Secondly, rationality means that, given their beliefs, agents make 
choices that are consistent with Savage’s idea of Subjective Expected Utility (Barberis and 
Thaler, 2002, p.2). Within this framework, a stock’s price is the discounted sum of expected cash 
flows, investors process all available information correctly when forming expectations and the 
discount rate is a preference specification that is normatively acceptable (Barberis and Thaler, 
2002, p.3). This hypothesis that actual prices reflect fundamental values is called the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (EMH). Under this theory, an investment strategy cannot yield an average 
return that exceeds the required compensation for risk. 
 
The behavioral finance theory states that asset prices partially deviate from fundamental value 
and that these deviations are due to investors acting not fully rational. Supporters of this field 
argue that models in which not all agents are assumed rational might help to understand at least 
some financial phenomena. Hence, since agents are included in behavioral models that display 
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human limitations and complications, the behavioral finance theory can be considered as a 
combination of psychology and economics (Mullainathan and Thaler, 2000, p.1). In other words, 
behavioral finance examines what happens when one or both assumptions of rationality are 
relaxed: whereas in some models, agents make choices that are not consistent with Subjective 
Expected Utility, other models include agents that do not adequately update their beliefs.47 
 
The existing behavioral theories on stock price momentum only question the first implication of 
rationality and include (at least some) traders that do not correctly update their beliefs. It can be 
divided into two groups. The first one claims that the continuation effect is due to traders’ initial 
underreaction to news whereas the second group of models posits that momentum is caused by 
traders’ initial overreaction to news. However, the basic idea of all models is that investors do 
not correctly interpret and react to new information. The link between theses behavioral models 
and the observed price momentum effect is that extreme past returns indicate on the arrival of 
new information. 
 
In the following subsections, it is shown that the behavioral literature has produced four different 
and contrasting main hypotheses why the momentum phenomenon exists. The first and the 
second hypothesis fall into the first group and view momentum as an initial underreaction 
phenomenon. The third hypothesis is related to the second group and predicts that momentum is 
generated by overreaction. The last behavioral hypothesis reconciles the underreaction and the 
overreaction idea of the two groups and states that momentum might be either an underreaction 
or an overreaction phenomenon. Whether it is the first or the last effect depends on the trading 
level. To the best of my knowledge, this sorting approach is new and first classifies the different 
behavioral approaches into different groups. These are presented in the following four 
subsections. 
  

47
 For a general review about the stand of behavioral finance literature, see Fuller (2000), Hirschleifer (2001), Barberis and 
Thaler (2002) and Subrahmanyam (2008). 
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3.3.2. Momentum – An Initial Underreaction Phenomenon 
The first behavioral hypothesis why stock price momentum strategies are profitable can be 
formulated as follows: 
 
H1: Momentum is generated by an initial underreaction followed by a correction 
 
Underreaction is defined by Barberis et al. (1998, pp.310) as follows: Suppose that in period ݐ, 
an investor gets information about a stock, which is denoted with ݒH?. The news can be either 
good (ݒH?ൌ ܩሻor bad (ݒH?ൌ ܤሻ. Underreaction means that in time ݐ, good (bad) news are not 
correctly incorporated into the stock price: Initially after the announcement of good (bad) news, 
the stock price increases (decreases) less than it should. This is corrected in ݐ ൅  ? with a higher 
return (lower return) of the stock. In other words, in terms of stock performance in the period 
following the announcement (ݐ ൅  ?), underreaction is present if the average return of a stock in ݐ ൅  ? is larger after the announcement of good news than the average return in ݐ ൅  ? after the 
announcement of bad news: 
ܧሺܴH?H?H?ȁݒH?ൌ ܩሻ ൐ ܧሺܴH?H?H?ȁݒH?ൌ ܤሻሺ ? ?ሻ
Barberis et al. (1998, p.1313) define overreaction in a similar but not analogue way. 
Overreaction means that the average return of a stock in ݐ ൅  ? is smaller after the announcement 
of a series of good news than after the announcement of a series of bad news about the stock: 
ܧ൫ܴH?H?H?หݒH?ൌ ܩǡ ݒH?H?H?ൌ ܩǡ ǥ ǡ ݒH?H?H?ൌ ܩ൯ ൏ ܧ൫ܴH?H?H?หݒH?ൌ ܤǡ ݒH?H?H?ൌ ܤǡ ǥ ǡ ݒH?H?H?ൌ ܤ൯ǡሺ ? ?ሻ
where ݆ is at least one. 
 
Barberis et al. (1998) contribute to the examination of the above hypothesis and present a model 
in which investors make systematic errors when they forecast future cash flows using public 
information. With conservatism and representativeness, two psychological phenomena are 
incorporated in the framework. Conservatism implies that individuals change their beliefs only 
very slowly after the arrival of new evidence (Edwards, 1968). For example in the light of good 
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earnings announcements by a firm, conservatism means that the price of the firm rises too little 
since investors do not react sufficiently to the news. As Barberis’ (1998) definition of 
underreaction in Equation (12) implies, the asset’s price is then below its fundamental value 
which leads to higher subsequent returns and hence to price momentum. 
 
The second psychological phenomenon included in the model is representativeness: “A person 
who follows this heuristic evaluates the probability of an uncertain event, or a sample, by the 
degree to which it is (i) similar in its essential properties to the parent population, (ii) reflects 
the salient features of the process by which it is generated” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 
p.33). Although representativeness is often very helpful, it might generate two severe biases: 
base rate neglect and sample size neglect.48 An important aspect of representativeness heuristic 
for the following model is that people observe patterns in sequences that are in fact purely 
random, a finding discussed in detail by Kahneman and Tversky (1974). This leads to 
overreaction as defined in Equation (15): When a firm has published good earnings for many 
periods, people might believe that the series of good earnings in the past is representative of an 
earnings growth potential in the future. While such a sequence of good earning news might be 
nothing more than a random draw that is unlikely to repeat itself again, people believe to see a 
pattern that will persist. Hence, they overestimate the growth potential and push the price of the 
firm too high. In the future, they will be disappointed when earnings do not grow as much as 
they have assumed what results in long-term reversals. According to Barberis et al. (1998, 
p.316), this is what overreaction is all about. 
 
Barberis et al. (1998) include these psychological phenomena – conservatism and 
representativeness – in a model with a single representative investor that is risk neutral. Earnings 
are assumed to follow a random walk. This is not know by the investors who believes that, at any 
time, one of two regimes can predict future earnings: a “mean-reverting” state in which earnings 
revert to their mean and a “trending” state in which earnings trend, i.e., have a high probability to 

48
 To understand the bias base rate neglect, consider an experiment of Kahneman and Tversky (1974, p.1125): People get a 
detailed description of the personality of an individual, which is quite similar to the description of an individual belonging to a 
particular profession. When asked to estimate the probability that the person belongs to that profession, people significantly 
overestimated its probability in the experiment. Hence, while they overweight the representative description, they put too little 
weight on the base rate evidence that only a small number of people belong to that profession (see also Barberis and Thaler, 
2002, p.13). The second bias induced by representativeness is sample size neglect. For instance, people might judge a financial 
analyst to be successful after he had recommended three stocks that generated high returns afterwards. Yet, it is obvious that a 
sample of three is not representative of a good or a bad analyst. A famous example for representativeness is the “hot hand“ 
phenomenon: After a basketball player made three shots in a row, some sports fans believe that he will score again although data 
give no evidence for a hot hand (Gilovich et al., 1985). 
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rise further after an increase. The phenomenon of representativeness is included in the model 
through the “trending-regime” as it is assumed that the investor sees a trend in the earnings 
announcement sequence that in fact is random. The “mean-reverting” regime captures 
conservatism as the investor puts too little weight on the latest earnings announcement piece 
relative to its prior believe. Hence, after the arrival of good news, the investor believes that part 
of the shock will be reversed in the subsequent period. Having this in mind, she underreacts to 
new information as it is implied by conservatism. Given these two regimes, the investor thinks 
that the two regimes change exogenously and sees her task in learning whether earnings are 
generated by the first or the second regime. 
 
In summary, Barberis et al. (1998) show that conservatism and the representativeness heuristic 
can generate momentum returns and long-term reversals.49 Since in the model, momentum is due 
to traders’ underreaction to news induced by conservatism, the work of Barberis et al. (1998) can 
be linked to behavioral hypothesis H1, which states that momentum is driven by initial 
underreaction and subsequent correction. 
 
One might argue that it is not necessary to discuss representativeness heuristic and its influence 
on stock returns in this work as it leads to long-term reversals, which is not directly linked to 
momentum – the topic of this study. However, the model implies that intermediate-term 
momentum and long-term reversal are closely linked. Barberis et al. (1998) show that for a wide 
range of parameter values, both underreaction and overreaction is commonly present in the 
model. Whether momentum and long-term reversals are parts of the same phenomenon is 
heavily discussed in the literature (see Section 4 for further details). 
 
Doukas and McKnight (2005)50 find empirical support for the theory of Barberis et al. (1998) 
that investors exhibit conservatism and fail to update their beliefs adequately. In order to 
examine this psychological phenomenon empirically, Doukas and McKnight (2005) refer to 
another description of conservatism. According to Griffin and Tversky (1992), investors do not 
adequately take the “weight” of news into consideration: In an experiment, they show that people 
evaluate new information based on its strength (upward or downward changes that is implied by 
the new information) and on its weight (the credibility of the new information). In these terms, 

49
 Barberis et al. (1998) also show that the two psychological phenomena can also generate post-earnings announcements and 
cross-sectional forecasting power for scaled-price ratios. However, this does only play a minor role for the topic of this work. 
50
 The relevance of the Barberis et al. (1998) model is also examined for option markets: Poteshman (2001) finds evidence for 
such an expectation formation process presented by Barberis et al. (1998) in these markets. 
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conservatism means that people underreact to news with high weights (Barberis and Thaler, 
2002, p.13-14). Based on this definition, Doukas and McKnight (2005) test whether investors 
underestimate high-weight news. As a proxy for weight of information, dispersion in analysts’ 
earnings forecast is employed which reflects uncertainty about the future economic performance 
of a firm (Barron et al., 1998, p.422). Based on Griffin and Tversky’s (1992) description of 
conservatism momentum profits should be larger for stocks with low analyst dispersion (and 
hence higher weight of information) as lower dispersion strengthens the credibility of analyst’s 
earnings forecasts. Doukas and McKnight (2005) find evidence for the conjecture that 
momentum is the result of investors’ psychological conservatism using a sample of 3,084 stocks 
for 13 European countries. 
 
In the studies of Barberis et al. (1998) and Doukas and MacKnight (2005), a weakness of the 
behavioral finance approach becomes obvious: presenting empirical evidence for the theories 
and assumptions. It is difficult to provide empirical support for the behavioral patterns 
conservatism and representativeness heuristic on which the model of Barberis et al. (1998) builds 
on. First, a proxy such as dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecast might not necessarily have a 
connection to the respective behavioral pattern and could stand for other effects than these 
phenomena as well (e.g. it might represent compensation for uncertainty or risk). Secondly, it is 
often the case that a variable employed to proxy a behavioral heuristic does not have the power 
to completely explain the existence of the momentum effect and capture at most only a part of its 
profits. For example, Doukas and MacKnight (2005) can only show that momentum strategies 
“work better” (p.337) for stocks with low analyst coverage than for all stocks. 
 
Beside Barberis et al. (1998), with Hong and Stein (1999), a second important model exists that 
supports behavioral hypothesis H1. While Barberis et al. (1998) use a representative agent model 
in order to construct an asset-price continuation and reversal framework, Hong and Stein (1999) 
take a different approach and focus on heterogeneous traders that interact with one another. In 
this model, two types of agents are present: “news watchers” and “momentum traders”. Each 
type is assumed boundedly rational and able to process only a part of the available public 
information: News watchers depend exclusively on private information whereas momentum 
traders solely consider past price changes for their trading activity. A second key assumption in 
the model is that news watchers learn about private information only gradually. It leads to a 
setting where news watchers underreact to private information. This attracts the second group of 
investors, momentum traders trying to exploit this underreaction effect with a simple arbitrage 
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strategy. Their trading activity leads to an eventual overreaction to news. In the long run, prices 
revert to their fundamental levels. Consequently, in the model of Hong and Stein (1999), gradual 
diffusion of private information in combination with the inability of news watchers to get this 
information from prices leads to return continuation. As Barberis et al. (1998), Hong and Stein 
(1999) propose a model that considers intermediate-term momentum and long-term reversals to 
be part of the same phenomenon. This is especially doubted by studies supporting the behavioral 
hypothesis H3 (see below). 
 
Three key implications can be extracted from this theoretical work. First, according to the model, 
intermediate-term momentum and long-term reversals should be stronger in stocks for which 
information diffusion takes place more slowly. Secondly, initially private news should cause a 
more long-run overreaction than public news announcements. Third, return autocorrelations and 
momentum traders’ horizon should be related. The model proposes that the longer the trading 
horizon of momentum traders the longer autocorrelations need to switch from positive to 
negative. 
 
The first implication of Hong and Stein’s (1999) model is tested empirically by the work of 
Hong et al. (2000). They examine whether intermediate-term stock price momentum is in fact 
stronger in stocks for which information diffuses only slowly. Hong et al. (2000) chose two 
measures for information diffusion: Firm size and analyst coverage. They argue that firm size is 
a plausible variable for the speed of information diffusion as information get out more slowly for 
small stocks. This can be explained by investors having fixed costs of information acquisition. 
Therefore, they prefer to focus on larger stocks in which they can invest more. However, firm 
size also captures other things than the speed of information (see e.g. Merton, 1987, Grossmann 
and Miller, 1988). For example, market making might be thinner for stocks with lower market 
capitalization. Hence, supply shocks for smaller stocks could lead to a greater reversal tendency, 
which masks the slow information diffusion effect. Further, if arbitrage capacity is less in small-
capitalization stocks, the importance of gradual information diffusion might be overstated since 
less arbitrage means that any behavioral driver of momentum has a stronger effect on smaller 
stocks. As a second measure for the rate of information diffusion, Hong et al. (2000) employ 
“analyst coverage”. It is argued that it takes more time until firm specific information diffuse 
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across the public if no or only few analysts report on a stock. To be precise, in order to have a 
purer proxy, their “analyst coverage” measure is controlled for size51.  
 
Their findings support the hypothesis. Hong et al. (2000) use a NYSE/AMEX sample between 
1980 and 1996 and sort stocks independently by their past six month returns and by firm size. 
They show that apart from the very smallest stocks, a negative relationship exists between 
momentum returns and market capitalization. In a second set of tests, they check whether 
momentum strategies yield higher returns in low-analyst-coverage stocks. Therefore, stocks are 
sorted independently according to their six month past performance and based on their residual 
analyst coverage (measured six month before the start of the ranking period), where the residual 
is obtained from a regression of analyst coverage on firm size. Hong et al. (2000) find support 
for the hypothesis that analyst coverage has explanatory power on momentum profits as they 
observe roughly 60% higher momentum returns for the one-third of stocks with the lowest 
analyst coverage. Moreover, the large momentum effect for small stocks and for stocks with low 
analyst-coverage is mainly driven by loser stocks. This finding represents a further evidence for 
their hypothesis that the momentum effect is larger in stocks with slow information diffusion: 
When firms can publish good news, they have the incentive to report them as quickly as 
possible. In contrast, firm managers are not willing to diffuse bad news at once, so outside 
analysts play a more important role in publishing negative information. 
 
Beside Hong et al. (2000), other studies support the hypothesis implemented by Hong and Stein 
(1999): Doukas and McKnight (2005) chose a similar approach as Hong et al. (2000) and test 
Hong and Stein’s (1999) theory for 13 European markets between 1988 and 2001. Like Hong 
and Stein (2000), they document that gradual diffusion of private information explains 
momentum returns. The work of Chan et al. (1996) gives some evidence that momentum 
strategies yield abnormal returns even after controlling for post earnings announcement drifts. 
This suggests that momentum is at least in part driven by information that is – unlike earnings 
news – not made publicly available to all at once. 
 
In summary, Barberis et al. (1998) show in a model that momentum and long-term reversals are 
driven by two updating biases - conservatism and representativeness – whereas Hong and Stein 
(1999) argue that gradual diffusion of private information generates momentum and reversals. 

51
 This proxy also might be endogenously related to other stock-specific factors apart from size. The correlation between analyst 
coverage and share turnover, industry factors, beta and market-to-book is controlled for in various sensitivity tests. 
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Both theoretical studies consider initial underreaction to be the driver of the momentum effect 
and see a link between intermediate-term price momentum and long-term reversals. 
3.3.3. Momentum – A Conditional Underreaction Phenomenon 
The second behavioral hypothesis can be defined as follows: 
 
H2: Momentum is due to underreaction, which depends on a specific level 
 
H2 considerably differs from hypothesis H1 stating that momentum is generated by an initial 
underreaction followed by a correction. While the behavioral hypothesis H1 states that 
momentum is caused by underreaction and by a subsequent overreaction that amplifies the 
continuation effect, hypothesis H2 posits that momentum and reversals are distinct phenomena. 
Further, while hypothesis H1 assumes that momentum arises due to initial underreaction to news, 
hypothesis H2 refines this point and states that the degree of underreaction varies with a specific 
level. Either this level can be a price level such as in Grinblatt and Han (2002) and George and 
Hwang (2004) or it can be a non-price level such as in Zhang (2006). While Grinblatt and Han 
(2002) relate the degree of underreaction to the acquisition price and while George and Hwang 
(2004) present a connection between the degree of underreaction to the 52-week high price of a 
stock, Zhang et al. (2006) document a relationship between the degree of underreaction and the 
level of uncertainty about the impact of news on the stock price. 
 
In the study of George and Hwang (2004), the behavioral explanation behind the hypothesis that 
the degree of underreaction (and hence momentum) is linked to a price level is the “adjustment 
and anchoring bias” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974, p.1128-1130)52  and relates to the way 
subjects form estimates. When people estimate a value, they often begin with an initial value that 
might be derived arbitrarily and then correct it. Kahneman and Tversky show that this correction 
is insufficient. The study of George and Hwang (2004) builds on this finding and hypothesizes 
that subjects use the 52-week high price of a stock (the highest price of a stock within the past 52 
weeks) as an “anchor” when estimating the potential impact of news about a firm on the stock 
price. This piece of information can be assumed to be an anchor as it is publicly available since it 
is regularly published in many newspapers reporting on stocks. When a stock is at or near its 52-
week high price and additional good news arrives, investors strongly underreact to this 

52
 Evidence for the existence of the anchoring bias is also found by Ginsburg and van Ours (2003). 
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information and are unwilling to push the price higher. As the news eventually prevails, the price 
slowly rises towards the stock’s fundamental value and momentum arises. Similarly, when the 
stock price is far from its 52-week high, and additional bad news arrive, investors are not 
prepared to sell the stock at a price as low as the news suggest and underreact as well. Since the 
bad news remains present, the price slowly declines and induces momentum. If however the 
stock trades at a price neither near nor far from the 52-week high price, investors adapt their 
beliefs quickly, which does not lead to an underreaction and hence to a momentum effect for 
those stocks. In other words, the unwillingness of traders to revise their beliefs depends on a 
price level: near and far from the 52-week high the unwillingness is greatest. 
 
George and Hwang (2004) implement a strategy that takes a long position in the 30 percent of 
stocks whose current price is closest to the 52-week high and is short in the 30 percent of stocks 
whose current market price is furthest from the 52-week high. The nearness of the current stock 
price to its 52-week high is measured based on Hܲ?ǡH?H?H?݄݄݅݃H?ǡH?H?H? ?  where ݄݄݅݃H?ǡH?H?H? is the highest 
price of stock ݅ over the last 12 months between ݐ െ  ? ? and ݐ െ  ? and Hܲ?ǡH?H?H? is the stock’s price 
at the end of month ݐ െ  ?. George and Hwang (2004) compare the returns of this strategy to 
Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993) momentum strategy and to Moskowitz and Grinblatt’s (1999) 
industry momentum strategy.53  For the CRSP sample between 1963 and 2001, George and 
Hwang (2004) measure the returns generated by theses three strategies over an investment period 
of 6 and 12 months. Using a two-way sort, George and Hwang (2004) show that the 52-week 
high strategy dominates the momentum and the industry momentum strategy. 
 
The theoretical and empirical findings of Grinblatt and Han (2002) are also in line with the 
behavioral hypothesis H2. In their model, two types of investors trade and determine the market 
price of a risky stock. The first group of investors is assumed rational with a price elastic demand 
function while the second group of investors has a greater tendency to sell stocks in which they 
have a paper gain than to sell stocks in which they have lost money. This behavioral 
phenomenon is called “the disposition effect” (Shefrin and Statman, 1985) and leads to an 
(excess) demand function of “disposition” investors that depends negatively on imbedded capital 
gains, which in turn affects market prices. Disposition investors are less prepared to sell a stock 

53
 Momentum and industry momentum strategies have a raking period of six months. Two different approaches are used to 
compare the three strategies. Both lead to similar results. First, George and Hwang (2004) conduct pairwise nested comparisons 
(a conditional sort): Stocks are ranked according to one criterion in a winner, middle and loser portfolios. Within each portfolio, 
stocks are ranked according to another criterion. If the first criterion is good at prediction, the second criterion should not yield 
significant returns. As a second approach, George and Hwang (2004) use Fama-MacBeth (1973) style cross-sectional regressions 
that allow comparing all three strategies simultaneously. 
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with a paper loss leading to a larger excess demand. However, they have a higher tendency to 
sell stocks with a paper gain, which means a lower excess demand because of the selling 
pressure. Grinblatt and Han (2002) test their hypothesis empirically for all ordinary common 
NYSE and AMEX stocks between 1962 and 1996 and find support that the disposition effect is 
the driving force of momentum returns: It is shown that a variable called “capital gains 
overhang” largely explains price continuation. This variable measures the difference between the 
market price and the acquisition price.  
 
Consistent with George and Hwang (2004), Grinblatt and Han (2002) show that there is a greater 
predictability of future prices for stocks with a price near and far from a long-term high. Both do 
also agree that this is due to a reference point, which traders take into consideration when 
making their trading choices. This “anchor” is however different in the two studies. George and 
Hwang (2004) consider the 52-week high as the reference point against which investors evaluate 
the impact of news. Grinblatt and Han (2002, p.12) in contrast propose that the acquisition price 
serves as an “anchor”. In their model, stocks with a price close or far from the long-term high 
price (e.g. the 52-week high) show a stronger momentum behavior, which is consistent with 
George and Hwang (2004). The idea behind this proposition is that “disposition” investors have 
a lower excess demand function for stocks that trades at or close to a long-term high as many 
investors acquired the stocks for a lower price. If (further) goods news arrives, it is not fully 
incorporated in the stock price at once as the demand of disposition investors is lower or since 
the selling pressure of disposition investors is larger than it would be in rational market. As the 
stock price eventually reverts to its fundamental, it will rise further and generate momentum. A 
similar effect is observed when stock prices are at their long-term low.54 
 
George and Hwang (2004) evaluate both proposed “anchors” and empirically compare their 52-
week high strategy with the method of Grinblatt and Han (2002). For their data sample, they 
show that although Grinblatt and Han’s ranking criterion predicts significant returns, it is clearly 
dominated by the 52-week high strategy (George and Hwang, 2004, pp.2162). 
 
An important implication of the behavioral hypothesis H2 is that the momentum effect and long-
term reversals are distinct phenomena. This is captured in the work of Grinblatt and Han (2002) 

54
 If stock prices are below the investors’ acquisition prices, “disposition” investors have a higher excess demand function 
compared to investors in a fully rational market since their propensity to sell the stock is very low. Therefore, the stock price 
decline will understate the full impact of bad news. As the stock prices decline further and eventually converge to the 
fundamental value, momentum is generated. 
- 52 - 

and George and Hwang (2004). The latter study documents that long-term reversals do not occur 
when stocks are ranked based on the nearness to their 52-week high and based on the acquisition 
price as proposed by Grinblatt and Han (2002). In the literature, long-term reversals are often 
viewed as evidence for intermediate-term overreaction, which is corrected over the longer term. 
The finding of George and Hwang (2004) indicates that momentum profits are explained solely 
due to underreaction and not by a combination of underreaction and a subsequent overreaction. 
This finding puts into question the theoretical approaches of Barberis et al. (1998), Daniel et al. 
(1998) and Hong and Stein (1999) suggesting that intermediate-term momentum and long-term 
reversals are components of the same phenomenon. According to the results of George and 
Hwang (2004) and Grinblatt and Han (2002) momentum and long-term reversals are distinct 
phenomena for which separate models should be implemented. 
 
The behavioral hypothesis H2 also leaves the door open for an underreaction story that depends 
on a level that is not related to a price. Zhang (2006) argues that intermediate-term stock price 
momentum is an underreaction effect that depends on the degree of uncertainty. The main 
hypothesis builds on the idea that stock investors underreact to new information since they suffer 
from behavioral biases (e.g. Chan et al., 1996, Barberis et al., 1998, Hong and Stein, 1998)55. 
According to the psychology literature, behavioral biases are larger when uncertainty is high. 
Based on this insight, Zhang examines whether information uncertainty increases the 
predictability of future expected stock returns: Following good (bad) news, expected stock 
returns are higher (lower) when uncertainty about the impact of new information on stock value 
is greater. To link this idea to the momentum phenomenon, Zhang argues that past losers imply 
bad news and past winners imply good news. As momentum strategies are long in winner and 
short in loser stocks, its profits are expected to increase in information uncertainty. Zhang (2006) 
uses six different measures for information uncertainty. First, firm size is employed since smaller 
firms are generally less diversified than larger ones and since it is expected that less information 
is available for smaller firms. A second proxy is firm age since more information is available for 
companies with a longer firm history. Thirdly, analyst coverage is included as a proxy for 
information uncertainty as analysts collect and distribute firm information to investors. The 
fourth proxy is dispersion in analyst earnings forecast, the fifth one is stock volatility and the 

55
 Zhang (2006, p.109) classifies momentum as an underreaction story. Therefore, this work represents a further evidence for the 
underreaction hypothesis. Yet, Zhang et al. (2006) can also be linked to the model of Daniel et al. (1998, 2001) that sees 
overreaction as the main determinant of the momentum effect. According to Daniel et al. (1998, 2001) and the finding of 
Hirshleifer (2001, p.1575), greater uncertainty about the impact of news on stock value leaves more room for psychological 
biases such as investors’ overconfidence in private information: Firms with greater uncertainty lead investors to be more 
overconfident what increases return predictability. 
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final measure is cash flow volatility. To test the hypothesis for NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq stocks 
between 1983 and 2001, Zhang conducts a two-way nonindependent sort by the type of news 
and by an information uncertainty proxy. For all six measures, evidence for the hypothesis is 
found in the data: Greater information uncertainty leads to higher expected returns following 
goods news and lower expected returns after bad news have arrived. 
 
The studies of Grinblatt and Han (2002), Hwang and George (2004) and Zhang (2006) have in 
common to show that momentum profits are an underreaction phenomenon of which the 
intensity depends on a specific level. Hwang and George (2004) measure this level as the 
distance to the 52-week high, an easily available piece of information, Grinblatt and Han (2002) 
view the acquisition price of the stock as the relevant level while Zhang (2006) argues that it is 
information uncertainty that influences the intensity of underreaction.  
3.3.4. Momentum – An Initial Overreaction Phenomenon 
According to the behavioral hypotheses H1 and H2, momentum is due to traders’ underreaction 
to new information. In contrast, behavioral hypothesis H3 states that the momentum 
phenomenon is an overreaction effect: 
 
H3: Momentum is generated by initial overreaction followed by even more overreaction 
 
It is supported by the theoretical studies of Daniel et al. (1998) and DeLong et al. (1990). While 
the model of Barberis et al. (1998) relies on conservatism and representativeness, Daniel et al. 
(1998) propose two other patterns from psychology as explanation for the momentum effect and 
long-term reversals: overconfidence56 and self-attribution bias. In general, overconfidence means 
that people overestimate their judgment – especially when they have to estimate quantities and 
probabilities (see e.g. Barberis and Thaler, 2002, p.12). DeBondt and Thaler (1995, p.793) state, 
“perhaps the most robust finding in the psychology of judgment is that people are 
overconfident”. In this context, investors are overconfident about their ability to generate and 
analyze information. Investors and analysts can get information for trading through various 
channels such as analyzing financial statements, interpreting rumors and listening to the 

56
 Overconfidence is also used as an explanation for other phenomena: It is argued that overconfidence can explain the observed 
excessive trading volume puzzle (see e.g. the model of Gervais and Odean, 2001, Hirshleifer and Luo, 2001, Scheinkman and 
Xiong, 2003, Chuang and Lee, 2006). Moreover, overconfidence is employed to show that stock prices are more volatile than 
they should be according to the efficient market hypothesis (e.g. Shiller, 1981, Campbell and Cochrane, 1999, Gervais and 
Odean, 2001, Chuang and Lee, 2006). 
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management. This research can be done with different levels of skill. If investors overestimate 
their ability in doing that, they will underestimate forecast errors and overestimate the precision 
of their private information (in contrast to the precision of public information, which are not 
overestimated). When a positive private signal arrives at the investors, they will overweight this 
information and push the stock price too high compared to the fundamental value. With the 
arrival of public information, the deviation of the price from its fundamental value is slowly 
corrected. Daniel et al. (1998) show that this overreaction-correction framework is consistent 
with long-run reversals.  
 
To get a post-earnings effect and a momentum effect, a second psychological phenomenon is 
included in the model: the self-attribution bias. According to the attribution theory (Bem, 1965), 
people tend to attribute the success of their actions to their ability and the failure of their actions 
to sabotage or bad luck. In the model, an investor trades based on her private information. 
Afterwards public information arrives. If it confirms the private signal, the investor’s confidence 
rises, if it does not, she gives les attention to the public information and her confidence falls only 
modestly, if at all. Hence, biased self-attribution implies that overconfidence is on average 
succeeded by even more severe overconfidence. This continuing overreaction leads to 
momentum, but after the gradual arrival of public information, the stock price reverses to its 
fundamental value. In summary, Daniel et al. (1998) show that overconfidence and biased self-
attribution cause momentum profits and long-term reversals. 
 
The idea that momentum and reversals are generated by overconfidence and biased self-
attribution is tested in the paper of Cooper et al. (2004), where the theory of Daniel et al. (1998) 
is extended. It is assumed that following market gains, aggregate overconfidence increases. This 
is quite intuitive since keeping the self-attribution bias in mind, investors attribute gains in their 
portfolios more than they should to their own ability. Therefore, during periods in which the 
overall market has increased, investors are likely to make profits what induces them to become 
increasingly self-confident. Hence, according to this idea, overconfidence is larger following 
market increases. Thus, the profits of momentum strategies are expected to depend on market 
states and should be higher following positive market returns than following negative market 
returns. In general, the literature does not agree whether momentum depends on the market state 
(see Section 3.2 or Griffin et al., 2003, Avramov, 2006 and Avramov, 2007). The findings of 
Cooper et al. (2004, pp.1359) indicate that the relationship between lagged market returns and 
momentum profits is inverted u-shaped. While the profitability of momentum considerably 
- 55 - 

increases from the lowest level of lagged market returns, it peaks at the median levels and 
diminishes for larger market return levels. Two explanations are offered for this nonlinear 
relationship. First, highest lagged market returns might indicate the end of the overreaction phase 
and the beginning of reversals. Secondly, in extreme levels of the market’s performance, 
investors are not able to get that much private information to which they can overreact (Cooper 
et al., 2004, pp.1360). 
 
Beside the work of Daniel et al. (1998), with DeLong et al. (1990) another central model exists 
that presents evidence for the overreaction hypothesis H3. The study proposes a framework in 
which the presence of positive feedback traders causes momentum and long-term reversals. 
Positive feedback traders are investors who buy more of a stock that has recently increased in 
value.57 If the price of a stock goes up this period due to good news, positive feedback traders 
buy the asset in the subsequent period. This leads to momentum and post-earnings 
announcement. Yet, since the stock price has increased more than it shall according to the news, 
the return will be lower on average in the following periods and therefore generate long-term 
reversals. Several explanations exist why investors might be positive feedback traders. First, it 
might be the case since investors extrapolate expectations and use past returns to form 
expectations about the future value of an asset (Barberis and Thaler 2002, p.40). This behavior is 
called representativeness, which is presented in more detail in Section 3.3.1.. While Long et al. 
(1990) uses this behavior to explain why investors extrapolate past returns too far into the future, 
it is employed by Barberis et al. (1998) to show that investors extrapolate past cash flows too far 
into the future. Second, positive feedback trading can also be exhibited by institutional features 
such as investors being unable to meet margin calls or buyers of portfolio insurance (DeLong et 
al., 1990, p.379). 
 
In their model, DeLong et al. (1990) consider four periods with only two assets: a stock and 
cash. Investors trade with each other and determine the price of the stock in each period. The 
stock is liquidated in the last period and pays a risky dividend that consists of a first part, which 
is not released before the end of the last period, and a second part, which becomes public in 
period 2. A signal about the second part of the final dividend, that is either noiseless or 
imperfectly informative, is released to informed traders in period 1. Beside the informed rational 
investors, two other types of speculators are included in the model, passive investors and positive 

57Evidence for the tendency of traders to be trend chasing comes from the experimental study of Andreassen and Kraus (1988) 
and from empirical work e.g. Case and Shiller (1988) and Frankel and Froot’s (1988). 
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feedback traders: It is assumed that passive investors trade solely based on the price relative to 
the fundamental value while positive feedback traders buy stocks when the price of the asset has 
risen (when the price change between the former and the present period was positive) and sell 
when the price have gone down (when the price change between the former and the present 
period was negative). In this framework, rational investors destabilize the stock price in the 
presence of feedback traders. When in period 1, rational investors obtain a positive signal about 
the stock’s fundamental value (that is not published to the uninformed and the feedback trader), 
they anticipate that the initial price increase subsequently leads to purchases by the feedback 
traders. In anticipation of this, informed traders acquire more stocks after the release of the signal 
and drive the stock price higher than its fundamental value. In the subsequent period, these 
rational investors stabilize the price now by selling the stock with a profit. Yet, the stock price 
remains higher than the fundamental value since feedback traders buy the stock in response to 
the former price increase. Hence, according to the theory of DeLong et al. (1990), overreaction 
arises due to the anticipatory trades by rational investors and the response of positive feedback 
speculators to such trades. The model predicts that stock price reverses to their fundamental 
values in the long run.
3.3.5. Momentum – An Underreaction and an Overreaction Phenomenon 
The forth behavioral hypothesis states that: 
 
H4: Momentum is an overreaction and an underreaction phenomenon. Whether it is the 
one or the other phenomenon depends on trading volume. 
 
This hypothesis reconciles the overreaction idea (see behavioral hypothesis H3) with the initial 
underreaction theory (see behavioral hypothesis H1 and H2). According to the finding of Lee 
and Swaminathan (2002), it depends on trading volume whether momentum can be considered 
an overreaction or an underreaction effect. For NYSE and AMEX stocks between 1965 and 
1995, Lee and Swaminathan (2002) find that low trading volume stocks outperform stocks with a 
high trading volume. Low trading volume losers experience larger returns than high trading 
volume losers for a five-year period following the portfolio formation date and low trading 
volume winners outperform high trading volume winners in the years 2 to 5 after the portfolio 
formation. In addition, in the five-year period after the portfolio formation data, low volume 
losers and high volume winners are more likely to experience price reversals whereas price 
momentum is more pronounced among high volume winners and low volume losers. These 
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findings propose two volume-based momentum strategies. The first one is long low volume 
winners and short high volume losers. Lee and Swaminathan (2002, p.2039) call this strategy an 
“early-stage” strategy to indicate that these portfolios experience momentum returns over a 
longer period. The second volume-based strategy is named the “late-stage” momentum strategy 
that involves buying high volume winners and selling low volume loser stocks. It is called “late-
stage” since price momentum in these stocks exhibits faster reversals. 
 
Figure 2 shows the buy-and-hold long-term profits to these two strategies and to the simple 
strategy that is long in past winners and short in past losers. On the left hand side, returns are 
industry-adjusted and on the right hand side, returns are size-adjusted. 
 
Figure 2 
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
The figure shows the buy-and-Hold abnormal returns for all NYSE and AMEX listed firms during 1965 and 1995. On the left 
hand side, returns are industry-adjusted, on the right hand side, abnormal returns are size-adjusted. See Figure 1 and Figure 2 in 
the work of Lee and Swaminathan (2000, pp.2044). 
 

 
 
The “early-stage” strategy generates positive returns for three to five years without any reversal 
pattern. Based on this strategy, momentum is due to investors’ underreaction to new information. 
However, according to the “late-stage” strategy, momentum seems to be an overreaction 
phenomenon, as returns turn negative after one year. Hence, the two graphs show that whether 
momentum returns are linked to underreaction or to overreaction depends on trading volume. 
3.2.6. Critical Notes on the Behavioral Finance Approach 
The behavioral finance literature is far from a consensus about the drivers of momentum and 
there are substantially different explanations attempts within this field of research. A similar 
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empirical finding is considered consistent with different theories. The studies of Doukas and 
McKnight (2005) and Zhang (2006) report higher momentum returns when the strategy is 
limited to stocks with high dispersion in analyst earnings forecast. Doukas and McKnight (2005) 
view this as evidence for conservatism being the driver of the momentum effect. This would be 
in line with the theoretical model of Barberis et al. (1998) and the behavioral hypothesis H1. 
Zhang (2006) views dispersion in analyst earnings forecast as a proxy for information 
uncertainty and presents support for the behavioral hypothesis H2. 
 
Moreover, some behavioral models use the same assumptions about the behavior of traders but 
come to different conclusions why the momentum effect exists. The models of Daniel et al. 
(1998), Long et al. (1999) (see hypothesis H3) and Barberis et al. (1998) (see hypothesis H1) 
consider the same psychological phenomenon – representativeness – in their models. While the 
first two models document that the momentum effect is an overreaction phenomenon, the latter 
links it to investors’ underreaction behavior. 
 
A further problem of the behavioral finance field is the difficulty to find empirical evidence for 
theoretical proposals since it is hard to document a behavioral pattern in stock prices. Variables 
that are employed as proxies for a specific behavior can often be used as proxies for other 
psychological heuristics or they can be linked to risk. While some assumptions of behavioral 
models might appear intuitive, “we should be skeptical of theories based on behavior that is 
undocumented empirically” (Barberis and Thaler, 2002, p.61). 
 
Furthermore, it needs to be questioned whether the behavioral finance literature has indeed 
provided evidence against market efficiency so far (Fama, 1998). Currently, the behavioral 
finance literature searches for anomalies, shows that these are due to an incorrect reaction to 
information and conclude that this challenges the assumption that the response of prices to a new 
piece of information is short-lived. This is problematic since the behavioral finance literature 
explains some of the patterns with overreaction behavior while others are considered an 
underreaction phenomenon.  As underreaction is used as explanation roughly as often as 
overreaction (Fama, 1998, p.284), Fama views this as strong evidence for the efficiency of 
markets, since in an efficient market, overreaction should be about as present as underreaction. 
Hence, in the eyes of Fama (1998), the behavioral finance literature can only seriously question 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis, if only one pattern is mentioned as explanations for the existing 
anomalies.  
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The behavioral finance approach is further criticized for not settling an alternative to market 
efficiency (Fama, 1998, p.284). The alternative hypothesis of most studies is simply “market 
inefficiency”. Fama (1998) states that market efficiency is like all models only a imperfect 
description of price formation and can only be replaced by a better theory, which itself can be 
tested empirically. Such a model has not yet been proposed by the behavioral finance literature 
and one might get the impression that the goal is to rather destructive by find evidence against 
the efficiency hypothesis instead of providing support for a new theory. 
4 Comparison between the Rational and Behavioral Approach 
Neither the rational approach nor the behavioral proposals so far have succeeded in undoubtedly 
identifying the driver(s) of intermediate-term stock price momentum. The main difference 
between the two groups is the assumption of the behavior of subjects. While the rational 
approach relies on the assumption that agents are rational, researchers of the behavioral finance 
literature depart from it and believe that only theories where at least some traders are assumed to 
be non-rational have the power to explain the profitability of momentum strategies.  
 
How problematic it is to find support for the one or the other field can be seen in the fact that 
some empirical findings are considered as evidence by both approaches. For example, it is 
documented in the literature that small stocks experience greater momentum than larger stocks 
(see e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, p.78). While supporters of the rational-based theory argue 
that firm size is a risk factor of special hedging concern to investors (see e.g. Fama and French, 
1993, p.8), researchers that favor the behavioral idea consider firm size as a proxy for slow 
information diffusion (see Hong and Stein, 1999, Hong et al., 2000) or as a measure for 
information uncertainty that increases behavioral biases (Zhang, 2006). Another example for a 
different interpretation of the same finding is the relationship between momentum returns and 
the state of the economy: Griffin et al. (2003, p.2536) view positive momentum returns in good 
states and negative returns in bad market states as evidence for macroeconomic risk being the 
driver of the momentum phenomenon. In contrast, Cooper et al. (2004) consider such a 
relationship being consistent with the behavioral proposals of Daniel et al. (1998) and Hong and 
Stein (1999) (see Section 3.3.2). Furthermore, the finding that momentum strategies are 
profitable on industry levels and the potential ability of macroeconomic variables to predict stock 
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returns can be linked to both theories (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999, pp.1250, Chordia and 
Shivakumar, 2002, pp. 1014). 
 
Moreover, in cases where the rational-based and the behavioral theory predict diametrical 
different patterns, the literature does not agree about the correctness of the empirical findings. 
While some behavioral models theoretically show that intermediate-term momentum and long-
term reversals are components of the same phenomenon, the rational proposal of Konrad and 
Kaul (1998) predicts that the success of winner stocks is determined by high unconditional 
expected rates of return that remains unchanged over time. This implies that momentum profits 
should not reverse in the long run and that stocks in the winner portfolios should outperform 
momentum loser stocks in any postranking period. Among others58 , Jegadeesh and Titman 
(2001, pp.707) measure negative postholding period returns of momentum portfolios, but warn 
the reader to interpret this finding with caution for several reasons. First, whether postholding 
period returns of the momentum portfolio are negative seems to depend on the sample period. 
While they find long-term reversals for NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq stocks in the 1965 to 1981 
subperiod, there is less evidence for its existence in the 1982 to 1998 period. Secondly, the 
composition of the sample has influence on the findings: According to Jegadeesh and Titman 
(2001, p.718), smaller stocks seem to experience stronger postholding return reversals. Finally, 
evidence for long-term reversals depends on whether returns are risk-adjusted or not. Since it 
seems to be controversial whether momentum and long-term reversals are connected, the present 
stand of research does not allow finding evidence for the one or the other theory.  
 
In summary, neither the behavioral nor the rational-based approach has so far succeeded in 
solving the momentum puzzle. Moreover, researchers of both theories have also not yet 
succeeded in rejecting the hypotheses of the other side. 
5 Conclusion 
The stock price momentum effect states that past winner stocks continue to outperform past loser 
stocks. This is shown by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) documenting that a strategy long in 
stocks with the highest past 3-12month buy-and hold returns and short in stocks with the worst 
performance during that period yield significant positive returns within the next 3-12 months. Its 

58
 See e.g. DeBondt and Thaler (1985, pp.799), Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, pp.83), Lee and Swaminathan (2000, pp.2026), 
Cooper et al. (2004, pp.1352). 
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profits cannot be explained by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and 
Lintner (1965) and by the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993). This has induced a 
large body of empirical and theoretical literature that focuses on the cause of the profitability of 
momentum strategies. The approaches can mainly be subdivided into three broad groups: data 
mining, risk-explanations and behavioral explanation attempts. As I show, there is substantial 
evidence for the existence of the momentum effect: for different markets, different samples, 
different measurement methods and over varying time periods, past winner stocks seem to 
outperform past loser stocks. Simple strategies that buy past winners and sell past losers appear 
to be profitable both statistically and economically. Therefore, data mining and measurement 
errors seem to be unlikely. 
 
Further, this work presents potential explanations for the momentum effect from the rational 
perspective and from the behavioral standpoint. The various risk-based explanations are 
structured by employing a theoretical decomposition of momentum returns. It becomes clear that 
the literature finds evidence for and against each of the four potential rational components. The 
behavioral ideas are classified into four broad categories. To the best of my knowledge, this 
classification does not exist in literature so far. Neither supporters of the rational idea nor 
behaviorists have yet found a convincing explanation for the existence of intermediate-term 
stock price momentum. Furthermore, they have not yet managed to refute the proposals of the 
opponent group. Hence, the evidence on momentum stands out as a major unresolved puzzle and 
further research is necessary to identify the driver of this phenomenon. This is especially 
important for the validity of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. If researchers succeed in 
identifying one or more risk factors that explain momentum profits, this effect is not in conflict 
with market efficiency as abnormal momentum returns can be viewed as compensation for risk. 
If however, it is shown that momentum is driven by traders acting non-rationally, this 
phenomenon presents a serious challenge to the Efficient Market Hypothesis. 
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Part II 
 
 
Can Stock Price Momentum be Explained by Anchoring? 
 
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1. Introduction 
This part of my thesis can be assigned to the behavioral field and tests whether anchoring, a 
specific form of non-rational behavior, can explain the momentum effect. It builds on the 
work of George and Hwang (2004). They hypothesize that momentum can be explained by a 
strategy that uses the nearness of a stock’s price to its 52-week high price as a ranking 
criterion. Stocks that are at or near their 52-week high price are included in the winner 
portfolio while stocks with a price far from the highest price within the last one year are 
assigned to the loser portfolio. George and Hwang assume that the profitability of the 52-
week high strategy is caused by “anchoring”, a type of non-rational 59 behavior that describes 
the way people make estimations. Tversky and Kahneman (1982, pp.1128) argue that subjects 
focus too much on a reference point when forming estimates. Applying the anchoring 
phenomenon to the 52-week high strategy, investors estimate the impact of news on the stock 
price and therefore use the 52-week high price of a stock as reference point – an easily 
“accessible piece of information” (George and Hwang, 2004, p.2146) as it is published in 
nearly all newspapers reporting on stocks. If good news has pushed a stock to or close to its 
52-week high price, investors are not prepared to bid the price higher even if the information 
warrants it. Since the information is not completely incorporated in the stock price at once, the 
price subsequently increases which results in continuation. Similarly, when bad news has 
pushed the stock price to a level far from its 52-week high, investors are also unwilling to sell 
the stock for a price as low as it should be based on the bad news. Subsequently, the news is 
incorporated in the stock price, which results in a decrease. Hence, investors are unwilling to 
immediately revise their beliefs. This unwillingness is largest for stocks close to or far from 
the 52-week high. For stocks that are traded neither close nor far from their 52-week high, 
news is faster incorporated into the stock price, which does not result in any observable 
predictability. 
 
This work examines the assumption of George and Hwang (2004) that anchoring is the driver 
of momentum profits. Therefore, it needs to be tested whether first, the 52-week high strategy 
dominates the momentum strategy, and secondly, whether anchoring qualifies as explanation 
for the 52-week high profits. This is illustrated in the very simply graphic of Figure 3. In 
short, this work tests whether anchoring can explain (indirectly through the 52-week high 
 
59
 Barberis and Thaler (2002, p.11) consider the “anchoring bias” as an irrational behavior. However, in general, literature 
views a behavioral heuristic as a non-rational behavior. 
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strategy) the momentum effect. Hence, the null hypothesis states that momentum cannot be 
explained by anchoring. 
Figure 3 
Illustration of the Core Research Question 
 

 
 
The focus of this part of my thesis lies in the exploration of the second relation – whether 
anchoring explains the 52-week high profits. Therefore, three different types of tests are 
proposed. To my knowledge, this study is the first that tests the link between this behavioral 
pattern and the 52-week high. The first test examines the 52-week high strategy at industry 
level. According to the anchoring hypothesis, the industry-52-week high strategy should not 
dominate the 52-week high since the one year high price of an industry is not publicly 
available and hence does not qualify as a potential reference point. I further test whether a 
strategy with a ranking criterion that employs the highest price of a stock over a period longer 
or shorter than one year is more profitable than the 52-week high. The highest price of a stock 
over most intervals is not published. Therefore, this measure is not easily accessible to 
investors and cannot be used as reference point. Thirdly, the profitability of the 52-week high 
strategy is measured during the dot-com bubble. A couple of papers document irrational 
behavior such as overreaction or herding as the cause for its emergence. When subjects herd 
or overreact, they do not suffer from the anchoring bias at the same time. This implies that 
people should not anchor during the dot-com bubble and hence, the 52-week high strategy is 
expected to be unprofitable during this period if it is caused by anchoring. 
2. Data and Method 
My sample includes all listed stocks on German exchanges that were traded during the period 
January 1980 and March 2008, a total of 339 months. For each stock and each month, the 
price (adjusted for subsequent capital actions), the market value, the 52-week high price and 
the 52-week low price are obtained from Datastream. The intraday high price of each stock is 
collected on a daily basis. To mitigate microstructure effects that are associated with low-
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priced and illiquid stocks, only stocks with a price larger than one Euro and a market value 
above 50 Mio. Euro are considered for the ranking in month . On average, the number of 
stocks available is 750 per month. The sample includes both surviving and non-surviving 
stocks and does not suffer from a survivorship bias.60 
 
Portfolios for all strategies are constructed as in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). At the end of 
each month, all traded stocks are ranked in ascending order based on the strategy’s respective 
ranking criterion. The top 30% of stocks are assigned to the winner portfolio, the bottom 30% 
to the loser portfolio and the rest to a portfolio that is referred to as the middle one. These 
portfolios are equally weighted and not rebalanced during the holding period. To be precise, 
this implies that stocks are only perfectly equal-weighted at the date of the portfolio 
formation. As the portfolios are not rebalanced during the holding period, stocks with a price 
increase get a larger fraction in the portfolio, while stocks with a negative return during the 
holding period get a smaller weight. The investment strategy is self-financing: it buys winner 
stocks and sells loser stocks. Hence, the strategy profits are computed as the arithmetic 
difference (WML) between the returns of the winner portfolio () and the returns of the 
loser portfolio (): 
    																																		ABCD 
To abstract from potential microstructure effects and the bid/ask bounce, I skip one month 
between the ranking and holding period which is common in the momentum literature. If a 
stock is delisted during the holding period, I follow Forner (2003, p.72) and assume that the 
remaining proceeds are equally invested in the remaining stocks.  
 
Consistent with Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), monthly portfolio returns are calculated on an 
overlapping holding period basis. Compared to non-overlapping returns, this method 
increases the power of the statistical tests and provides cleaner results as the bid-ask bounce 
effects are reduced (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999, p.1258).61 Hence, measuring returns on 
an overlapping period basis implies that the monthly average profits to 	E	 strategies (with 	E	 
 
60
 Some studies using Datastream suffer from a survivorship bias since delisted stocks are missing if the data is taken 
unadjusted and in its raw state from the database. Yet, this does not mean that it is impossible to get a survivorship-free 
sample using Datastream. It provides dead stock files, which can be applied to recreate the complete sample.  
61
 Calculating non-overlapping returns leads to similar conclusions and are therefore not report in this work. 
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equals to the length of the holding period in months) are reported, each beginning one month 
apart. For example, at the beginning of month , the winner portfolio with a holding period of 
3 months consists of three subportfolios: one formed at the beginning of 	  F, one built in 
	  	 and one started in 	  B. At the beginning of month   B, the monthly return is 
measured for the subportfolios constructed in 	  , 	  B	 and 		 while the portfolio formed 
in 	  F	 is replaced by the one built in 	.  
 
I also conduct an experimental analysis to test whether subjects do in fact suffer from the 
anchoring bias. Therefore, 105 undergraduate students take part in this test and have to 
estimate a percentage number. Without their knowledge, students are subdivided into three 
groups. This is done by giving different information, which they might employ when 
estimating the percentage, to the participants. In order to ensure that the results are not biased 
by a group dynamic, I make sure that a participant’s estimation is not influenced by her 
neighbor firstly by leaving enough space between the subjects and secondly by ensuring that 
the information are not the same for students sitting next to each other. Furthermore, as the 
test is anonymous and as I do not offer payoffs for accuracy, the risk that decisions are made 
based on other criteria than the own estimate is quite small. 
3. Momentum and the 52-week High Strategy 
3.1 Performance of the Strategies 
Formally, the main difference between the momentum strategy and the 52-week high strategy 
is the ranking criterion. According to the momentum strategy, stocks are ranked based on 
their past buy-and hold performance. The 30% of stocks that performed best during the 
ranking period is attributed to the winner portfolio while the 30% of stocks with the worst 
buy-and-hold returns is assigned to the loser portfolio. The notation AED applies to the 
momentum strategies and indicates a ranking period of 		 months, a skip period of 		 months 
and a holding period of E months. 
 
Measuring returns on an overlapping holding period basis allows calculating simple t-
statistics (Rouwenhorst, 1998, Lee and Swaminathan, 2000). This is future ensured with a 
Breutsch-Godfrey test. Therefore, I regress the monthly returns   of the strategies on a 
constant c and an error term :     . The obtained  (least squares) are regressed on 
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their p lags in a simple AR(p) model:            . I chose 
different values for p between 1 and 12. From this auxiliary regression, I obtain  which is 
necessary to get the test statistics that is denoted with A  !D"#$.  
 
In Panel A of Table 4, average monthly momentum returns are reported for different ranking 
and holding periods. Winner and loser profits are returns in excess of the Datastream 
Germany Price Index62. Table 4 documents that momentum strategies yield substantial and 
mainly highly significant profits over the sample period 1980 to 2008. Stocks that were 
winners over the previous 3 to 12 months continue to outperform past loser stocks over the 
next 3 to 12 months. All examined momentum strategies yield positive returns. For 12 out of 
16 strategies, returns are significant on the 10% level, for 10 strategies on the 5% level and for 
4 out of 16 strategies, momentum profits are significant on the 1% level. The highest monthly 
returns are generated by the A%BFD and the ACBCD portfolios. 
 
At first glance, the momentum profits in Table 4 seem rather low in comparison to the study 
of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) reporting an average monthly return of about 1% for U.S. 
stocks. Yet, this results from the examination of the return differences between the top and 
bottom tercile while Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) focus on the top and bottom decile. The 
30% and 70% breakpoints are chosen for two reasons: Firstly, I use German data. Compared 
to the number of stocks traded in the U.S., my sample is much smaller which implies that 
winner and loser portfolios contain fewer stocks. This disadvantage can be reduced by 
including a larger fraction of stocks in the portfolios. And secondly, in opposite to Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) who are interested in presenting evidence for the existence of the 
momentum effect, I focus on the driver of this phenomenon and therefore, I put less 
emphasize on the tails of the distribution. 
 
Some papers point out that the momentum effect has disappeared in the post-2000 era 
(Henker et al., 2006, Hwang and Rubesam, 2007). Yet, my results show that this is not the 
case for momentum in Germany. Between January 1, 2000 and March 1, 2008, the ACBCD 
momentum portfolios generate an average monthly return of 0.60% (not in the tables). This 
finding is consistent with Dimson et al. (2008) examining UK stocks and reporting an average 
 

 The Datastream Germany Price Index was chosen as it includes substantially more stocks as the MSCI Germany Price 
Index with only about 60 stocks.
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monthly profit of 0.86% for momentum portfolios after 2000. Hence, the results indicate that 
it is premature to pronounce the disappearance of momentum. 
 
The ranking criterion of the 52-week high strategy is the distance of a stock’s current price to 
its 52-week high (&'(: Price-52-week high ratio). Formally, let 	&)	 be the price of 
stock 	*	 at the first day of month   B	 and 	')	(  stock *’s highest price during the one year 
period ending at the first day of month   B. 
&')
( 
	&)
	')	
(
																								AB+D
By construction, &'( takes positive values but cannot be larger than 1. The 30% of stocks 
with a price closest to their 52-week high (stocks with the largest &'() are attributed to the 
winner portfolio and the 30 of stocks with a price furthest from their 52-week high (stocks 
with the smallest &'( values) are assigned to the loser portfolio. 
 
Panel B of Table 4 shows the average monthly returns of the 52-week high strategy for 
different holding periods. Stocks with a price close to the 52-week high significantly 
outperform stocks with a price far from the 52-week high over all four examined investment 
periods. The profits to the 52-week high strategy are approximately as high as the top 
momentum strategy for each investment period. 
 
Momentum and 52-week high returns might be influenced by the turn-of-the-year effect: 
Stocks with a poor performance strongly rebound at the beginning of a new year. According 
to Roll (1983), Griffiths and White (1993) and Ferris et al. (2001), this anomaly is due to tax 
loss selling: In order to realize tax loss benefits, investors sell loser stocks at the end of the 
year. This leads to lower prices at year-end for loser stocks. At the beginning of the following 
year, the selling pressure vanishes and the prices of the loser stocks recover.  
 
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Table 4 
Profits to Momentum and 52-week High Strategies 
This table reports the average monthly portfolio returns in excess of the Datastream Germany Price Index average return 
from February 1981 through March 2008, for momentum strategies (Panel A) and 52-week high strategies (Panel B). For the 
momentum portfolios, stocks are picked based on their buy-and-hold return over the ranking period. The 52-week high 
portfolios chose stocks based on the ratio of the current price to the highest price within the past 12 months. All portfolios are 
held over the investment period. Between the ranking and holding period, a skip period of 1 month is included to abstract 
from bid/ask bounce. The winner (loser) portfolios on the momentum strategy are the equally weighted portfolios of the 30% 
of stocks with the highest (lowest) return over the ranking period. The winner (loser) portfolios of the 52-week high strategy 
are the equally weighted portfolios of the 30% of stocks with the highest (lowest) quotient of the current price to the 52-week 
high. For the ranking, all German stocks on Datastream with a price larger than 1 Euro and a market value above 50 Million 
Euro are considered; t-statistics (two-tailed) are reported in parentheses. *;**;*** are the significance levels on the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level. 
     
Ranking 
Period (in 
months) 
Holding Period (in months) 
 
3___ 6___ 9___ 12___ 
Panel A: Average Monthly Returns 
3 Winner 0.0016___ 0.0019___ 0.0021___ 0.0023___ 
 
Loser -0.0006___ -0.0013___ -0.0016___ -0.0010___ 
 
Winner-Loser 0.0022___ 0.0032*__ 0.0038**_ 0.0032**_ 
  
(1.05)___ (1.83)___ (2.52)___ (2.33)___ 
      6 Winner 0.0032___ 0.0034___ 0.0031___ 0.0023___ 
 
Loser -0.0018___ -0.0022___ -0.0019___ -0.0011___ 
 
Winner-Loser 0.0049**_ 0.0056*** 0.0050*** 0.0034** 
  
(2.02)___ (2.75)___ (2.86)___ (2.20)___ 
      9 Winner 0.0038___ 0.0034___ 0.0023___ 0.0016___ 
 
Loser -0.0024___ -0.0019___ -0.0014___ -0.0005___ 
 
Winner-Loser 0.0062*** 0.0053*** 0.0037**_ 0.0021___ 
  
(2.72)___ (2.68)___ (2.05)___ (1.25)___ 
      12 Winner 0.0030___ 0.0025___ 0.0019___ 0.0014___ 
 
Loser -0.0012___ -0.0011___ 0.0002___ 0.0008___ 
 
Winner-Loser 0.0042*__ 0.0036**_ 0.0018___ 0.0006___ 
  
(1.95)___ (2.07)___ (0.92)___ (0.32)___ 
Panel B: Average Monthly 52-week-High Returns 
     Winner 0.0036___ 0.0033___ 0.0029___ 0.0024___ 
Loser -0.0022___ -0.0025___ -0.0021___ -0.0015___ 
Winner-Loser 0.0059**_ 0.0058**_ 0.0050**_ 0.0039*__ 
    (2.12)___ (2.24)___ (2.08)___ (1.74)___ 
 
 
In order to examine momentum and 52-week high profits when the turn-of-the-year effect is 
excluded, I report the returns for both strategies in non-January months in Table 5. Compared 
to the results in Table 4, loser portfolio returns are substantially lower for both, the 
momentum and the 52-week high strategy. This is consistent with the turn-of-the-year effect, 
which states that loser stocks perform well at the beginning of the year. The exclusion of 
January returns does also lead to lower profits in the winner portfolios. This is not unusual 
when the turn-of-the-year effect is excluded (see George and Hwang, 2004, p.2150). Yet, the 
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decrease of loser returns is larger compared to the decrease of the winner profits which leads 
to slightly higher average monthly returns for momentum and 52-week high strategies. 
 
The sample period includes the dot-com bubble around the year 2000. In order to ensure that 
my findings are not driven by this short period, I exclude all months between October 1, 1998 
and March 1, 2000 during which the speculative bubble has grown. March 1 was chosen as 
the ending date since the German equivalent to the Nasdaq Composite, the NEMAX50, 
peaked at the beginning of March 2000. The choice of a beginning date is less clear for the 
dot-com bubble. I decide for October 1, 1998 since the NEMAX50 increased by only 1.3% 
within 6 months before that date and rose by 17% from October 1, 1998 to November 1, 
1998, by 43% until January 1, 1999 and by 359% to March 1, 2000. Table 6 reports the 
average monthly momentum and 52-week high returns for all months except for those during 
the dot-com bubble period. Most momentum returns and all 52-week high profits are higher 
when the dot-com bubble period is excluded. As in Table 4, the most profitable momentum 
strategy and the 52-week high yield returns that are approximately similar for each holding 
period. During the dot-com bubble, neither the momentum nor the 52-week high strategies 
performed well. Between October 1998 and March 2000, 13 out of 16 momentum strategies 
yield negative returns and only two have a slightly positive average monthly return. The four 
52-week high strategies perform even worse and generate with -0.8% to -1.3% (not reported 
in the tables) substantially negative average monthly profits. Hence, momentum and 52-week 
high strategies seem to be profitable between 1981 and 2008. The profits are not due to the 
turn-of-the year effect or due to the dot-com bubble period. 
 
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Table 5 
Non-January Profits to Momentum and to 52-week High Strategies 
This table reports the average monthly portfolio returns in excess of the Datastream Germany Price Index average return 
from February 1981 through March 2008, for momentum strategies (Panel A) and 52-week high strategies (Panel B) 
excluding returns in Januaries. For the momentum portfolios, stocks are picked based on their buy-and-hold return over the 
ranking period. The 52-week high portfolios chose stocks based on the ratio of the current price to the highest price within 
the past 12 months. All portfolios are held over the investment period. Between the ranking and holding period, a skip period 
of 1 month is included to abstract from bid/ask bounce. The winner (loser) portfolios on the momentum strategy are the 
equally weighted portfolios of the 30% of stocks with the highest (lowest) return over the ranking period. The winner (loser) 
portfolios of the 52-week high strategy are the equally weighted portfolios of the 30% of stocks with the highest (lowest) 
quotient of the current price to the 52-week high. For the ranking, all German stocks on Datastream with a price larger than 1 
Euro and a market-value above 50 Million Euro are considered; t-statistics (two-tailed) are reported in parentheses. *;**;*** 
are the significance levels on the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
Ranking 
Period (in 
months) 
Holding Period (in months) 
3___ 6___ 9___ 12___ 
Panel A: Average Monthly Returns 
3 Winner 0.0006___ 0.0008___ 0.0010___ 0.0006___ 
Loser -0.0026___ -0.0032___ -0.0033___ -0.0026___ 
Winner-Loser 0.0032___ 0.0040**_ 0.0043*** 0.0032*** 
(1.58)___ (2.37)__ (3.08)___ (2.70)___ 
6 Winner 0.0022___ 0.0023___ 0.0018___ 0.0011___ 
Loser -0.0036___ -0.0039___ -0.0034___ -0.0025___ 
Winner-Loser 0.0058**_ 0.0062*** 0.0053*** 0.0036**_ 
(2.45)_ _ (3.13)___ (3.10)___ (2.34)___ 
9 Winner 0.0026___ 0.0021___ 0.0010___ 0.0004___ 
Loser -0.0040___ -0.0034___ -0.0028___ -0.0018___ 
Winner-Loser 0.0066*** 0.0054*** 0.0038**_ 0.0022___ 
(3.01)___ (2.76)___ (2.06)___ (1.23)___ 
12 Winner 0.0017___ 0.0012___ 0.0006___ 0.0002___ 
Loser -0.0026___ -0.0021___ -0.0012___ -0.0006___ 
Winner-Loser 0.0043**_ 0.0033*__ 0.0018___ 0.0007___ 
(1.98)___ (1.85)___ (0.90)___ (0.38)___ 
Panel B: Average Monthly 52-week High Returns 
     Winner 0.0029___ 0.0025___ 0.0022___ 0.0017___ 
Loser -0.0044___ -0.0046___ -0.0041___ -0.0034___ 
Winner-Loser 0.0073*** 0.0071*** 0.0062*** 0.0051**_ 
(2.80)___ (2.91)___ (2.75) (2.34)___ 
 
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Table 6 
Dot-com Bubble-free Profits to Momentum and 52-week High Strategies  
This table reports the average monthly portfolio returns in excess of the Datastream Germany Price Index average return 
from February 1981 through March 2008, for momentum strategies (Panel A) and 52-week high strategies (Panel B) 
excluding the period of the dot-com bubble from October 1st 1998 to March 1st 2000. For the momentum portfolios, stocks 
are picked based on their buy-and-hold return over the ranking period. The 52-week high portfolios chose stocks based on the 
ratio of the current price to the highest price within the past 12 months. All portfolios are held over the investment period. 
Between the ranking and holding period, a skip period of 1 month is included to abstract from bid/ask bounce. The winner 
(loser) portfolios on the momentum strategy are the equally weighted portfolios of the 30% of stocks with the highest 
(lowest) return over the ranking period. The winner (loser) portfolios of the 52-week high strategy are the equally weighted 
portfolios of the 30% of stocks with the highest (lowest) quotient of the current price to the 52-week high. For the ranking, all 
German stocks on Datastream with a price larger than 1 Euro and a market-value above 50 Million Euro are considered; t-
statistics (two-tailed) are reported in parentheses. *;**;*** are the significance levels on the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
Ranking Period 
(in months) 
Holding Period (in months) 
3___ 6___ 9___ 12___ 
Panel A: Average Monthly Returns 
3 Winner 0.0015___ 0.0016___ 0.0020___ 0.0017___ 
Loser -0.0008___ -0.0017___ -0.0019___ -0.0013___ 
Winner-Loser 0.0023___ 0.0033**_ 0.0039**_ 0.0031**_ 
(1.05)___ (1.79)___ (2.48)___ (2.51)___ 
6 Winner 0.0027___ 0.0032___ 0.0030___ 0.0026___ 
Loser -0.0020___ -0.0024___ -0.0020___ -0.0012___ 
Winner-Loser 0.0048**_ 0.0057*** 0.0051*** 0.0038**_ 
(1.87)___ (2.63)___ (2.86)___ (2.40)___ 
9 Winner 0.0037___ 0.0033___ 0.0029___ 0.0022___ 
Loser -0.0024___ -0.0020___ -0.0012___ -0.0003___ 
Winner-Loser 0.0062*** 0.0054*** 0.0041**_ 0.0025___ 
(2.60)___ (2.69)___ (2.20)___ (1.49)___ 
12 Winner 0.0035___ 0.0031___ 0.0027___ 0.0022___ 
Loser -0.0008___ -0.0008___ 0.0004___ -0.0010___ 
Winner-Loser 0.0043**_ 0.0040**_ 0.0023___ 0.0012___ 
(2.06)___ (2.44)___ (1.27)___ (0.74)___ 
Panel B: Average Monthly 52-week High Returns 
     Winner 0.0040___ 0.0040___ 0.0036___ 0.0031___ 
Loser -0.0018___ -0.0028___ -0.0031___ -0.0016___ 
Winner-Loser 0.0066**_ 0.0067**_ 0.0058**_ 0.0047**_ 
(2.36)___ (2.50)___ (2.45)___ (2.16)___ 
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3.2 Comparison of the Strategies with the Same Ranking Period 
Momentum strategies with a ranking period of 12 months cover a ranking period which is as 
long as that of the 52-week high strategies (momentum focuses on the past 12 months 
performance while the 52-week high uses the highest price over the past one year in its 
ranking measure). Despite of the identical length of the ranking period, momentum strategies 
are substantially less profitable for all examined holding periods (see Table 4-Table 6). This 
leads to the question, which stocks are included in the winner (loser) portfolio according to 
the 52-week high criterion but are not in the winner (loser) portfolio based on the 12 months 
momentum measure and the other way round. 
 
The first line in Figure 4 illustrates two types of stocks that are in the winner portfolio of the 
52-week high strategy but not in that of the momentum strategy. In the second line of Figure 
4, two types of stocks are illustrated which are in the momentum winner portfolio but not in 
the 52-week high winner portfolio. Each graphic shows the stock price from 	,  -	 to 	, 
B. This time horizon is defined as 12 months. The top horizontal line represents the 52-week 
high between 	,  -	 and 	,  B	, while the bottom horizontal line shows the lowest price 
within this interval. The first graphic illustrates “Reversal Stocks” which lose value at the 
beginning but recover and are near or close to the 52-week high in 	,  B. As the buy-and-
hold return between 	,  -	 and 	,  B	 is small, these stocks are not winner stocks according 
to the momentum criterion. “Low-volatility Stocks” are also stocks that are only 52-week 
high winners. For this type of stocks, the distance between their 52-week high and low is 
small. In the second line of Figure 4, the price pattern of stocks that are only momentum 
winners is illustrated. “Former Loser Stocks” suffer from great loses at the beginning and 
stabilize on a certain level (or slightly recover). They are only momentum winner stocks as 
the return between ,  -	 and 	,  B	 is large but do not belong to the 52-week high winners 
as the stocks trade far from their 52-week high. In the bottom left graphic, the price pattern of 
“Early Loser Stocks” which yield high returns at the beginning of the period but have a poor 
performance at the end. As the 52-week high strategy is substantially more profitable than the 
ABB.D momentum strategy, either stocks that are only considered winner stocks by the 52-
week high strategy perform well or stocks that are only momentum winners underperform. 
Hence, either “Reversal Stocks” or “Low-volatility Stocks” have a good performance in the 
holding periods or “Former Loser Stocks” or “Early Loser Stocks” must perform poorly. 
Symmetric conclusions can be drawn for loser stocks. 

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Figure 4 
Types of Stocks Responsible for the Difference between the A/0/1D Momentum and 
the 52-week High Strategy Performance 
 
The figure shows types of stocks that are 52-week high winners but not momentum winners (H1 and H2) and types of stocks 
that are included in the winner portfolio by the momentum criterion but not by the 52-week high measure (M1 and M2). Each 
graphic illustrates the stock’s price pattern from 	  -	 to 	  B. This time span between 	  -	 to 	  B is defined as 12 
months. The top horizontal line represents the 52-week high between 	  -	 and 	  B	 while the bottom horizontal line 
shows the lowest price within this interval. 
 
 
This brief illustration has two interesting implications. First, it theoretically shows that there 
are types of stocks that are only considered as winners by one criterion. These types could 
make the difference in the performance between the 52-week high and the ABB2D 
momentum strategy. Secondly, these four graphics show that the ABB2D momentum is 
slower in identifying future winner stocks:  Since it is less profitable than the 52-week high, 
stocks that are only momentum winners are expected to have a bad or at least modest 
performance while stocks that are only 52-week high winners are assumed to perform well. 
“Reversal Stocks” and “Low-volatility Stocks” are assigned to the 52-week high winner 
portfolio in 	3  B. Due to their excepted performance, they will also be included in the 
momentum winner portfolios to a later date. Hence, the 52-week high strategy seems to 
earlier invest in a future winner stock than momentum. A similar pattern can be observed for 
the “Former Loser stocks” and “Early Loser Stocks”. While the 52-week high does not 
include those stocks in the winner portfolio in 	3  B, the momentum criterion does. Finally, 
after 	3  B, after a bad or modest performance of those stocks, the momentum measure does 
also refuse to call these stocks winners. Hence again, while the poor performance of these 








Reversal Stocks Low-volatility Stocks 
Former Loser Stocks Early Loser Stocks 
52-week High 
Winners only 
Momentum 
Winners only 
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stocks is identified by 52-week high in 	3  B, the ABB2D momentum measure is much 
slower. In summary, these four types of stocks indicate that the 52-week high is faster in 
identifying winner stocks than the momentum strategy with a ranking period of 12 months. 
4. Dominance of the 52-week High Strategy 
In Table 4-6, the profitability of momentum strategies with different ranking and holding 
periods are compared to the returns of 52-week high strategies with different holding periods. 
Measuring the performance of both strategies over a variety of ranking and holding periods is 
important in order to completely examine their relationship. For example, it is not sufficient to 
compare only the (6/1/6) momentum strategy with the 52-week high strategy, since it is not 
necessarily the most profitable momentum strategy (Rouwenhorst, 1998, Forner and 
Marhuenda, 2003, Doukas and McKnight, 2005, Agyei-Ampomah, 2007). This chapter 
examines whether stock price momentum and the 52-week high are independent or whether 
one ranking criterion dominates the other. Therefore, with the sorting and the regression 
approach, two different methods are employed. The sorting approach attributes stocks to 
different portfolios based on both the 52-week high and the momentum criterion. This method 
can further be subdivided in a conditional sort and a two-way sort. Based on the conditional 
sort, stocks are first sorted and collected in different portfolios according to one strategy. 
Then within the portfolios, stocks are further ranked on the criterion of the second strategy. 
The two-way method ranks stocks independently based on the first and on the second ranking 
criterion and forms portfolios based on the independent rank of both strategies. For example, 
winners according to one ranking criterion are subdivided into different portfolios based on 
the second independent sort. A big advantage of the sorting approach is that this methodology 
offers a simple and intuitive insight in the relationship between two strategies, as stocks are 
included in different portfolios of which the returns can be easily compared and interpreted. A 
potential problem, however, is the unevenly balanced number of stocks within the portfolios. 
For example, there are more stocks ranked as winners by both criteria than stocks that are 
momentum winners and at the same time losers based on the 52-week high. A further 
disadvantage is the construction of test statistics, which is less clear for the sorting approach 
compared to other methods (Nijman et al., 2004). Beside sorts, strategies can also be 
compared by regressions. They allow the incorporation of other effects in addition to the 
momentum and the 52-week high effects. For example, firm size can be controlled for, as a 
relationship between firm size and momentum returns is documented in some studies 
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(Rouwenhorst, 1998, Hong, 2000). Moreover, the construction of regressions and the 
interpretation of the obtained results seem to be well understood. Yet, a drawback of 
regressions is the functional form they impose on the relationship between the exogenous and 
the endogenous variables (Fama and French, 2008). This form might be incorrect and 
therefore lead to wrong conclusions. In order to ensure that my results are not driven by the 
drawbacks of the employed method, I use both approaches to test the relationship between the 
momentum and the 52-week high strategy. 
 
As a first method to examine the relationship between the momentum and the 52-week high 
strategy, Fama-MacBeth (1973) style cross-sectional regressions similar to those in George 
and Hwang (2004) are conducted. As above, I compare the ACBCD momentum strategy to 
the 52-week high with a holding period of six month length.63 Dummy variables that indicate 
whether a stock is included in the winner or loser portfolios by a strategy are regressed on the 
month  return of stock *. In order to control for firm size, the market capitalization of firm * 
is taken as explanatory variable with a lag. With the return of stock * in   B as explanatory 
variable, a second control variable is employed to isolate the bid-ask bounce impact on the 
coefficient estimates. Hence, the coefficients of the dummy variables help us to measure the 
return of one strategy in isolation from the second one and in control of size and the bid-ask 
bounce. As mentioned above, overlapping portfolios are employed to examine a strategy’s 
profitability. Consequently, as I examine the 52-week high and the momentum strategy for a 
holding period of six months, the winner and loser portfolios of both strategies in month  
consist of six subportfolios formed in 	  4	 (with 4  )5 +) respectively. 
 
I estimate for each 4 the following regression in order to examine the relationship between the 
winner and loser portfolios formed in   4 and the return in month : 
)  6
7
 6
7
	8*9:)  6
7
	)  6;
7
	<=)7  6>
7
	<?)7 
 6(
7
	@=)7  6A
7
	@?)7  B)																																																															ABCD 
where ) is the return and 8*9:) the market value of stock 	*	 in month . The momentum 
strategy is considered in the regression by two dummy variables, <=)7 and 	?=)7. If in 
 
	
The conclusions are similar when the 52-week high with a 3-month holding period is compared to the A%BFD 
momentum.
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month   4 stock 	*	 is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% based on the momentum ranking 
criterion, <=)7 A?=)7D	 is one and zero otherwise. The ranking criterion of momentum is 
stock *’s buy-and-hold return between   4  C and   4. The dummy variables 	@=)7 and 
	@?)7	 represent the 52-week high strategy: if in month   4  stock 	*	  is among the top 
(bottom) 30% according to the 52-week high ranking measure, 	@=)7	(	@?)7) takes one 
and zero otherwise. The ranking criterion of the 52-week high is the ratio of stock *’s price in 
  B and its highest price between   4  B and   4. The intercept 6
7
	can be interpreted 
as the monthly return of a portfolio that has hedged out the size effect, the bid-ask bounce, the 
momentum and the 52-week high effect (Fama, 1976). The dummy variable coefficients 6;7  
for example can be viewed as the return in excess of 6
7
 that can be obtained by taking a long 
position in the ACBCD momentum winner portfolio in isolation of all other effects.  
 
In order to obtain the total monthly return of the pure winner or pure loser portfolios, the 
averages of the coefficients from the six independent regression for each 	4  )5 )+  are 
calculated: 
A
D 6;
7E
7F , …, 

A
D 6A
7E
7F . 
 
Table 7 reports the time-series averages of the total monthly returns and the associated t-
statistics. In the bottom of the table, the difference between the winner and loser dummies for 
the momentum (the 52-week high strategy) represents the average monthly return from a 
zero-cost portfolio that is long in the momentum (52-week high) winners and short in the 
momentum (52-week high) losers. The regression results support the general conclusions of 
the sorting approach. When the dot-com bubble period is excluded, the dominance of the 52-
week high strategy is obvious. A self-financing 52-week high strategy yields 0.48%, which is 
much larger than the momentum return of 0.34%. A similar pattern can be observed when 
January returns are excluded. Using raw returns, the dominance is less clear and the 
difference in the 52-week high dummy variables is with 0.40% only weakly larger than the 
difference in the momentum dummy variables with 0.37%. 
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Table 7 
Comparison between the AG/GD Momentum and the 52-week High Strategy: 
Regression 
The table reports the results of six cross-sectional regressions (4=2, ...,7) which are estimated for each month between 
February 1981 and March 2008. The regressions for ACBCD momentum strategy and the 52-week high with a 6-month 
holding period have the following form: 
)  6
7
 6
7
8*9:)  6
7
)  6;
7
<=)7  6>
7
<?)7  6(
7
@=)7  6A
7
@?)7  B ) 
where ) is the return and 	8*9:) the market value of stock 	*	 in month 		. The ACBCD momentum strategy is included in 
the regression through the dummy variables =<)7 and ?<)7. The variable 	=<)7 (?<)7D takes one if in month   4 
stock * is among the top (bottom) 30% according to the ranking criterion (the past six months buy-and-hold return) and zero 
otherwise. The dummy variables @=)7  and @?)7  represent the 52-week high strategy. @=)7  (?=)7D takes one if in 
  4 stock * is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% based on the strategy’s ranking criterion (The ratio of stock *’s price in   B 
and its highest price between month   4  B and   4). The coefficients of the independent variables =<)7, ?<)7 , 
@=)7  and @?)7  are averaged over 4=2, ...,7. The table reports the time-series averages of the averaged coefficients 
measured in percent. The time-series t-statistics are documented in parentheses. The first column reports the results for all 
months, the second column shows the findings for all months except for those during the dot-com bubble period from 
October 1998 to February 2000 and the last column reports the returns for non-January months. *;**;*** are the significance 
levels on the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
   
All months ex Dot-com Bubble ex Jan 
  6 0.94_____ 0.81_____ 0.81_____ 
(3.65)***__ (3.12)***__ (3.05)***__ 
8*9:H -0.02_____ -0.05_____ -0.04_____ 
(-0.80)_____ (-0.76)_____ (-0.94)_____ 
) -1.03_____ -1.04_____ -1.03_____ 
(-3.96)***__ (-3.34)***__ (-3.74)***__ 
<=)7  0.24_____ 0.25_____ 0.22_____ 
(2.49)***__ (2.59)***__ (2.30)**___ 
<?)7 -0.13_____ -0.10_____ -0.13_____ 
(-1.67)*____ (-1.70)*____ (-1.69)*____ 
@=)7 0.17_____ 0.24_____ 0.20_____ 
(1.82)*____ (2.10)**___ (2.15)**___ 
@?)7 -0.24_____ -0.23_____ -0.34_____ 
(-1.70)*____ (-1.71)*____ (-2.05)**___ 
<=)7 <?)7 0.37_____ 0.34_____ 0.35_____ 
(2.34)***__ (2.28)**___ (2.20)**___ 
@=)7  @?)7  0.40_____ 0.48_____ 0.55_____ 
(2.16)**___ (2.38)**___ (2.30)**___ 
 
 
As a further sorting method, a conditional sort is conducted64: Stocks are assigned to different 
portfolios based on one ranking measure. Then within the portfolios, stocks are further sorted 
according to the criterion of the second strategy. This test identifies whether the 52-week high 
strategy still has explanatory power conditional on the momentum ranking, and vice versa. 
For consideration of space, I only report the results of the comparison between the most 
 
64
 A conditional sort is used by Rouwenhorst (1998) examining whether size has an influence on momentum returns.  
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profitable momentum strategy and the 52-week high over a holding period of 6 months (Table 
8) and 3 months (Table 9).65 
 
In Panel A of Table 8, stocks are first classified into winner, middle and loser portfolios 
according to the momentum criterion (the past six month performance), and then each of the 
three portfolios is further subdivided into winner, middle and loser portfolios based on the 52-
week high rankings. Panel B documents the results when stocks are first classified based on 
the 52-week high performance measure and then sorted according to the momentum criterion 
within the three portfolios. As above, the top 30% of stocks is assigned to the winner 
portfolio, the bottom 30% is included in the loser portfolio while the rest (40%) is collected in 
the middle portfolio. The ranking criterion for the momentum strategy is the past return of a 
stock during 	  +	 and 	  	 and 	&'(	 for the 52-week high strategy. 
 
Panel B shows that the ACBCD momentum strategy loses its profitability within the 52-week 
high winner and loser groups. The returns to momentum W-L portfolios are small at 0.28% or 
less and not significant. Excluding the dot-com bubble period (column 2) or the turn-of-the-
year effect (column 3) or both (column 4) does not increase momentum profits within the 52-
week high winner and loser groups. In opposite, the 52-week high strategy still is profitable 
after controlling for momentum. This is at least true for non-January returns and outside the 
dot-com bubble where the 52-week high measure yields large and significant profits (0.38% – 
0.56% on average per month). The returns to the 52-week high strategy within the winner and 
loser momentum portfolio are almost two times higher than the profits to the ACBCD 
momentum strategy within the 52-week high winner and loser groups outside the Dot-com 
period. The dominance of the 52-week high over momentum becomes even more obvious 
when both the Dot-com period and January returns are excluded (column 4). 
 

 
A
As the difference in returns between the most profitable momentum and the 52-week high strategy is smallest for a holding 
period of three and six month, I do report the results of these tests.
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Table 8 
Comparison between the AG/GD Momentum and the 52-week High Strategy: Conditional Sort 
The table reports the average monthly returns of portfolios that are formed according to the ACBCD momentum and to the 52-week high strategy with a 6-month holding period from February 1981 through March 
2008. In Panel A, stocks are first sorted on the ACBCD momentum ranking criterion. The 30% of stocks with the highest (lowest) past 6 month performance are assigned to the winner (loser) portfolio; the rest of 
stocks are included in the middle portfolio. Within the three portfolios, stocks are further sorted in winner and loser portfolios based on the 52-week high criterion: The 30% of stocks with a price nearest to 
(furthest from) their one-year high are included in the winner (loser) portfolio. In Panel B, stocks are first sorted according to the 52-week high measure and then subsequently within the portfolios based on the 
momentum criterion. All portfolios are held over 6 months. In column 3, the average monthly portfolio returns are reported for the total sample period, in column 4 for the total period except for the dot-com bubble 
period between October 1998 and February 2000. Column 5 reports the average monthly returns for all months except Januaries and within the last column both January returns and dot-com bubble returns are 
skipped. The t-statistics are in parentheses. *;**;*** are the significance levels on the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
      
Panel A 
Portfolios 
Classified by the 
Momentum 
Portfolios Classified by 
the 52-Week High  Ave. Monthly Return 
Ave. Monthly Return 
Excl. 10/98-2/00 
Ave. Monthly Return 
Excl. January 
Ave. Monthly Return 
Excl. Jan. and 10/98-2/00 
Winner Winner 0.0042 0.0040 0.0032 0.0038 
Loser 0.0016 0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0013 
Winner-Loser 0.0027 (1.47) 0.0040 (2.55)** 0.0038 (2.27)** 0.0051 (3.10)*** 
Middle Winner 0.0008 0.0019 0.0003 0.0018 
Loser -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0035 -0.0030 
Winner-Loser 0.0028 (1.42) 0.0038 (2.09)** 0.0039 (2.08)** 0.0048 (2.57)** 
Loser Winner -0.0019 -0.0008 -0.0020 -0.0011 
Loser -0.0043 -0.0051 -0.0077 -0.0082 
Winner-Loser 0.0025 (0.76) 0.0043 (2.11)** 0.0056 (2.22)** 0.0071 (2.81)** 
                    
Panel B 
Portfolios 
Classified by the 
52-Week High  
Portfolios Classified by 
the Momentum Ave.Monthly Return 
Ave.Monthly Return 
Excl. 10/98-2/00 
Ave. Monthly Return 
Excl. January 
Ave.Monthly Return 
Excl. Jan. and 10/98-2/00 
Winner Winner 0.0046 0.0040 0.0032 0.0030 
Loser 0.0020 0.0018 0.0003 -0.0014 
Winner-Loser 0.0026 (1.58) 0.0022 (1.37) 0.0029 (1.74)* 0.0016 (1.07) 
Middle Winner 0.0017 0.0011 0.0004 -0.0003 
Loser -0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0014 -0.0011 
Winner-Loser 0.0028 (1.54) 0.0016 (1.20) 0.0019 (1.39) 0.0007 (0.56) 
Loser Winner -0.0008 -0.0022 -0.0039 -0.0051 
Loser -0.0031 -0.0044 -0.0067 -0.0077 
  Winner-Loser 0.0024 (1.30) 0.0022 (1.20) 0.0028 (1.67)* 0.0026 (1.54) 

 
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Table 9 
Comparison between the AI/JD Momentum and the 52-week High Strategy: Conditional Sort 
The table reports the average monthly returns of portfolios that are formed according to the A%BFD momentum and to the 52-week high strategy with a 3-month holding period from February 1981 through March 
2008. In Panel A, stocks are first sorted on the A%BFD momentum ranking criterion. The 30% of stocks with the highest (lowest) past 9 month performance are assigned to the winner (loser) portfolio; the rest of 
stocks is included in the middle portfolio. Within the three portfolios, stocks are further sorted in winner and loser portfolios based on the 52-week high criterion: The 30% of stocks with a price nearest to (furthest 
from) their one-year high are included in the winner (loser) portfolio. In Panel B, stocks are first sorted according to the 52-week high measure and then subsequently within the portfolio based on the momentum 
criterion. All portfolios are held over 3 months. In column 3, the average monthly portfolio returns are reported for the total sample period, in column 4 for the total period except for the dot-com bubble period 
between October 1998 and February 2000. Column 5 reports the average monthly returns for all months except Januaries and within the last column both January returns and Dot-Com bubble returns are skipped. 
The t-statistics are in parentheses. *;**;*** are the significance levels on the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
      
Panel A 
Portfolios Classified by 
the Momentum 
Portfolios Classified by the 
52-Week High  Ave. Monthly Return 
Ave. Monthly Return 
Excl. 10/98-2/00 
Ave. Monthly Return 
Excl. January 
Ave. Monthly Return 
Excl. Jan. and 10/98-
2/00 
Winner Winner 0,0050 0.0046 0.0039 0.0035 
Loser 0.0024 0.0013 -0.0005 -0.0012 
Winner-Loser 0.0026 (1.33) 0.0033 (1.68)* 0.0044 (2.22)** 0.0047 (2.35)** 
Middle Winner 0.0001 0.0015 0.0001 0.0014 
Loser -0.0020 -0.0017 -0.0037 -0.0037 
Winner-Loser 0.0021 (1.04) 0.0032 (1.55) 0.0038 (1.76)* 0.0051 (2.34)** 
Loser Winner -0.0021 -0.0015 -0.0028 -0.0024 
Loser -0.0047 -0.0062 -0.0074 -0.0083 
Winner-Loser 0.0025 (0.90) 0.0046 (1.67)* 0.0046 (1.68)* 0.0059 (2.08)** 
                    
Panel B 
Portfolios Classified by 
the 52-Week High  
Portfolios Classified by the 
Momentum Ave. Monthly Return 
Ave. Monthly Return 
Excl. 10/98-2/00 
Ave. Monthly Return 
Excl. January 
Ave. Monthly Return 
Excl. Jan. and 10/98-
2/00 
Winner Winner 0.0052 0.0045 0.0044 0.0038 
Loser 0.0022 0.0024 0.0019 0.0022 
Winner-Loser 0.0029 (1.67)* 0.0021 (1.35) 0.0025 (1.38) 0.0016 (1.01) 
Middle Winner 0.0014 0.0008 0.0002 -0.0004 
Loser -0.0012 -0.0007 -0.0020 -0.0016 
Winner-Loser 0.0026 (1.50) 0.0014 (0.94) 0.0022 (1.30) 0.0013 (0.82) 
Loser Winner -0.0012 -0.0026 -0.0037 -0.0049 
Loser -0.0070 -0.0092 -0.0113 -0.0127 
  Winner-Loser 0.0026 (1.20) 0.0020 0.98 0.0025 (1.18) 0.0015 (0.75) 

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Importantly, for non-January returns or outside the dot-com bubble, the 52-week high strategy 
remains also profitable within the middle momentum portfolio (with a monthly return of 
between 0.38% and 0.48%). According to the momentum strategy, these stocks do not have 
extremely high or extremely low future returns. Hence, if the momentum measure is a 
powerful predictor of future returns, forming subgroups within the middle portfolios based on 
the 52-week high criterion should not lead to profits. In contrary, the ACBCD momentum 
measure does not produce large and significant returns within the middle group of the 52-
week high. 
 
Over the total sample period, however, the dominance of the 52-week high over momentum is 
less obvious. Although the momentum criterion does not generate significant returns within 
the 52-week high groups, this is also not the case for the 52-week high measure within the 
momentum portfolios. As the findings in Table 8 indicate, either this might be due to the turn-
of-the-year effect, which distorts the results related to the relationship between the 52-week 
high and the ACBCD momentum strategy, or it could be influenced by the dot-com bubble 
period. During this phase, the 52-week high portfolios underperform the momentum ones 
although both strategies are not profitable. These findings are confirmed by the conditional 
sort of the A%BFD momentum strategy and the 52-week high with a holding period of 3 
months (Table 9). 
 
The relationship between the 52-week high and the momentum strategy is further tested using 
a two-way sort. Based on the momentum criterion, all stocks are divided into three portfolios 
(M1, M2, M3). The top 30% of the stocks are included in portfolio M1. Independently from 
this sort, stocks are arranged in three portfolios (H1, H2, H3) based on the 52-week high 
criterion, with the 30% of stocks closest to the 52-week high included in portfolio H1. Hence, 
the portfolio M1H1 consists of stocks that are in the winner portfolio according to both the 
momentum and the 52-week high ranking criterion. As above, the test is conducted for the 
relationship between the ACBCD momentum and the 52-week high with a holding period of 
six months (Table 10) and between the A%BFD momentum and the 52-week high with a 
holding period of three months (Table 11). 
 
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Table 10 
Comparison between the AG/GD Momentum and the 52-week High Strategy:  
Two-way Sort 
The table reports the average monthly returns of portfolios that are formed according to the ACBCD momentum and the 52-
week high strategy with a 6-month holding period from February 1981 through March 2008. Stocks are sorted independently 
by the 52-week high and the ACBCD momentum criterion. In portfolio M1 (M3), the top (bottom) 30% of stocks based on 
the past six month buy-and-hold return are included, while the rest of stocks that are neither winners nor losers are assigned 
to portfolio M2. Stocks are included in the portfolio H1 (H3) if they belong to the top (bottom) 30% of stocks based on the 
52-week high criterion. Stocks that belong neither to H1 nor to H3 are included in portfolio H2. All portfolios are held over 6 
months. Panel A reports the average monthly returns over the total sample period. Panel B documents average monthly 
returns when the dot-com bubble period is excluded, whereas Panel C reports average returns for non-January months. In 
Panel D, the average monthly profits are shown when both the turn-of-the-year effect and the dot-com bubble period are 
excluded. The t-statistics are in parentheses. *;**;*** are the significance levels on the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
                  
 52-week High Strategy 
 
  H1  H2 H3 H1-H3 t-stat 
 
      
(6/
1/
6) 
M
o
m
en
tu
m
 
St
ra
te
gy
 
 
Panel A: Raw Returns 
 
M1 0.0033 0.0015 0.0001 0.0033 (1.10)__ 
M2 0.0003 -0.0012 -0.0035 0.0039 (1.50)__ 
M3 0.0001 -0.0012 -0.0042 0.0043 (1.26)__ 
M1-M3 0.0032 0.0027 0.0043 -0.0011 
t-stat (1.56) (1.51) (1.94)* 
Panel B: ex Dot-com Bubble 
 
M1 0.0042 0.0016 -0.0013 0.0055 (1.95)*_ 
M2 0.0017 0.0000 -0.0032 0.0049 (1.84)*_ 
M3 0.0012 -0.0001 -0.0041 0.0053 (1.49)__ 
M1-M3 0.0030 0.0017 0.0028 0.0002 
t-stat (1.27) (0.91) (1.28) 
Panel C: ex Jan 
 
M1 0.0027 0.0004 -0.0029 0.0055 (1.98)** 
M2 0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0041 0.0045 (1.78)*_ 
M3 0.0000 -0.0007 -0.0048 0.0048 (1.35)__ 
M1-M3 0.0027 0.0011 0.0020 0.0007 
t-stat (1.02) (0.70) (0.85) 
Panel D: ex Jan and ex Dot-com Bubble 
 
M1 0.0035 0.0006 -0.0034 0.0069 (2.45)** 
M2 0.0015 0.0000 -0.0038 0.0053 (2.08)** 
M3 0.0011 0.0000 -0.0055 0.0066 (1.82)*_ 
M1-M3 0.0024 0.0006 0.0020 0.0004 
t-stat   (1.13) (0.65) (1.26)       
 
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Table 11 
Comparison between AI/JD Momentum and the 52-week High Strategy: 
Two-Way Sort 
The table reports the average monthly returns of portfolios that are formed according to the A%BFD momentum and the 52-
week high strategy with a 3-month holding period from February 1981 through March 2008. Stocks are sorted independently 
by the 52-week high and the A%BFD momentum criterion. In portfolio M1 (M3), the top (bottom) 30% of stocks based on 
the past nine month buy-and-hold return are included, while the rest of stocks that are neither winners nor losers are assigned 
to portfolio M2. Stocks are included in the portfolio H1 (H3) if they belong to the top (bottom) 30% of stocks based on the 
52-week high criterion. Stocks that belong neither to H1 nor to H3 are assigned to portfolio H2. All portfolios are held over 3 
months. Panel A reports the average monthly returns over the total sample period. Panel B documents average monthly 
returns when the dot-com bubble period is excluded, whereas Panel C reports average returns for non-January months. In 
Panel D, the average monthly profits are shown when both the turn-of-the-year effect and the dot-com bubble period are 
excluded. The t-statistics are in parentheses. *;**;*** are the significance levels on the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
                  
 52-week High Strategy 
 
  H1  H2 H3 H1-H3 t-stat 
 
      
(9/
1/
3) 
M
o
m
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m
 
St
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Panel A: Raw Returns 
 
M1 0,0040 0.0015 0.0010 0.0029 (1.00) 
M2 0.0021 -0.0005 -0.0013 0.0034 (1.12) 
M3 0.0016 -0.0018 -0.0027 0.0042 (1.10) 
M1-M3 0.0024 0.0033 0.0037 -0.0013 
t-stat (1.11) (1.41) (1.54) 
Panel B: ex Dot-com Bubble 
 
M1 0.0037 0.0012 -0.0004 0.0041 (1.76)* 
M2 0.0028 0.0004 -0.0017 0.0045 (1.81)* 
M3 0.0011 -0.0018 -0.0028 0.0039 (1.50)__ 
M1-M3 0.0026 0.0030 0.0024 0.0002 
t-stat (1.21) (1.34) (0.96) 
Panel C: ex Jan 
 
M1 0.0032 -0.0004 -0.0027 0.0059 (2.08)** 
M2 0.0017 -0.0010 -0.0030 0.0047 (1.82)* 
M3 0.0012 -0.0025 -0.0047 0.0059 (1.86)* 
M1-M3 0.0020 0.0021 0.0020 0.0000 
t-stat (1.13) (1.10) (0.88) 
Panel D: ex Jan and ex Dot-com Bubble 
 
M1 0.0029 -0.0006 -0.0032 0.0062 (2.16)** 
M2 0.0026 -0.0003 -0.0036 0.0062 (2.20)** 
M3 0.0009 -0.0024 -0.0052 0.0061 (1.88)* 
M1-M3 0.0020 0.0017 0.0020 0.0000 
t-stat   (1.13) (0.65) (1.26)       
 
 
The two-way sort confirms the findings of the conditional sort. Table 10 indicates that the 52-
week high dominates the ACBCD momentum strategy when the turn-of-the-year effect or the 
dot-com bubble effect is excluded (Panel B-D). This can be observed in the positive H1-H3 
returns that are large and mostly significant. They indicate whether stocks with a price close 
to the 52-week high outperform stocks with a price far from their one year high within the 
- 85 - 

same momentum portfolio. In opposite, the M1-M3 portfolio returns are small and not 
significant. They document whether stocks with a good 6-month performance outperform 
stocks with a poor 6-month return within the same 52-week high portfolio. Hence, the 52-
week high strategy seems to dominate the ACBCD momentum strategy at least outside the 
dot-com bubble period or in non-January returns. The results of the two-way sort that 
examines the relationship between the A%BFD  momentum effect and the 52-week high 
strategy with a holding period of three months lead to similar conclusions (Table 11). 
 
So far, the results indicate that the momentum and the 52-week high strategy generate similar 
returns, but that the 52-week high dominates momentum – at least when it is controlled for 
the dot-com bubble effect or the turn-of-the-year effect. Yet, this is not enough to reject the 
hypothesis that momentum is not driven by the anchoring phenomenon. The cause for the 
profitability of the 52-week high strategy (and hence of momentum) could also be a risk 
factor not yet detected or another behavioral heuristic than anchoring.  
5. The Anchoring Bias as Explanation for the 52-week High Profits 
5.1 The Anchoring Bias 
A potential explanation for the profitability of the 52-week high strategy is “anchoring” 
(George and Hwang, 2004). Anchoring refers to the method how people make estimations. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1982, pp.1128) argue that people form estimates by starting from an 
initial value and then adjusting to the final guess. Anchoring states that this adjustment is not 
sufficient and that subjects focus too much on the initial value (or reference point). Hence, 
anchoring can be defined as the insufficient adjustment of people’s estimate from the starting 
value to the final guess. 
 
To examine this behavior, I carry out an experimental analysis similar to one of Tversky and 
Kahneman (1982). I ask 105 undergraduate students to estimate the fraction of the area in 
Germany that is used for agriculture. This question is chosen based on two criteria: First, its 
answer should be unknown to the subjects so that they in fact have to guess the correct 
percentage and secondly it should be easily understandable for the participants in order to 
avoid misunderstandings. In the test, the participants have to answer two questions. In the first 
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one, they are asked to estimate whether the fraction is smaller or larger than a specific 
number, which is given to them and which varies across the students. The specific number 
represents the initial value and is 20% for the first group, 50% for the second and 70% for the 
third group. In a second question, they have to estimate the percentage. In order to ensure that 
the results are not biased by a group dynamic, I make sure that a student’s estimation is not 
influenced by her neighbor by first leaving enough space between the subjects and secondly 
by not giving the same initial value to students sitting next to each other. Furthermore, as the 
test is anonymous and as I do not offer payoffs for accuracy, the risk that decisions are made 
based on other criteria than the own estimate is quite small. 
 
The core finding of the test is that the arbitrarily numbers have a substantial effect on the 
estimates. The median estimate for the group that obtains 20% as percentage number is 31% 
while it is 47% for the group with an initial value of 50%. Participants that have to evaluate 
whether the percentage is smaller or larger than 70% have a median estimate of 56%. When 
the estimates are compared pairwise between the groups, the differences are highly significant 
with a p-value below 0.01. 
5.2 The x-month High Strategy 
As a first test for anchoring as explanation for the 52-week high and hence for momentum 
profits, I examine whether the predictive power of the KLMN( ranking criterion is improved 
when I replace the 52-week high price by the x-month high price. I define the x-month high 
price as the highest price of a stock over the past x months. This test allows to examine two 
implications of my core hypothesis. First, as in the first test, it is tested whether the 52-week 
high is indeed driven by the described behavioral phenomenon. While many newspapers 
publish the 52-week high price, this is not the case for most x-month high prices of a stock. 
As this information is not easily available to traders, they should not be able to use it as a 
reference point against which they evaluate the impact of news. Therefore, according to the 
anchoring hypothesis, strategies should not dominate the 52-week high strategy that rank 
stocks based on their nearness to an x-month high, which is not widely published. If however 
an x-month high strategy dominates the 52-week high, anchoring would not be the right 
explanation for the 52-week high (and momentum) profits. Secondly, this test can also be 
used to examine whether the 52-week high price is the reference point used by traders that 
- 87 - 

suffer from the anchoring bias. For example, some newspapers do also publish the 1-month 
high or the 3-month high of a stock. If the 1-month high strategy or the 3-month high strategy 
dominates the 52-week high, anchoring cannot be rejected although the 52-week high price 
might not be the correct reference point. 
 
The x-month high strategy is constructed similarly to the 52-week high strategy except for 
denominator. It is represented by 	')O )	 the highest price of stock *  over a period of 	. 
month length that ends at the beginning of month   B: 
&'
O 
	&)
	')	
O 																							AB%D 
&')	
O is constructed by using daily data and measuring the maximum intraday high price 
for stock 	*	 during the .-month period. 
 
Table 12 documents the profitability of x-month high strategies during the total sample 
(column A), for all months except January (column B) and for all months except during the 
dot-com bubble. The 52-week high strategy dominates all x-month high strategies. This 
strongly supports the anchoring story since the biggest difference between most x-month high 
prices and the 52-week high price is the availability of the information and therefore, the 52-
week high qualifies as reference point while most x-month high measures do not. Beside the 
52-week high, strategies that employ the highest price of a stock over a period close to one 
year yield the highest returns. This pattern is illustrated in Figure 5 where the monthly 
average returns of the x-month high strategies are shown graphically. It documents that profits 
are inverted u-shaped. The closer (further) the length of the period over which the highest 
price of a stock is measured with respect to the one year high, the smaller (larger) is the 
difference between the monthly returns. This is not surprising, as with a high probability, the 
maximum price of a stock over a period close to one year is identical to the 52-week high 
price. For example, the 1-month high is only equal to the 52-week high if the highest price 
over the past year is reached within the previous month. In opposite, the chance that the 52-
week high and the 9-month high are identical is larger as they have nine months in common. 
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Table 12 
Profitability of x-month High Strategies 
This table reports the average monthly portfolio returns in excess of the Datastream Germany Price Index average return 
from February 1981 through March 2008 for all x-month high strategies except for the 15-month and 18-month high which 
start in May 1980 and August 1980 respectively. The reason for this is that this sample starts in January 1980 and these 
strategies require the highest price of a stock over the previous 15 and 18 months (plus a skip period). The highest price of a 
stock is obtained by using daily intraday prices and calculating the maximum price for each stock over the previous x 
months. The x-month high portfolios are built based on the ratio of the current price of a stock to the highest price within the 
past x months. All portfolios are equal-weighted and held over the investment period of six months. Between the ranking and 
holding period, a skip period of one month is included to abstract from bid/ask bounce. The winner (loser) portfolio of the x-
month high strategy consists of the top (bottom) 30% of stocks based on the strategy’s ranking criterion. For the ranking, all 
German stocks on Datastream with a price larger than 1 Euro and a market value above 50 Million Euro are considered; t-
statistics (two-tailed) are reported in parentheses. *;**;*** are the significance levels on the 10%, 5% and 1% level 


          
X-month High  All months ex Jan. ex Dot-com Bubble 
Strategy  Wi  Lo Wi-Lo Wi  Lo Wi-Lo Wi  Lo Wi-Lo 

1-month   0.0016 -0.0011 0.0026 0.0019 -0.0027 0.0047** 0.0015 -0.0022 0.0036** 
 (1.48) (2.45) (1.94) 
3-month   0.0019 -0.0010 0.0029___ 0.0018 -0.0036 0.0055**_ 0.0018 -0.0022 0.0040___ 
 (1.14)___ (1.91)___ (1.55)___ 
6-month   0.0027 -0.0019 0.0045___ 0.0026 -0.0043 0.0069**_ 0.0026 -0.0032 0.0058**_ 
 (1.58)___ (2.44)___ (1.95)___ 
9-month   0.0032 -0.0024 0.0056**_ 0.0030 -0.0047 0.0077*** 0.0029 -0.0038 0.0066**_ 
 (2.07)___ (2.91)___ (2.43)___ 
12-month   0.0033 -0.0025 0.0058**_ 0.0024 -0.0055 0.0079*** 0.0040 -0.0028 0.0067**_ 
(52-week)  (2.24)___ (3.08)___ (2.50)__ 
15-month  0.0021 -0.0030 0.0051*__ 0.0018 -0.0050 0.0069*** 0.0028 -0.0032 0.0060**_ 
 (1.94)__ (2.70)___ (2.24)___ 
18-month  0.0023 -0.0024 0.0048*__ 0.0021 -0.0043 0.0065*** 0.0027 -0.0027 0.0055**_ 
 
    (1.90)*__       (2.64)___        (1.82)___ 
 
 
Furthermore, given that anchoring explains the 52-week high profits, other x-month high 
prices do not qualify as potential reference points used by traders. Both the 1-month high and 
the 3-month high prices are also published in some newspapers. However, strategies that use 
these figures in their ranking criterion are less profitable than the 52-week high and they are 
not substantially more profitable than other x-month high strategies65. 
 
In summary, these findings support anchoring as the explanation for the profits of the 52-
week high (and the momentum) strategy and secondly present evidence for the 52-week high 
as the reference point used by investors. 

 
A
In Figure 5, the 1-month high performance appears not to nicely fit into the inverted u-shape of the monthly average 
returns. This might be because the x-month high strategies differ by three months except for the 1-month high which covers a 
ranking period that is only 2 month shorter than the 3-month high.
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Figure 5 
Monthly Profits to x-month High Strategies  
This graph illustrates the average monthly returns of different x-month high strategies. On the x-axis, the number of months 
is shown over which the highest price for each stock is measured and on the y-axis, the average monthly return is 
documented. For each x-month high strategy, the average return for the total period, the average return for all months except 
January and for the total period except the dot-com bubble period is illustrated. 
 
 
5.3 The Industry-52-week High Strategy 
As documented, momentum strategies are profitable for individual stocks. There is also some 
evidence that the momentum effect is present at industry level (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 
1999, Nijman et al., 2004). Strategies that buy the top industries and sell the bottom industries 
based on the past returns over the ranking period generate significant monthly profits. Since 
momentum and the 52-week high strategies seem to be related, it is worth to examine whether 
the 52-week high strategy is also profitable at industry level. This test is that powerful as it 
tests both relationships, that between the momentum and the 52-week high strategy and that 
between the 52-week high strategy and anchoring (see Figure 4). Evidence for both 
relationships is obtained by comparing the returns of the momentum and the 52-week high 
strategy at individual stock level and at industry level. Four potential findings with different 
interpretations are possible:  
 
First, the industry-52-week high strategy dominates and explains the profitability of the 52-
week high strategy at the individual stock level. This finding presents clear evidence against 
the anchoring hypothesis, which states that traders evaluate the impact on news based on a 
reference point. It implies that the reference point is a piece of information that is readily 
available to traders. This is true for the 52-week high of an individual stock as it is reported in 
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nearly all newspapers publishing stock prices. However, this is not the case for the 52-week 
high of an industry. This figure is not available and needs to be calculated manually. 
Therefore, the 52-week high price of an industry cannot be considered as an easily obtainable 
piece of information. Consequently, the industry-52-week high strategy should not be 
substantially profitable or at least not dominate the 52-week high strategy of individual stocks 
if anchoring explains its profitability. 
 
Second, the 52-week high strategy is not profitable at industry level. This could imply that the 
52-week high is not able to fully explain momentum as it has not the capability to explain its 
profitability in industry portfolios. Yet, it could also indicate that momentum and industry 
momentum are independent phenomena with different drivers66. Furthermore, this finding 
does not represent any evidence against anchoring being the driver of the 52-week high as the 
nearness to the 52-week high price of an industry is (at least) not a better predictor of future 
returns than the 52-week high price of individual stocks which is an easily available piece of 
information. 
 
Third, the profits to the industry-52-week high strategy are not larger than those to the 52-
week high but different in magnitude compared to the industry momentum returns. As above, 
since the industry-52-week high does not dominate the 52-week high, this finding does not 
present evidence against anchoring as the driver of the 52-week high. It also implies that there 
is a close link between the 52-week high and the momentum strategy, as the profits of the 
strategies are similar both at individual stock level and in industry portfolios.  
 
Fourth, the profits to the industry-52-week high strategy are not larger than those of the 52-
week high but similar to the industry momentum profits. As in the third potential finding, this 
does not contradict the anchoring idea. Concerning the link between momentum and the 52-
week high, this finding points on a close connection between the two strategies as their profits 
are similar both at individual stock and at industry level. 
 
Only the fourth potential finding presents support for the hypothesis that stock price 
momentum is driven by anchoring. The other three findings are either at odds with anchoring 
 
66
 Intuitively, due to the similar ranking criterion of momentum and industry momentum, this interpretation appears to be 
rather unrealistic. 
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being the driver of the 52-week high or challenge the relation between the 52-week high and 
momentum. 
 
The construction of the industry-52-week high strategy resembles that of the 52-week high for 
individual stocks. Yet, since for an industry, neither a price nor a 52-week high exist, I 
calculate the price-52-week high ratio (PQ&') for each industry. Therefore, the weighted 
price of all 	R7 	 stocks belonging to industry 	4	 at the beginning of month 	  B	 is divided by 
the weighted 52-week high of all 	R7 	 stocks (the highest price of a stock over one year ending 
at the beginning of month   B). Within industry 	4	, the 	R7 	 stocks are weighted based on the 
factor S). If stocks are value-weighted within the industries, it represents the fraction of 
stock 	*’s market value in   B	 to the total market value of industry 4 in 	  B. If however, 
stocks are equal-weighted within an industry, S	) is equal to one divided by 	R7: 
PQ&'7)
( 
D S)&)
TU
F
D S)')
(TU
F
											A-D 
By construction, the 	PQ&'	 measure can take positive values not larger than 1: if all stocks 
of industry 	4	 trade exactly on their 52-week high, PQ&' is one, if industry 4’s stocks have a 
price that is extremely far from their one year high, PQ&' takes a value close to zero. The 
strategy is long in stocks that belong to the 30% of industries with the highest PQ&' value 
and short in stocks that belong to 30% of industries with the lowest PQ&' measure. The 
portfolios are held over a holding period of six months. Between the ranking time and the 
holding period, a skip period of one month is included. 
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Table 13 
Description of Industries, March 1988 – March 2008 
Summary statistics of the 20 industry portfolios are reported below. The table represents only 19 industries because “Other” 
is excluded as it does not contain more than two stocks in most months. The first columns represent the average returns in 
excess of the Datastream Germany Price Index and the standard deviations of value weighted industry portfolios, while the 
second ones show the mean and standard deviation of equally weighted industry portfolios. Also reported are the average 
percentages of total market capitalization, the average number of stocks assigned to each industry and the average PHR 
(value-weighted) for each industry over the sample period. 
                  
Industry 
  
Value-weighted 
 
Equal-weighted Avg. % of 
Market 
Cap. 
Avg. No. 
of Stocks  
Average 
PHR Mean Standard deviation   Mean  
Standard 
deviation 
Automobiles & Parts 0.15 3.15 0.12 2.66 3.98% 30.76 0.92 
Banks 0.50 2.74 0.17 1.70 17.01% 83.16 0.90 
Basic Resources 0.61 3.52 0.44 2.86 2.47% 52.47 0.94 
Chemicals 0.21 2.41 0.33 1.91 3.37% 29.27 0.95 
Construct. & Material 0.24 2.67 0.06 2.47 0.85% 35.25 0.95 
Financial Services 0.64 3.44 0.21 2.62 5.87% 48.92 0.93 
Food & Beverage 0.66 2.07 0.21 1.50 0.69% 38.74 0.94 
Healthcare 0.73 2.63 0.67 2.74 8.80% 72.20 0.93 
Ind. Goods & Services 0.50 3.11 0.17 2.43 8.09% 154.26 0.92 
Insurance 0.23 2.99 0.06 2.48 5.36% 49.84 0.93 
Media 0.18 3.79 0.17 4.01 4.19% 37.86 0.89 
Oil & Gas 0.65 2.74 0.43 2.85 3.63% 30.69 0.89 
Pers & Household Goods 0.34 2.42 0.03 2.07 4.51% 57.49 0.92 
Real Estate 0.58 2.64 0.18 2.09 0.95% 34.12 0.95 
Retail 0.27 2.67 0.11 2.64 3.25% 46.58 0.92 
Technology 0.72 5.02 0.44 4.36 8.43% 139.70 0.89 
Telecommunications 0.50 3.53 0.20 3.54 12.21% 33.75 0.90 
Travel & Leisure 0.24 2.89 0.13 2.36 1.71% 28.10 0.91 
Utilities 0.52 1.82   0.24 1.79 4.63% 31.57 0.95 
 
 
In order to examine the industry-52-week high strategy, I classify stocks into one of 20 
industries according to the FTSE Economic and Industrial sector criterion of Datastream. I 
decide for this industry measure for three reasons. First, Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) also 
classify stocks into 20 industry categories when examining industry momentum. Secondly, 
dividing stocks into more than 20 industry groups would imply a smaller number of stocks 
per industry which increases the risk that results are driven by idiosyncratic effects due to lack 
of diversification. A broader measure in opposite would reduce the number of industries that 
is included in the winner and loser portfolios 
 
To ensure that the industry portfolios are well diversified and have only negligible firm-
specific risk, I reduce my sample period to the interval between March 1988 and March 2008. 
This is necessary since the industry-52-week high strategy has stricter requirements on data 
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availability than the momentum and the 52-week high strategies as a sufficient number of 
stocks is necessary for each industry to ensure diversification. Since the number of stocks is 
small for some industries between 1980 and 1988, this period is ignored in the subsequent 
research. Additionally, each month, only industry that contain 15 stocks or more are 
considered. 
 
Table 13 gives a description of the industry portfolios and a summary on them. There are 
some differences in the average monthly returns of industry portfolios when stocks are value- 
and equal-weighted within an industry. Therefore, the following tests are computed for both 
value-weighted and equal-weighted industry portfolios. 
 
Table 14 reports the profits to the industry-52-week high and to the industry momentum 
strategy. Panel A documents the profits to the strategies when stocks are value-weighted 
within an industry and Panel B when stocks are equal-weighted within an industry. The 
industry-52-week high strategy generates significant positive returns both when stocks are 
value-weighted and equal-weighted within an industry. The strategy remains profitable after 
the exclusion of the turn-of-the-year effect (line 4 in Panel A and B) and/or of the dot-com 
bubble (line 6 in Panel A and B). However, compared to the 52-week high strategy for 
individual stocks, the industry-52-week high is substantially less profitable. The 52-week high 
with a holding period of six months yields a monthly profit of 0.59% for the total sample, 
0.75% for the period except the dot-com bubble and 0.80% for non-January returns between 
March 1, 1988 and March 1, 2008 (not reported in the tables). The industry-52-week high 
portfolios generate substantially lower returns with an average profit of 0.32% for the total 
sample, 0.44% for the non-dot-com bubble period and 0.44% for non-January months (when 
stocks are value-weighting within industries). To be very precise, I also compare the 52-week 
high strategy to the industry-52-week high strategy when stocks are not only equal-weighted 
within the industries but within the total winner and loser portfolios (line 8). This ensures that 
only the ranking criteria of the 52-week high and of the industry-52-week high strategy are 
compared, but not also the weighting method. But even with the same weighting within the 
winner and loser portfolios, the industry-52-week high strategy is still not as profitable as the 
52-week high strategy. 
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Table 14 
Profitability of Industry Strategies 
This table reports the average monthly portfolio returns from 1st March 1988 to 1st March 2008, for industry momentum and 
industry-52-week high strategies. In Panel A, stocks are value-weighted within an industry while stocks are equal-weighted 
within an industry in Panel B. Industry momentum portfolios are built based on the past buy-and-hold returns over the 
ranking period. The industry-52-week high portfolios are formed based on the ratio of current average price of all stocks 
belonging to industry 4 to the highest average price within the past 12 months. All portfolios are held over an investment 
period of 6 months. Between the ranking and the holding period, a skip period of 1 month is included to abstract from bid/ask 
bounce. The winner (loser) portfolios of the momentum strategy consist of stocks that belong to the 30% of industries with 
the highest (lowest) return over the ranking period. The winner (loser) portfolios of the 52-week high strategy include stocks 
that belong to the 30% of industries with the highest (lowest) quotient of the current average price to the average 52-week 
high. For the ranking, all German stocks on Datastream with a price larger than 1 Euro and a market value above 50 Million 
Euro are considered; t-statistics (two-tailed) are reported in parentheses. *;**;*** are the significance levels on the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level. 

    
 Wi Lo Wi-Lo t-stat 
 Panel A: Value-Weighting 
Industry Momentum ACBCD  0.0058 0.0024 0.0034 (1.73)* 
Industry-52-week High  0.0051 0.0019 0.0032 (1.67)* 
  
Industry Momentum ACBCD ex. Jan  0.0053 0.0016 0.0038 (1.83)* 
Industry-52-week High ex. Jan  0.0048 0.0004 0.0044 (2.17)** 

Industry Momentum ACBCD ex. 10/98-2/00  0.0062 0.0028 0.0036 (1.81)* 
Industry-52-week High ex. 10/98-2/00  0.0058 0.0013 0.0044 (2.10)** 

 Panel B: Equal-weighting 

Industry Momentum ACBCD  0.0039 -0.0004 0.0043 (2.27)** 
Industry-52week High  0.0033 -0.0007 0.0040 (1.72)* 

Industry Momentum ACBCD ex. Jan  0.003 -0.0024 0.0053 (2.51)** 
Industry-52-week High ex. Jan  0.0029 -0.0025 0.0054 (2.52)** 

Industry Momentum ACBCD	ex. 10/98-2/00  0.0032 -0.0011 0.0044 (2.17)** 
Industry-52-week High ex. 10/98-2/00  0.0030 -0.0025 0.0054 (2.57)*** 

Ind. Mom. ACBCD (Equal-weighted portfolios)  0.0038 0.0007 0.0033 (1.75)* 
Ind. 52-week High (Equal-weighted portfolios)  0.0038 0.0005 0.0034   (1.72)* 
 
 
Furthermore, industry momentum does not outperfom the industry-52-week high strategy. 
Both yield similar profits during the total sample period. For equal-weighted industry 
portfolios, the difference is 0.03%, for value-weighted portfolios it is only 0.02%. The 
difference in the profitability is larger when the dot-com bubble period or the turn-of-the-year 
effect is excluded, but even still below 0.10%.  
 
In summary, the momentum and the 52-week high strategy seem to be linked closely together. 
Both at individual stock level and across industry portfolios, the returns to the strategies are of 
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similar magnitude. Furthermore, since the industry-52-week high does not dominate the 52-
week high strategy for individual stocks, I cannot reject the hypothesis that the 52-week high 
(and hence momentum) can be explained by anchoring. Moreover, I do not find any evidence 
that industry momentum can explain the profitability of individual momentum which is 
documented in Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) for the U.S. market. 67  In Table 14, the 
industry momentum portfolios yield substantially lower returns than individual momentum 
portfolios. This finding is consistent with Nijman et al. (2004) documenting that industry 
momentum plays only a minor role in explaining the individual momentum effect for 
European stocks.  
5.4 The 52-week High Strategy during the Dot-com Bubble 
As a third test for anchoring being the driver of the 52-week high, I measure the profitability 
of the 52-week high strategy during the emergence of the dot-com bubble. There is a vast of 
literature, which documents that bubbles are caused by irrational behavior of subjects. 
Herding - the tendency of subjects of being influenced by others (see, e.g. Hirshleifer and 
Hong Teoh (2003) for an overview) and overreaction (e.g. Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003, 
Hong et al., 2006). This argumentation implies that subjects change their behavior during a 
bubble. When herding or overreacting to private news, people form their estimates about 
future stock price based on other criteria than a reference point. This implies that the 52-week 
high strategy should not be profitable during the Dot-com phase if anchoring is in fact its 
driver. 
 
As mentioned above, I define October 1, 1998 as beginning and March 1, 2000 as ending date 
of the dot-com bubble. 68  During that period, the 52-week high portfolios generate 
substantially negative returns for all examined holding periods (between -0.80% and -1.30% 
per month on average). Hence, while the 52-week high ranking criterion seems to work well 
in predicting future stock returns outside the dot-com bubble. This is not the case within this 
period. The difference in the profitability of the 52-week high in and outside the dot-com 
 
67
 The role of industry momentum in explaining the existence of individual stock momentum is heavily discussed. Conrad 
and Kaul (1998) Grundy and Martin (2001), Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) among others provide theoretical as well as 
empirical evidence against Moskowitz and Grinblatt’s (1999) hypothesis. 
68
 Another possibility to examine the influence of the Dot-com Bubble on the strategies’ profitability is to identify candidate 
firms by the ratio of price-to sales (P/S) and use the highest P/S quantile as Brunnemeier and Nagel (2004). Yet, information 
about sales is not available for all stocks. Furthermore, in this study, the profitability of the strategies for the total sample is of 
interest. Therefore, a classification of stocks by industries is preferred. 
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bubble indicates that the driver of this strategy disappeared during the time. One explanation 
could be the behavior of investors: while they normally use the 52-week high as orientation in 
evaluating news and suffer from anchoring, they form their estimations about future stock 
prices based on other criteria during the bubble (e.g. herding). This might be viewed as 
evidence that the 52-week high is driven by people’s non-rational behavior. 
5.5 The 52-week Low Price– An Alternative Anchor? 
Beside the 52-week high price, investors could also use the 52-week low price of a stock as a 
reference point as this information is also easily available. The 52-week low reports the 
lowest price of a stock within the past 52 weeks. Therefore, I also examine a strategy based 
on the 52-week low and examine a strategy that buys 30% of stocks of which the price is 
furthest away from their 52-week low and sells 30% of stocks with a price closest to the 52-
week low. This strategy is substantially less profitable than the 52-week high. For a holding 
period of six months, the 52-week low portfolios generate an average monthly return of 
0.39% (t-statistic: 2.46). The profitability of the strategy is not surprising as it partly replicates 
the 52-week high strategy: The 52-week low portfolios are long in stocks with a price far 
from the 52-week low and short in stocks with a price close to the 52-week low. Stocks that 
are far from the 52-week low are often those that are close to their 52-week high and stocks 
that are close to their 52-week low are often those with a price far from the 52-week high. 
This can also be seen in the data. Over the total sample period, 46.7% (47.0%) of stocks in the 
winner (loser) portfolio based on the 52-week high criterion are also in the winner (loser) 
portfolio based on the 52-week low criterion. Hence, the 52-week low strategy is partially 
long in stocks that are close to the 52-week high and partially short in stocks with a price far 
from the 52-week high. Nevertheless, this replication is incomplete as the 52-week high 
strategy generates a monthly return that is about 49% higher than the 52-week low strategy. If 
each strategy is only allowed to include stocks that are not considered in the same portfolio by 
the other strategy, the 52-week high strategy yields higher returns than the 52-week low. I 
come to this conclusion as the 52-week low strategy yields lower returns than the 52-week 
high although the number of stocks that are considered winners or losers commonly by both 
strategies is large. If the 52-week high winners and losers are not allowed to be included into 
the winner and loser portfolios of the 52-week low strategy, the latter strategy loses its 
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profitability and generates an insignificant average monthly return of 0.14% (t-stat 0.56). 
Hence, the 52-week low profits seem to be driven by the 52-week high criterion. 
6. Robustness Tests 
To ensure that the findings are not driven by illiquid stocks, I recalculate momentum and 52-
week high returns and only considers stocks for the ranking that are traded continuously in all 
six months before the ranking date. This approach goes back to Forner and Marhuenda 
(2003). Table 15 reports the results for the ACBCD momentum and the 52-week high strategy 
with a holding period of six months. It shows that the profits to the strategies are only slightly 
different under this assumption. Hence, my requirements for stocks to be included in the 
sample (stocks with a market value larger than 50 million Euro and a price above one Euro) 
seem to be sufficient. 
 
Table 15 
Profits to the Strategies when Limited to Highly Liquid Stocks 
This table reports the average monthly portfolio returns in excess of the Datastream Germany Price Index average return 
from February 1981 through March 2008, for the ACBCD  momentum strategy and the 52-week high strategy. The 
momentum strategy ranks stocks based on their past buy-and-hold returns over the ranking period. The top (bottom) 30% of 
stocks are included in the winner (loser) portfolio. The 52-week high strategy sorts stocks on the ratio of their current price to 
their highest price within the past 12 months. The 30% of stocks with the highest (lowest) ratio are included in the winner 
(loser) portfolio. All portfolios are held over the investment period of six months. Between the ranking and the holding 
period, a skip period of 1 month is included to abstract from bid/ask bounce. In the left column, monthly returns for strategies 
are reported when only stocks are considered for ranking with a price larger than 1 Euro, a market value above 50 million 
Euro and which are traded continuously in all six months before the ranking date. In the right columns, stocks are considered 
with a price larger than 1 Euro and a market value above 50 Million Euro for the ranking. The data contains all German 
stocks on Datastream; t-statistics (two-tailed) are reported in parentheses. *;**;*** are the significance levels on the 10%, 
5% and 1% level. 
 
                
 Stocks traded continuously All stocks 
 Wi  Lo Wi-Lo Wi  Lo Wi-Lo 
Raw Returns 
Mom ACBCD 0.0030 -0.0024 0.0053*** 0.0034 -0.0022 0.0056*** 
(2.89)___ (2.75)___ 
52-week High 0.0029 -0.0023 0.0052*** 0.0033 -0.0025 0.0058**_ 
(3.63)___ (2.24)___ 
 
Ex Jan. 
Mom ACBCD 0.0019 -0.0039 0.0058*** 0.0023 -0.0039 0.0062*** 
(3.28)___ (3.13)___ 
52-week High 0.0026 -0.0047 0.0073*** 0.0025 -0.0046 0.0071*** 
      (3.95)___       (2.91)___ 
 
Ex Dot-com 
Bubble 
Mom ACBCD  0.0040 -0.0015 0.0054*** 0.0032 -0.0024 0.0057*** 
(3.68)___ (2.63)___ 
52-week High 0.0037 -0.0019 0.0056*** 0.0040 -0.0028 0.0067**_ 
(3.87)___ (2.50) 
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To further limit the risk of obtaining biased results due to data mining, I follow August et al. 
(2000) and Göppl and Schütz (1992) and only include those stocks that are traded in at least 
50% of all months of the sample. This limitation also does not alter my results and 
conclusions (not reported in the tables). 
 
In order to ensure that dot-com bubble period does not heavily influence my results, I report 
monthly returns for all months except those during October 1998 and February 2000. Another 
way to control for this short episode in finance history is to measure profits of momentum and 
52-week high strategies when technology and telecommunication stocks are excluded from 
the sample. These stocks are most heavily influenced by the emergence and the collapse of 
the dot-com bubble. Yet, the exclusion does not alter my findings: the ACBCD momentum 
strategy generates an average monthly return of 0.53%, which is only slightly smaller than 
0.56% for all stocks; the profitability of the 52-week high strategy is with 0.57% almost 
identical compared to 0.58% for all stocks. 
 
The last robustness check relates to stocks delisted during the holding period. As in Forner 
(2003, p.72), this study assumes that the proceeds of the delisted stocks are at once equally 
invested in the remaining stocks. To ensure that this does not influence the results I use the 
procedure of Agyei-Ampomah (2003, p.780) and assume a return of zero when a stock is 
delisted. Yet, as the percentage of stocks that are delisted during each ranking period is small, 
this assumption does not change my results.  
7. Summary 
This work relates to the behavioral finance literature and tests the hypothesis whether momentum can 
be explained by anchoring – a behavioral heuristic documented by Kahneman et al. (1982, p.14-20) 
which states that subjects focus too much on a reference point when forming estimates. With three 
different tests, I find support for the 52-week high price of a stock being used as a reference point by 
investors against which they evaluate the impact of news on the stock price. Based on the results, 
anchoring cannot be rejected as driver of the 52-week high strategy. This is the main finding of this 
part of my thesis. Up to my knowledge, this study is the first to test empirically whether anchoring 
qualifies as the driver of the 52-week high strategy.  
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Testing whether anchoring qualifies as explanation for the profits to the 52-week high strategy is 
important as it indicates whether evidence against the EMH is found. Without clear indication for 
investors’ non-rationality driving the 52-week high, the relation between momentum and the 52-week 
high documented in George and Hwang (2004) only states that one strategy is explained by another 
although the drivers of both are unknown and could also be linked to risk factors. 
 
I also go further than George and Hwang (2004) in testing the relationship between momentum and 
the 52-week high strategy. On the one hand, the relation between the two strategies is explored more 
broadly. Firstly, the profitability of both strategies is compared for different ranking and holding 
periods. This is important as it is not sufficient to compare the 52-week high to only one or two 
momentum strategies (e.g. the ACBCD strategy) in order to document the dominance of the 52-week 
high. Secondly, I look at the profitability of both strategies at industry level and find that they generate 
returns of similar magnitude. The similar profitability of them for industry portfolios further indicates 
a close relation between momentum and the 52-week high. On the other hand, the link between the 
two strategies is tested with two sorting and one regression approaches as all methods have strengths 
but also face substantial drawbacks. 
 
The third contribution of this work is to present some insights into the momentum literature for non-
U.S. data. As most studies examine U.S. stocks, it is important to use a different sample in order to 
exclude data mining as explanation for the momentum effect. This work shows that the momentum 
effect still exists after 2001, which is doubted by Henker et al (2006) and Hwang and Rubesam (2007). 
I therefore support the view of Dimson et al. (2008) that the non-profitability of the momentum 
strategy after 2001 is only limited to the U.S. sample. The data sample also allows a closer look at the 
momentum effect in Germany. Stock price momentum is profitable for the German market. This is 
shown by using the common methodology of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). To my knowledge, this 
has not yet been verified. With August et al. (2000) and Nelles et al. (2007), two studies of the recent 
past examine momentum profits for the German market but do not exactly employ the Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) method.69 Furthermore, this study documents that the industry momentum strategy is 
profitable. Yet, its returns are in opposite to the U.S. not as large as those of momentum strategies on 
individual stock level. Finally, this work presents evidence that the 52-week high strategy of George 
and Hwang (2004) is also profitable outside the U.S for the total sample, but that it does not work 
during the dot-com bubble between October 1998 and February 2000. 
 
69
 Nelles et al. (2007) do not control for potential microstructure distortions by skipping a month between the ranking and 
holding period. Furthermore, with CDAX stocks, their work only uses a quite small data sample. August et al. (2000) do not 
measure momentum returns with overlapping holding periods, but wait to the end of the investment period before they form 
another one. 
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Part III 
 
 
The 52-week High Strategy and Information Uncertainty 
 
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1. Introduction 
This work resembles the second part of my thesis as it tests the same null hypothesis, which 
states that the 52-week high strategy cannot be explained by anchoring. Yet, since a different 
approach to test the null hypothesis is chosen and since another sample is considered, the 
previous and this work differ substantially and cannot be included in one part of the thesis. To 
examine the null, I build in this work on an insight of the psychological literature that 
psychological biases is more present when uncertainty is greater70. It implies that a behavioral 
heuristic such as anchoring should have more room in cases of larger uncertainty. 
Consequently, given that anchoring explains the 52-week high profits, the 52-week high 
measure should have more predictive power in cases of larger information uncertainty. 
Information uncertainty is defined as the doubt about the implication of news on a firm’s 
value (Zhang, 2006); it arises either due to a firm’s underlying fundamental volatility or due 
to poor information. I expect the level of information uncertainty to be positively related to 
52-week high winner stocks and negatively related to 52-week high loser stocks if anchoring 
is the driver of the strategy. 
 
As a measure for information uncertainty, I use six proxies: firm size (market value), firm’s 
book-to-market ratio, the distance between the 52-week high price of a stock and its 52-week 
low price, stock price volatility, firm age and cash flow volatility. Four out of the six proxies 
have already been employed by the literature as measures for uncertainty (see e.g. Zhan, 
2006). The other two variables (the firm’s book-to-market ratio and the distance of a stock’s 
52-week high price to the 52-week low price) are to my knowledge new in the information 
uncertainty literature. Although each of the six measures might also contain other effects than 
information uncertainty, their common element should be the ability to quantify uncertainty 
about the impact of news on a firm’s fundamentals. 
2. Information Uncertainty 
According to Zhang (2006), information uncertainty is defined as the uncertainty about the 
impact of new information on the firm’s value. Either the ambiguity can arise due to the 
volatility of the fundamentals of a firm or it could be due to the quality of the information. 
 
70
 See also the work of Daniel et al. (1998, 2001) and Hirshleifer (2001). 
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Formally, an observed signal  consists of information about the fundamental value  of a 
firm (e.g. dividend or future cash flow) and a noise term : 
    	A 
Information uncertainty is measured as the variance of the signal: 
BCA  BCA  BCA   D EF AA 
Given that EF A  , information uncertainty is equal to the variance of the volatility of 
the firm’s fundamentals and the variance of the noise term. While the first part of the right-
hand side can be interpreted as the firm’s underlying fundamental volatility, the latter refers to 
the quality of the information. In the subsequent empirical tests, I do not differentiate between 
the two sources as it is difficult to distinguish between them empirically. Stocks, for which 
BCA is large are called high-uncertainty stocks (H), whereas stocks with a small variance 
of the signal are named low-uncertainty stocks (L).  
 
Given that a behavioral bias explains the profitability of the 52-week high strategy, I predict 
that high-uncertainty 52-week high winners have a higher future return than low-uncertainty 
52-week high winners and that high-uncertainty 52-week high losers have a lower future 
return than low-uncertainty losers: 

  
  
  
  A 
where  and  ( and ) are returns for high- and low-uncertainty 52-week high 
winner (loser) stocks. It implies that the 52-week high strategy is more profitable for high-
uncertainty stocks than when it is limited to low-uncertainty stocks: 

  
  
  
 A 
To proxy information uncertainty, I employ six different variables. Firm size qualifies quite 
intuitively as a measure since small firms are often less diversified than big ones, which 
implies a higher volatility in fundamentals. Moreover, small companies do not provide as 
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much information to the market as large ones. They have fewer shareholders, customers and 
suppliers and may have lower disclosure preparation costs. Additionally, if investors have 
fixed costs in the acquisition of information, they put in sum more effort in stocks in which 
they can take larger positions (Hong et al., 2000). Firm size is measured as the market value 
of each company at the ranking date.71 
 
A second proxy is the book-to-market value of a firm. Daniel and Titman (1999) argue that 
ambiguity is larger for growth stocks than for value stocks. They state that the value of a 
growth stock heavily depends on future growth possibilities and intangible assets (Daniel and 
Titman, 1999, p.30), which are especially difficult to measure. Therefore, in the attempt to 
estimate the value of an investment, investors more heavily depend on subjective information 
and are confronted with more ambiguity when estimating the value of a growth stock 
compared to a value stock. Similar to Fama and French (1993), I calculate the book value of a 
firm as the shareholders’ equity plus deferred taxes (balance sheet deferred taxes plus balance 
sheet investment tax credit). Different to Fama and French (1993), I do not subtract the value 
of preferred stock, as this type of data is not available from Datastream (see also Nagel, 2001 
and Daniel and Titman, 1999). If a book value is negative, I exclude it from the analysis. 
 
Another measure for information uncertainty is the distance of the 52-week high price to the 
52-week low price of a stock. The 52-week high (low) is the highest (lowest) price of a stock 
in the past 52 weeks. The proxy  (Low-High Ratio) is calculated as follows: 
 !" 
	A
BC
D	A
BC
#A 
where D
-	A
BC
 is the highest price of stock $ during the one year period ending at the first day of 
month %  	 and 
-	A
BC
 is the lowest price of stock $ during this interval. The lower the value 
of the variable, the higher is the distance between the 52-week high and low of a stock and 
hence the larger the level of information uncertainty. As I will show, this proxy resembles but 
is not identical to the volatility of the stock price. Theoretically, if there is few information 
about a firm, but for which uncertainty is large, price volatility is low as the stock price does 
 
71
 To be very precise, this is formally different from Zhang (2006), where the market value is considered at the portfolio 
formation date. The differentiation between the ranking date and the beginning of the holding period is important in my study 
as I include a skip period between the ranking and the holding period in opposite to Zhang (2006). 
- 104 - 

not heavily move up or down in most days of the year. However,  captures these strong 
implications of the rarely appearing information as it only considers the highest and lowest 
price of the stock over the past 12 months.  
 
Stock price volatility is another proxy for information uncertainty. It is calculated as the 
standard deviation of weekly market excess returns over the 12 months before the portfolio 
formation date. As in Lim (2001) and Zhang (2006), weekly excess returns are calculated 
from daily prices between Thursday and Wednesday in order to mitigate bid-ask bounce 
effects or non-synchronous trading. As a market reference, the UK-DS index from Datastream 
with 550 stocks is chosen. 
 
Further, the age of a firm might also give evidence on the degree of information uncertainty. 
Compared to recently founded companies, older firms have a longer history of data and more 
information available to the market (Barry and Brown, 1985). Additionally, Zhang (2006) 
argues that the age of a firm is also linked to the maturity of the industry. Therefore, the 
variable implicitly measures the underlying volatility of an industry. Ideally, the variable 
should capture the time since the firm was founded. As this information is not available for 
the total sample, AGE is calculated as the number of months since Datastream first covers the 
firm. This procedure is also employed in Zhang (2006). 
 
The cash flow volatility is another measure for information uncertainty (CFVOLA). It is 
calculated as the standard deviation of net cash flow from operating activities divided by 
average total assets of the past 3 years.72 While the sample period starts in January 1988, this 
variable is not available before January 1996. Similarly, to Zhang (2006), CVOL is assumed 
to be missing if there is only 1 or 2 years’ data available. For about 70% of stocks in my 
sample, information about the cash-flow volatility is available.73 
 
It is very likely that each variable on its own does also capture other effects than information 
uncertainty. This might be especially true for firm size. While it is employed as a proxy for 
information uncertainty in this work, Hong et al. (2000) interpret firm size as a measure for 
the rate of information diffusion. Merton (1987) and Grossman and Miller (1988) argue that 
 
72
 Zhang (2006) calculates CVOL as the standard deviation of the cash flow of the past 5 years. However, due to the limited 
period between January 1996 and August 2008, I decide for a shorter period of 3 years. 
73
 This might lead to biased results as about 30% of stocks are ignored in the tests if cash-flow volatility is considered. I do 
not assume a cash-flow volatility of zero when data is missing as otherwise, stocks with missing information would be 
automatically considered in the lowest-uncertainty stock.  
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the difference in returns across firm size is explained by the arbitrage capacity and by market 
making. Therefore, drawing any inferences based on a single proxy about information 
uncertainty might seem questionable, but taken all together their common element should be 
information uncertainty.74 
3. Data and Methodology 
This work examines the returns of different strategies between January 1989 and August 
2008, a total of 236 months. The data consists of all stocks traded in the UK and is obtained 
from Datastream on a monthly basis except for stock prices (adjusted for subsequent capital 
actions), which are also used on a weekly interval to calculate the VOLA proxy. To mitigate 
microstructure effects that are associated with low-priced and illiquid stocks, only stocks with 
a market value above 20 Mio. Pounds are considered for the ranking in month %. On average, 
965 stocks are available per month. The sample includes both surviving and delisted stocks 
and should therefore not suffer from a survivorship bias.75 
 
With UK stocks, I employ a different sample than in Part II of my thesis, where German 
stocks are examined. The reason lies in the fact that additional information about a stock is 
necessary for the tests in this part (e.g. to proxy information uncertainty). For the German 
sample, this information is not available or only for a fraction of stocks. Moreover, employing 
a different sample in Part III than in Part II offers the advantage that the same theory 
(anchoring as driver of the momentum and of the 52-week high strategy) and some patterns 
documented in the literature can be examined for different samples. For example, this thesis 
presents support for the profitability of the momentum effect and of the 52-week high strategy 
for German and UK stocks. Since most important studies investigate US stocks, employing a 
different sample contributes to the robustness of some already documented patterns. 
 
Portfolios for all strategies are constructed as follows. At the beginning of each month, all 
traded stocks are ranked in ascending order based on the strategy’s respective ranking 
 
74
 I also examine whether information uncertainty varies over time. I therefore test, whether the 52-week high strategy is 
more profitable in periods when the index volatility is above the median compared to intervals when volatility is below the 
interval. Yet, I do not obtain consistent and robust findings. Therefore, I only report tests about cross-sectional differences in 
information uncertainty. 

 Some studies using Datastream suffer from a survivorship bias since delisted stocks are missing if the data is employed 
unadjusted and in its raw state from the database. Yet, this does not mean that it is impossible to get a survivorship-free 
sample using Datastream. It provides dead stock files, which can be applied to recreate the complete sample.
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criterion. For most tests in the study, stocks are sorted into quantiles. The top stocks according 
to the criterion are assigned to the winner portfolio, the bottom to the loser portfolio. For most 
tests in the paper, a holding period of six months is examined. This is consistent with the 
literature. The portfolios are equally weighted and not rebalanced during the holding period. 
To be precise, as for the tests in Part II, this implies that a portfolio is only perfectly equal-
weighted at the formation date. Subsequently, stocks experiencing a price increase have 
implicitly a higher weight than stocks with a price drop. Momentum and 52-week high 
strategies are self-financing and are long in winner stocks and short in loser stocks. Hence, the 
profits to the strategies are computed as the arithmetic difference (WML) between the returns 
to the winner portfolio () and the returns to the loser portfolio (): 
EF    &A 
To abstract from potential microstructure effects and the bid-ask bounce, a skip of one month 
is included between the ranking and holding period. If a stock is delisted during the holding 
period, a return of zero is assumed for the stock (Agyei-Ampomah, 2003, p.780). As the 
percentage of stocks that are delisted during the holding period is quite small, this assumption 
does not influence the inferences. (The robustness of the results to the assumed returns for 
delisted stocks is already shown in Part II for the German sample, where the percentage of 
delisted stocks is larger compared to the UK sample; this robustness test for the UK sample is 
available on request).  
 
To increase the statistical power and to reduce the effects of the bid-ask bounce (Moskowitz 
and Grinblatt, 1999, p.1258), monthly portfolio returns are calculated on an overlapping 
holding period basis. It implies that the total portfolio return per month is the average return 
of ' strategies (with ' equal to the length of the holding period, in months), each beginning 
one month apart. In each of the ' portfolios, a fraction of 	(' of the total amount is invested. 
For example, at the beginning of month %, the winner portfolio with a holding period of 3 
months consists of three sub-portfolios: one formed at the beginning of %  , one built in 
%   and one started in %  	. The return to the winner portfolio in % is the average return of 
the three subportfolios. At the beginning of month %  	, the monthly return is measured for 
the subportfolios constructed in %  , %  	 and %, where the portfolio formed in % 
replaces the one built in %  . An advantage of this method is that simple t-statistics can be 
employed (Rouwenhorst, 1998, Lee and Swaminathan, 2000). As in Part II, I test whether 
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returns are autocorrelated by using the Breutsch-Godfrey test. Therefore, I regress the 
monthly returns   of the 52-week high strategy on a constant E and an error term ) : 
  E  ) . The obtained )*  (least squares) are regressed on their + lags in a simple AR(p) 
model: )*  E,  -")* !"  -.)* !" / -0)* !0  1 . I chose different values for + 
between 1 and 12. From this auxiliary regression, I obtain . which is necessary to get the 
test statistics that is denoted with %  CA.234.. The tests show that simple t-statistics can be 
employed. 
 
As in Part II, the ranking criterion for the 52-week high strategy can formally be described as 
(see also Equation 17): 
5 !"
6. 
5 !"
 !"
6.
7A
where 5 !" is the price of stock $ at the first day of month %  	 and  !"6.  is stock $’s 
highest price during the one-year period ending at the first day of month %  	. According to 
Equation (27), all stocks in month %  	 are sorted into five portfolios. The top 20% of stocks 
– those with the highest 5 value and hence with a price close to their 52-week high – are 
assigned to portfolio P5, the bottom 20% to portfolio P1. Table 16 reports for each of the five 
52-week high portfolios the average monthly raw returns (column 1), the non-January 
returns76 to control for the turn-of-the-year effect (column 2) and the Fama-French alphas to 
control for risk factors77 (column 3). The difference between P5 and P1, which implies the 
profits to the 52-week high strategy, is 1.21% for the total sample, 1.44% when January 
returns are excluded and 1.87% when returns are adjusted for the three Fama-French factors.78 
This verifies that the 52-week high strategy is profitable for my sample. The turn-of-the year 
effect can also be observed in the data, as the loser stocks (P1) yield lower returns outside 
Januaries. This is also true for stocks in portfolio P5, yet the difference is more than twice for 
loser stocks than for winners.  
 
76
 The exclusion of January returns allows obtaining results, which are not biased by the turn-of-the-year effect. It implies 
that stocks with a poor performance experience a recovery at the beginning of a new year. According to Roll (1983), Griffiths 
and White (1993) and Ferris et al. (2001), investors sell loser stocks at the end of the year in order to realize tax loss benefits. 
This leads to lower prices at year-end for loser stocks. At the beginning of the following year, the selling pressure vanishes 
and the prices of the loser stocks recover. 
77
 A detailed description of how the Fama-French alphas are calculated can be found in Section 4.2. 
78
 The 52-week high strategy is not profitable during the Dot-com Bubble period between October 1998 and March 2000 
with an average monthly return of -1.11%.  
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Table 16 
Profits to the 52-week High and the (6/1/6) Momentum Strategy 
This table reports the average monthly portfolio returns from January 1989 to August 2008 for the 52-week high strategy and 
for the (6/1/6) momentum strategy. The 52-week high portfolios rank stocks based on the ratio of the current price of a stock 
to its highest price within the past 12 months. For the momentum portfolios, stocks are sorted based on their past six-month 
buy-and-hold return. All portfolios are held over the investment period of six months. Between the ranking and holding 
period, a skip period of one month is included to abstract from bid-ask bounce. The highest 20% of stocks based on the 
ranking criterion is assigned to the portfolio P5 and is equal-weighted, while the bottom 20% is included in portfolio P1. The 
52-week high strategy and the momentum strategy are long in P5 and short in P1. For the two strategies, the average monthly 
return is reported for raw returns, for non-January months and for returns that are adjusted for the three Fama-French factors. 
The sample covers all UK stocks available from Datastream with a market value above 20 million Pounds; t-statistics (two-
tailed) are reported in parentheses. 
                  
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P5-P1 t-stat 
52-week High Raw returns -0.0016 -0.0007 0.0053 0.0071 0.0106 0.0122 (4.49) 
Ex Jan. -0.0056 -0.0031 0.0033 0.0053 0.0089 0.0144 (5.25) 
Adjusted returns -0.0021 0.0022 0.0046 0.0124 0.0166 0.0187 (7.96) 
(6/1/6) Momentum Raw returns -0.0024 0.0016 0.0046 0.0073 0.0095 0.0119 (4.41) 
Ex Jan. -0.0055 -0.0003 0.0031 0.0058 0.0087 0.0142 (4.77) 
  Adjusted returns -0.0006 0.0016 0.0047 0.0091 0.0167 0.0173 (6.16) 
 
 
Table 16 also documents the average monthly (6/1/6) momentum returns. The strategy ranks 
stocks into five portfolios based on their past 6-month buy-and-hold returns. As for the 52-
week high strategy, all portfolios are held over a six-month period after a skip of one month. 
The strategy yields very similar returns as the 52-week high strategy for the total sample, 
when January is excluded and when returns are “Fama and French”-risk-adjusted. The t-
statistics indicate that the momentum returns are highly significant. The similar magnitude of 
(6/1/6) momentum profits and of 52-week high returns confirms the finding of George and 
Hwang (2004) for the UK stock market. They show a close connection between the two 
strategies. The reason why the strategies seem more profitable if controlled for the three 
Fama-French factors (compared to raw returns) lies in the fact that loser stocks load more on 
the SMB factor than winners do. This observation is consistent with the findings of 
Rouwenhorst (1998, p.277) and of Jegadeesh (2001, p.707). 
 
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Table 17 
Descriptive Statistics of the Information Uncertainty Variables 
MV is the market capitalization (in millions of Pounds) at the beginning of month t. Book-to-market value (B/M) is the book 
value of shareholders equity plus deferred taxes divided by its market value at the end of the last fiscal year. LHR is the 
quotient of the lowest price of a stock within the past 52 weeks and the highest price of the stock within the last 52 weeks. 
Stock volatility (VOLA) is the standard deviation of weekly market excess returns over the year ending at the beginning of 
month t, whereas weekly returns are measured from Thursday to Wednesday. Firm age (AGE) measures the number of 
months since a firm was first covered by Datastream. Cash-flow volatility (CFVOLA) represents the standard deviation of 
the net cash flow from operating activities standardized by average total assets in the past three years. The sample covers all 
UK stocks available from Datastream with a market value above 20 million Pounds. The sample period is between January 
1989 and August 2008 except for CFVOLA, which is not available before January 1996. 
                
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
F  1,381 15,510 20 45 116 431 1319 
F  0.6382 0.7892 0.0000 0.2746 0.4889 0.8320 83,0900 
D  0.5998 0.1692 0.0028 0.5035 0.6288 0.7232 0.9811 
  4.71 5.12 0.87 2.72 3.78 5.46 350.85 
  113 78 0 49 98 163 347 
A  0.0497 0.0605 0.0233 0.0193 0.0343 0.0590 1.8489 
 
 
Table 17 presents descriptive statistics for the six information uncertainty variables employed 
in the tests. It shows that firm size heavily varies across the sample. Moreover, it documents 
that the distribution of firm size is skewed. While the smallest market value is slightly above 
20 Million Pounds, the largest value is 1.319 Mio. Pounds. The mean firm size is 1.381 Mio. 
Pounds while the median is 116 Mio. Pounds. Considering the mean volatility (VOLA), a 
value of 4.71% shows that stock prices are quite volatile during the sample period. Firm age 
ranges between 0 months and 347 months. The relative low maximum value of AGE leads to 
the assumption that there is a discrepancy between the beginning of the coverage in 
Datastream and the actual formation date of the firms, especially for old companies. Yet, the 
potential measurement error of the age of older firms should not have large influence on the 
obtained findings: Firm age is used as a proxy for uncertainty since, among other things, the 
age of a company is related to length of data history available. However, the difference in data 
history should have a greater impact on the uncertainty level in the first years of a firm’s 
existence. A slightly longer data history should increase the insights of investors into a firm to 
a larger extend for younger than for older companies. Such a low maximum for the age of a 
company is not only limited to our study.79 
 
79
 Zhang (2006) also employs firm age as a variable for the U.S. sample. The difference in the descriptive statistics for the 
two samples is not too large: While the median age lies at 13 years for U.S. stocks, it is 8 years in my sample. 
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4. The 52-week High Strategy and Information Uncertainty 
4.1  The Predictive Power of the 52-week High Measure 
Before testing the relation between information uncertainty and the 52-week high profits, I 
first examine the cross-sectional variation of stock returns in the six information uncertainty 
proxies (mean effect). Each month, stocks are sorted into five portfolios according to the 
information uncertainty measure. Portfolios are equal-weighted and held over a six-month 
period. Between the ranking date and the beginning of the holding period, a skip period of one 
month is included. For the proxies MV, B/M, LHR and AGE, the reciprocals are employed in 
order to avoid confusion: By doing this, it is assured that for all proxies, a high (low) value 
implies a high (low) degree of information uncertainty. Table 18 reports the average monthly 
portfolio returns on an overlapping holding period basis. Except for cash-flow volatility, high 
information uncertainty stocks generate lower returns than low information uncertainty 
stocks. However, for five out of six variables, the return difference is not significant on the 
5% level. Only a strategy that is long in high book-to-market values and short in low B/M 
values produces negative returns that are highly significant. Hence, except for B/M, the cross-
section variation in stock returns is, if at all, only weak in the uncertainty proxies.80 
 
The reason to construct the uncertainty portfolios as described is to make the results 
comparable to subsequent tests, where the relation between the six variables and the 52-week 
high profits is documented for portfolios that are constructed in the same manner. I also 
examine the average monthly portfolio returns without a skip period and with a one-month 
holding period, which does also not lead to significant return differences between high- and 
low-uncertainty stocks.81 
 
 

The mean effect is also examined in a similar setting by Jiang et al. (2004) and Zhang (2006). While Jiang (2004) presents 
evidence for a significant variation in mean returns, Zhang (2006) does not find a significant negative mean effect. Yet, for 
data and methodology reasons, Zhang (2006) cannot completely exclude its existence. My results do also not allow to 
convincingly rejecting the existence of a significant mean effect for my six uncertainty variables.

Results are not reported for consideration of space, but are available on request.
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Table 18 
Six-month Returns to Information Uncertainty Portfolios 
This table reports the average monthly returns of portfolios sorted by each information uncertainty variable. Each month, 
stocks are ranked according to the information uncertainty proxy into five portfolios, whereas stocks with the highest (lowest) 
value of the variable are assigned to portfolio U5 (U1). MV is the market capitalization (in millions of Pounds) at the end of 
month t. Book-to-market value (B/M) is the book value of shareholders equity plus deferred taxes divided by its market value 
at the end of the last fiscal year. LHR is the quotient of the lowest price of a stock within the last one year and the highest 
price of the stock within the last 52 weeks. Stock volatility (VOLA) is the standard deviation of weekly market excess returns 
over the year ending at the beginning of month t. Firm age (AGE) measures the number of months since a firm was first 
covered by Datastream. Cash-flow volatility (CFVOLA) represents the standard deviation of the net cash flow from 
operating activities standardized by average total assets in the past 3 years. Stocks are equal-weighted and held in the 
portfolio over six months. Between the ranking date and the formation period, a skip period of one month is included. The 
table reports the overlapping holding period returns. 1/MV, 1/(B/M), 1/LHR and 1/AGE are the reciprocals of MV, B/M, 
LHR and AGE. Each month, all actively traded UK stocks on Datastream with a market value above 20 million Pounds are 
considered. The sample period is between January 1989 and August 2008 except for CFVOLA, which is not available before 
January 1996. 
              
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U5-U1 t-stat 
	F  0.0057 0.0043 0.0034 0.0024 0.0018 -0.0039 -(1.21) 
	F  0.0078 0.0051 0.0034 0.0014 -0.0005 -0.0082 -(3.04) 
	D  0.0036 0.0048 0.0043 0.0035 0.0014 -0.0023 -(0.66) 
  0.0061 0.0050 0.0044 0.0022 0.0021 -0.0039 -(1.65) 
	  0.0059 0.0055 0.0048 0.0024 0.0026 -0.0034 -(1.19) 
  0.0007 0.0054 0.0060 0.0062 0.0064 0.0056 (1.77) 
 
 
In order to test whether the 52-week high strategy yields higher returns in cases of higher 
uncertainty, the following method is conducted: Stocks are first classified into quantiles 
according to the uncertainty proxy. Stocks with the lowest information uncertainty level are 
assigned to portfolio U1, whereas stocks with the highest uncertainty level are included into 
portfolio U5. Within each portfolio, stocks are further sorted into three portfolios according to 
the 52-week high measure of Equation (27). The top 20% of stocks is assigned to the 52-week 
high winner portfolio (H1) and the bottom 20% to the 52-week high loser portfolio (H5). The 
portfolios are formed after a skip period of one month and are held over six months. Returns 
are calculated on an overlapping holding period basis. Table 19 reports the average monthly 
profits to the 52-week high strategy that is long in 52-week high winner stocks and short in 
52-week high loser stocks within an information uncertainty portfolio. The results present 
evidence that the predictive ability of the 52-week high criterion is increasing in information 
uncertainty. A positive relationship between the level of ambiguity and the 52-week high 
profits can be observed for each information uncertainty measure. The 52-week high 
portfolios generate an average monthly return that is by 1.36% to 2.36% higher when the 
strategy is limited to high-uncertainty stocks compared to low-uncertainty stocks. For VOLA, 
for example, the 52-week high strategy yields an average monthly return of 0.74% across 
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low-uncertainty stocks, but generates a monthly profit of 1.99% for stocks in the high-
uncertainty group, which is more than twice as large. 
 
The increase of the 52-week high profits in the level of information uncertainty is driven by 
both, winner and loser portfolios. The relation between the degree of information uncertainty 
and the 52-week high winner stock returns is positive and the difference between high-
uncertainty winners and low-uncertainty winners is significant on at least the 10% level for 
most proxies. For the 52-week high loser stocks in opposite, the relation between information 
uncertainty and monthly returns is negative; the difference between high-uncertainty losers 
and low-uncertainty losers is with -1.12%, on average, large and highly significant across the 
proxies. The reason why the winner difference is not as large and significant as the loser 
difference (in absolute terms) between high- and low-uncertainty stocks might be due to the 
fact that the uncertainty effect disappears more quickly for winners and good news than for 
losers and bad news (see Section 5.3). An increase in the 52-week high winner portfolio 
returns and a decrease in the 52-week high loser portfolio profits in information uncertainty is 
consistent with my hypothesis that anchoring is the driver of the 52-week high strategy. 
Higher information uncertainty tends to increase subjects’ anchoring bias82 and leads them to 
underweight the impact of information. The subsequent correction of the bias generates 
positive returns to 52-week high winner stocks and negative returns to 52-week high losers.  
 
The increase of the predictive power of the 52-week high criterion in information uncertainty 
is largest in the tails of the PHR distribution. At least for LHR, VOLA and AGE, the 
difference between the largest and the lowest information uncertainty group is in absolute 
terms largest for stocks with a price furthest from the 52-week high price (H4, H5) and for the 
price closest to the 52-week high price (H1) (see column U5-U1 in Table 19). It is smallest in 
the H2 and H3 groups for all proxies. These are the portfolios with stocks that are neither 
close to nor far from the 52-week high price. This is consistent with the anchoring hypothesis, 
which states that investors’ underreaction behavior is mostly observable for stocks close to 
and far from their respective 52-week high price. 
 
 

The anchoring bias might be larger as either individuals underestimate the impact of news and focus more on the reference 
point or as the number of investors employing the 52-week high price of a stock as an anchor increases.
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Table 19 
The 52-week High Profits for different Information Uncertainty Groups 
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns sorted by an information uncertainty proxy and by the 52-week high 
criterion. Each month, stocks are sorted into quantiles based on the value of the uncertainty variable. The 20% of stocks with 
the highest variable value (and with the greatest information uncertainty) is included into U5 while the 20% of stocks with 
the lowest value (and hence with least information uncertainty) are assigned to group U1. Within each information 
uncertainty quantile, I further sort stocks based on the 52-week high ranking criterion. The top (bottom) 20% is included in 
the winner (loser) portfolio H1 (H5). MV is the market capitalization (in millions of Pounds) at the beginning of month t. 
Book-to-market value (B/M) is the book value of shareholders equity plus deferred taxes divided by its market value at the 
end of the last fiscal year. LHR is the quotient of the lowest price of a stock within the last one year and the highest price of 
the stock within the last 52 weeks. Stock volatility (VOLA) is the standard deviation of weekly market excess returns over 
the year ending at the beginning of month t. Firm age (AGE) measures the number of months since the firm was first covered 
by Datastream. Cash-flow volatility (CFVOLA) represents the standard deviation of the net cash flow from operating 
activities standardized by average total assets in the past 3 years. Stocks are equal-weighted and held in the portfolio over six 
months. Between the ranking date and the formation period, a skip period of one month is included. The table reports the 
overlapping holding period returns. 1/MV, 1/(B/M) 1/LHR and 1/AGE are the reciprocals of MV, B/M, LHR and AGE. Each 
month, all actively traded UK stocks on Datastream with a market value above 20 Million Pounds are considered. The 
sample period is between January 1989 and August 2008 except for CFVOLA, which is not available before January 1996; t-
statistics (two-tailed) are reported in parentheses. 
                
U1-Low U2 U3 U4 U5-Large U5-U1 t-stat 
INFORMATION UNCERTAINTY PROXY: MV 
H1 0.0084 0.0089 0.0105 0.0124 0.0120 0.0036 (1.60) 
H2 0.0075 0.0079 0.0079 0.0076 0.0093 0.0023 (1.23) 
H3 0.0071 0.0051 0.0037 0.0021 0.0005 -0.0066 (-2.60) 
H4 0.0047 0.0027 -0.0026 -0.0037 -0.0031 -0.0078 (-2.85) 
H5 -0.0004 -0.0049 -0.0061 -0.0058 -0.0077 -0.0073 (-2.34) 
H1-H5 0.0088 0.0138 0.0166 0.0181 0.0197 0.0109 
t-stat (2.52)_ (4.19) (5.06) (5.45) (6.12) 
INFORMATION UNCERTAINTY PROXY: 1/(B/M) 
H1 0.0094 0.0105 0.0101 0.0095 0.0130 0.0026 (1.56) 
H2 0.0089 0.0089 0.0080 0.0067 0.0110 0.0021 (1.32) 
H3 0.0080 0.0062 0.0042 0.0030 0.0014 -0.0066 (-3.29) 
H4 0.0074 0.0033 0.0011 -0.0021 -0.0056 -0.0130 (-4.35) 
H5 0.0069 -0.0024 -0.0054 -0.0093 -0.0100 -0.0169 (-6.58) 
H1-H5 0.0025 0.0128 0.0154 0.0188 0.0230 0.0236 
t-stat (0.68) (4.47) (5.69) (6.52) (7.58) 
INFORMATION UNCERTAINTY PROXY: 1/LHR 
H1 0.0068 0.0087 0.0103 0.0115 0.0135 0.0067 (2.20) 
H2 0.0062 0.0074 0.0090 0.0079 0.0086 0.0023 (1.10) 
H3 0.0042 0.0059 0.0054 0.0048 0.0012 -0.0030 (-0.80) 
H4 0.0024 0.0031 0.0013 -0.0007 -0.0059 -0.0083 (-2.20) 
H5 -0.0014 -0.0012 -0.0048 -0.0062 -0.0083 -0.0068 (-1.54) 
H1-H5 0.0082 0.0099 0.0151 0.0177 0.0218 0.0136 
t-stat (6.36) (6.59) (8.30) (8.17) (6.18) 
 
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continued 
U1-Low U2 U3 U4 U5-Large U5-U1 t-stat 
INFORMATION UNCERTAINTY PROXY: VOLA 
H1 0.0067 0.0099 0.0115 0.0101 0.0120 0.0052 (1.92) 
H2 0.0060 0.0077 0.0085 0.0080 0.0077 0.0017 (0.40) 
H3 0.0063 0.0050 0.0039 0.0031 0.0013 -0.0050 (-2.16) 
H4 0.0043 0.0025 -0.0017 -0.0027 -0.0050 -0.0093 (-3.53) 
H5 -0.0006 -0.0014 -0.0031 -0.0047 -0.0079 -0.0073 (-2.60) 
H1-H5 0.0074 0.0112 0.0146 0.0148 0.0199 0.0125 
t-stat (4.31) (5.40) (6.05) (5.38) (5.34) 
INFORMATION UNCERTAINTY PROXY: AGE 
H1 0.0080 0.0104 0.0113 0.0114 0.0120 0.0041 (1.99) 
H2 0.0075 0.0081 0.0093 0.0079 0.0095 0.0020 (1.27) 
H3 0.0070 0.0062 0.0057 0.0040 0.0042 -0.0028 (-2.16) 
H4 0.0051 0.0026 0.0014 -0.0038 -0.0051 -0.0103 (-3.36) 
H5 0.0023 -0.0027 -0.0058 -0.0083 -0.0073 -0.0097 (-2.92) 
H1-H5 0.0057 0.0131 0.0171 0.0197 0.0194 0.0137 
t-stat (1.92) (4.20) (5.61) (5.75) (5.46) 
INFORMATION UNCERTAINTY PROXY: CFVOLA 
H1 0.0056 0.0085 0.0097 0.0116 0.0133 0.0077 (2.21) 
H2 0.0060 0.0078 0.0076 0.0079 0.0084 0.0024 (1.04) 
H3 0.0081 0.0067 0.0039 0.0069 -0.0009 -0.0090 (-2.48) 
H4 0.0055 0.0044 0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0062 -0.0117 (-2.74) 
H5 0.0030 0.0018 0.0009 -0.0058 -0.0090 -0.0119 (-2.04) 
H1-H5 0.0026 0.0067 0.0088 0.0175 0.0222 0.0196 
t-stat (0.58) (1.50) (2.14) (3.77) (3.71) 
 
 
For three out of six variables, the strategy generates highly significant profits in the U1 group, 
where strategy returns are assumed low based on the main hypothesis. Yet, this is not against 
the main hypothesis. This study does not predict that subjects are free from an anchoring bias 
when information uncertainty is low. The underlying idea behind the tests is that this 
behavioral heuristic is increasing in information uncertainty. Hence, it is not necessary to 
document a non-profitability of the 52-week high strategy when information uncertainty is 
low to reject the main hypothesis that anchoring drives the 52-week high returns. Evidence 
against the null is found if a positive relationship between information uncertainty and the 
predictive power of the 52-week high criterion is documented. 
4.2  Robustness of the Information Uncertainty Effect 
In order to ensure the obtained results are not driven by other effects, I conduct the same test 
as above but control for potential influences. Industry effects might have an impact on the 
relation between the information uncertainty proxies and the 52-week high returns. The 
employed variables might just capture differences across industries instead of being a proxy 
for ambiguity about information. Firm size, for example, might implicitly sort stocks based on 
their industries instead of their level of uncertainty, as the average firm size is not identical 
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across industries: The mean (median) market value is 410 (74) Mio. Pounds for technology 
stocks, 916 (120) Mio. Pounds for media stocks and 1889 (330) Mio. Pounds for insurance 
firms. Hence, the fraction of insurance companies should be larger in the lowest uncertainty 
portfolios formed by MV, while the share of technology firms is expected to be higher in 
high-uncertainty portfolios based on MV. For other characteristics, similar differences across 
industries can be found as well. To control for industry effects, I calculate industry-adjusted 
holding period returns. Specifically, the adjusted returns are defined as 
8 
9  8   
9:A 
where 8  is the monthly return of security ; in month % and  9 is the value-weighted monthly 
return of industry < in month %. To calculate  9, stocks are sorted according to the INDM3 
criterion of Datastream into 20 industries. Such a classification seems sensible as it represents 
a compromise between a precise arrangement of stocks into industries and a sufficient 
diversification within an industry. Stocks within an industry portfolio are value-weighted. 
Therefore, the one month lagged market value is employed. 
 
Table 20 presents the results of the conditional sort, where stocks are classified into quantiles 
according to the respective uncertainty proxy. Then within each group, stocks are further 
sorted into five portfolios based on the 52-week high measure. The holding period is still six 
months, portfolio returns are measured on an overlapping basis and are calculated as 
described in Equation (28). It is shown that the effect of information uncertainty on the 52-
week high profits is still present after controlling for industry effects. As for raw returns, the 
strategy is more profitable when limited to high-uncertainty stocks. However, the return 
differences of the 52-week high strategy between high and low uncertainty stocks are slightly 
smaller. For the LHR proxy, it is 1.36% using raw returns, but it is 1.15% when returns are 
controlled for industry effects. The reduction in the 52-week high return difference is due to a 
smaller return difference in the winner and in the loser portfolio between the highest and 
lowest information uncertainty level. Nevertheless, controlling for industry effect does not 
lead to the disappearance of the effect of information uncertainty on the profitability of the 
52-week high strategy. 
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Table 20 
The 52-week High Profits for Different Information Uncertainty Groups- Industry-
Adjusted Returns 
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns sorted by an information uncertainty proxy and by the 52-week high 
criterion adjusted for industry returns. Each month, stocks are assigned to one of five portfolios based on the value of the 
uncertainty variable. The 20% of stocks with the highest variable value (and most information uncertainty) is included into 
U5 while the 20% of stocks with the lowest value (and hence with least information uncertainty) is assigned to group U1. 
Within each information uncertainty quantile, I further sort stocks based on the 52-week high ranking criterion. The top 
(bottom) 20% is included in the winner (loser) portfolio H1 (H5). MV is the firm’s market capitalization (in millions of 
Pounds) at the end of month t. Book-to-market value (B/M) is the book value of shareholders equity plus deferred taxes 
divided by its market value at the end of the last fiscal year. LHR is the quotient of the lowest price of a stock within the last 
one year and the highest price of the stock within the last 52 weeks. Stock volatility (VOLA) is the standard deviation of 
weekly market excess returns over the year ending at the end of month t. Firm age (AGE) measures the number of months 
since the firm was first covered by Datastream. Cash-flow volatility (CFVOLA) represents the standard deviation of the net 
cash flow from operating activities standardized by average total assets in the past 3 years. Stocks are equal-weighted and 
held in the portfolio over six months. Between the ranking date and the formation period, a skip period of one month is 
included. The table reports the overlapping holding period returns. For each stock, the monthly return in excess of the 
monthly return of its industry is measured. The industry return is obtained by classifying stocks into 20 industries according 
to the INDM3 criterion of Datastream. Within each industry, stocks are value-weighted. 1/MV, 1/(B/M), 1/LHR and 1/AGE 
are the reciprocals of MV, B/M, LHR and AGE. Each month, all actively traded UK stocks on Datastream with a market 
value above 20 Million Pounds are considered. The sample period is between January 1989 and August 2008 except for 
CFVOLA, which is not available before January 1996; t-statistics (two-tailed) are reported in parentheses.  
                  
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U5-U1 
	FA  Winner 0.0017 0.0034 0.0046 0.0065 0.0050 0.0033   (1.65) 
Loser -0.0035 -0.0071 -0.0084 -0.0085 -0.0118 -0.0083   (-2.50) 
Wi-Lo 0.0052 0.0105 0.0130 0.0150 0.0168 0.0116   (4.24) 
t-stat (2.48) (4.55) (5.07) (5.14) (-5.91) 
	F  Winner 0.0048 0.0044 0.0047 0.0038 0.0039 -0.0010   (-0.70) 
Loser 0.0049 -0.0060 -0.0083 -0.0112 -0.0184 -0.0234   (-7.66) 
Wi-Lo -0.0001 0.0104 0.0130 0.0150 0.0223 0.0224   (7.04) 
t-stat (-0.03) (4.41) (6.18) (7.24) (8.38) 
	D  Winner 0.0013 0.0025 0.0044 0.0057 0.0082 0.0069   (3.21) 
Loser -0.0063 -0.0056 -0.0098 -0.0098 -0.0109 -0.0047   (-1.30) 
Wi-Lo 0.0076 0.0081 0.0142 0.0154 0.0192 0.0115   (3.83) 
t-stat (6.82) (6.63) (9.04) (8.28) (5.95) 
  Winner 0.0015 0.0039 0.0056 0.0045 0.0061 0.0046   (2.35) 
Loser -0.0045 -0.0059 -0.0076 -0.0072 -0.0115 -0.0070   (-2.61) 
Wi-Lo 0.0061 0.0098 0.0132 0.0117 0.0176 0.0116   (3.93) 
t-stat (4.49) (6.30) (6.74) (4.98) (5.53) 
	  Winner 0.0021 0.0041 0.0056 0.0055 0.0065 0.0044   (2.46) 
Loser -0.0017 -0.0059 -0.0078 -0.0111 -0.0107 -0.0091   (-3.93) 
Wi-Lo 0.0038 0.0100 0.0134 0.0166 0.0172 0.0134   (5.50) 
t-stat (1.65) (3.80) (5.31) (5.58) (6.28) 
A  Winner 0.0023 0.0033 0.0054 0.0053 0.0077 0.0054   (2.53) 
Loser 0.0005 -0.0013 -0.0002 -0.0048 -0.0086 -0.0091   (-1.83) 
Wi-Lo 0.0018 0.0046 0.0056 0.0101 0.0163 0.0145   (2.93) 
  t-stat (0.66) (1.14) (1.71) (2.98) (3.26)     

The results in Table 20 also provide support that the profitability of the 52-week high strategy 
cannot be explained by industry components. For almost each uncertainty subsample, 
irrespective of the uncertainty measure, the strategy generates positive and significant returns 
after controlling for industry effects. This finding is important as Moskowitz and Grinblatt 
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(1999) document that stock price momentum loses its profitability when controlled for 
industry effects. This finding is heavily discussed in the literature. It is important for the 
robustness of the 52-week high strategy to document that the strategy remains profitable after 
consideration of potential industry influences as this has not been done yet. 

The effect of information uncertainty on the profitability of the 52-week high strategy is also 
examined when returns are controlled for risk. In order to examine the idiosyncratic 
component of a stock return, monthly excess returns on the three Fama-French factors are 
examined. For different information uncertainty levels, the monthly excess returns of the 52-
week high winner and loser portfolios on the risk-free rate   = A are regressed on an 
intercept, the excess return of the FTSE All Share >  C= A and on the F and the DF 
factors: 
  =  ?  @>  C= A  F  ADF  1 BA 
F and DF are constructed exactly as described in Fama and French (1993): In June of 
each year between 1989 and 2008, all stocks are sorted into two groups based on their market 
value. Stocks with a market value above (below) the median are attributed to portfolio B (S). 
Independently from this sort, stocks are assigned to three book-to-market portfolios (H, M, L) 
according to the 30% and 70% breakpoints. Stocks with the highest (lowest) B/M-ratio are 
included in portfolio H (L). From the intersections of the two market value portfolios and the 
three book-to-market ratio groups, six value-weighted portfolios are constructed (S/L, S/M, 
S/H, B/L, B/M, B/H). SMB represents the difference between the average return of small 
stocks (S/L, S/M, S/H) and of big stocks (B/L, B/M, B/H) per month. HML is constructed by 
calculating the difference between the average return of the two high book-to-market ratio 
portfolios (S/H, S/L) and the average return of the two low book-to-market ratio portfolios 
(S/L, B/L) per month: 
CDE 
F G  F(H  F(


I(  I(H  I(

BA 
D 
F(  I(


F(  I(

JA 
- 118 - 

where  is the monthly return of the respective portfolio. Table 21 reports the intercepts of the 
52-week high winner and loser portfolios for different levels of information uncertainty. 
Stocks with the lowest (highest) level according to the different proxies, and hence with the 
lowest (highest) degree of information uncertainty, are attained to portfolio U1 (U5). Even 
after controlling for the three Fama-French factors, the profitability of the 52-week high 
strategy is still monotonically increasing in the level of information uncertainty. The 52-week 
high profits for high-uncertainty stocks are significantly larger than the returns for low-
uncertainty stocks and the return difference of between 1.30% and 2.04% per month for the 
variables is comparable to the findings in Table 19 where raw returns are examined. As for 
raw returns, the positive relation between 52-week high profits and information uncertainty 
can be attributed to both winner stocks and loser stocks. Compared to the 52-week high 
winner portfolios, loser portfolios show a larger return difference between high- and low-
uncertainty stocks. However, the differences in the profits for winners is positive, substantial 
and for most proxies highly significant. 
 
The coefficients on the three variables are as expected and consistent with the findings and 
conclusions of Fama and French (1993, 1996) (not reported in the table). The betas of all 60 
portfolios are highly significant with a t-statistic almost always above 20. The betas are 
smaller for low-uncertainty stocks compared to high-uncertainty stocks. The risk loadings on 
SMB are higher for high-uncertainty stocks suggesting that these stocks are or behave like 
small stocks. The loadings on HML are generally lower for high-uncertainty stocks with the 
only exception when information uncertainty is measured by past stock price volatility. This 
implies that stocks with a high information uncertainty degree are more likely growth stocks. 
The adjusted . are for almost all portfolios at least 0.80 (and for some above 0.90), 
indicating that the three-factor model has reasonable explanatory power. 
  
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Table 21 
Three-Factor Risk-Adjusted Excess Returns 
The table shows the intercepts obtained from regressions conducted as follows: 
  =  ?  @>  = A  KLM  ANLO  1  
where   =  is the monthly excess return of 52-week high winner and loser portfolios over the risk-free rate (the UK 
Stearling one-month rate) and >  is the monthly return of the FTSE ALL SHARE. The variable KLM is the monthly excess 
return on a portfolio of small stocks over a portfolio of large stocks and NLO is the monthly excess return on a portfolio of 
stocks with a high book-to-market ratio over a portfolio of stocks with a low book-to-market ratio. The regressions are 
conducted for 52-week high strategies within different portfolios of information uncertainty. KLM and NLO are constructed 
exactly as described in Fama and French (1993): In June of each year between 1989 and 2008, all stocks are sorted into two 
groups based on their market value Stocks with a market value above (below) the median are attributed to portfolio B (S). 
Independently from this sort, stocks are sorted into three groups (H,M,L) with the 30% and 70% breakpoints based on their 
book-to-market ratio. Stocks with the highest (lowest) ratio are included in portfolio H (L). Six value-weighted portfolios are 
constructed from the intersections of the two market value and the three book-to-market ratio groups (S/L, S/M, S/H, B/L, 
B/M, B/H). SMB represents the difference, each month, between the average return of the small stocks portfolios (S/L, S/M, 
S/H) and the average return of the big stocks portfolios (B/L, B/M, B/H). HML is constructed by calculating the difference, 
each month, between the average return of the two high book-to-market ratio portfolios (S/H, S/L) and the average return of 
the two low book-to-market ratio portfolios (S/L, B/L). The table reports the intercepts of the winner and loser portfolios (the 
top and bottom 30% of stocks according to the 52-week high ratio) for different information uncertainty levels, where U1 
(U5) represents the stocks with the lowest (highest) uncertainty level according to the respective proxy. For the regressions, 
all actively traded UK stocks on Datastream with a market value above 20 Million Pounds are considered. The sample period 
is between January 1989 and August 2008 except for CFVOLA, which is not available before January 1996. t(?) is the 
intercept divided by its standard error. 
                            
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U5-U1 U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U5-
? t(?) 
	F Winner 0.1090 0.1167 0.1689 0.3411 0.3718 0.2628 2.65 0.85 1.32 2.66 1.83 2.04 
Loser -0.6204 -1.2798 -1.5855 -1.6592 -1.9739 -1.3535 -2.32 -4.29 -5.36 -5.38 -7.02 -4.87 
W-L 0.9294 1.3964 1.7544 2.0003 2.3458 1.6164 2.85 4.69 6.23 6.81 8.89 4.92 
	F Winner 0.0016 0.1186 0.2166 0.3865 0.4861 0.4845 0.01 0.94 1.04 2.65 3.08 2.87 
Loser -0.0739 -1.6799 -0.8860 -1.2564 -1.6253 -1.5514 -0.22 -4.24 -5.69 -7.91 -8.71 -7.35 
W-L 0.0755 0.7985 1.1026 1.6429 2.1114 2.0359 1.73 6.11 6.88 7.96 8.23 5.81 
	D Winner 0.0608 0.2004 0.3042 0.3192 0.4023 0.3415 0.55 1.72 2.69 2.60 1.20 2.80 
Loser -0.7980 -0.8291 -1.2942 -1.5532 -1.8789 -1.0809 -5.03 -4.60 -6.47 -6.93 -5.44 -3.63 
W-L 0.8589 1.0294 1.5984 1.8724 2.2811 1.4223 7.23 7.19 9.27 8.88 6.54 4.33 
 Winner 0.2490 0.2883 0.3576 0.3461 0.5652 0.3162 2.30 2.48 3.33 1.09 2.32 2.26 
Loser -0.4479 -0.8203 -1.1260 -1.3847 -1.9215 -1.4736 -2.57 -3.90 -4.76 -5.14 -5.87 -5.08 
W-L 0.6968 1.1086 1.4836 1.7308 2.4867 1.7898 4.48 5.71 6.65 6.07 6.21 4.48 
	 Winner 0.1847 0.3158 0.3328 0.2491 0.4534 0.2313 2.46 2.29 2.56 1.97 0.67 1.78 
Loser -0.5039 -1.2113 -1.5293 -1.9667 -1.6407 -1.3670 -1.78 -4.03 -5.41 -6.43 -6.14 -4.79 
W-L 0.6886 1.5271 1.8621 2.2158 2.1941 1.3055 2.86 5.48 6.79 7.34 6.31 4.62 
 Winner 0.1517 0.2584 0.2363 0.2326 0.2944 0.1427 1.15 1.46 1.19 1.21 1.49 1.17 
Loser -0.3012 -0.5247 -0.6633 -1.4077 -2.0639 -1.7627 -0.87 -1.11 -1.56 -2.93 -3.76 -3.32 
  W-L 0.4573 0.7831 0.8996 1.6404 2.3583 1.9054   1.40 1.78 2.19 3.53 4.09 2.89 
 
 
Given a specific information uncertainty level, the 52-week high profits are larger when the 
three Fama-French factors are controlled for. The 52-week high monthly raw return is 1.31% 
for AGE when limited to the U2 group (see Table 19) while it is 1.52% when controlled for 
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the three factors. This is because loser stocks load more on the SMB factor and have a larger 
market premium than winners.83 It suggests that losers behave more like small stocks 
(Rouwenhorst, 1998, p.276). 

I also control for the turn-of-the year effect, which states that stocks with a poor performance 
strongly recover in the first weeks of a year. According to the tax-loss selling hypothesis, this 
pattern arises as investors heavily sell loser stocks at year-end in order to realize tax loss 
benefits. This behavior leads to lower prices for loser stocks at the end of a year. At the 
beginning of the new year, the selling pressure vanishes and the prices of former loser stocks 
recover. To abstract the relation between the 52-week high strategy and information 
uncertainty from the turn-of-the year effect, I examine the monthly portfolio returns for all 
months except Januaries. Yet, the uncertainty effect is even more visible when controlled for 
this effect.84 
5. Are the Variables Proxies for Information Uncertainty? 
5.1  One-Variable-Effect 
In Section 4.1, a test is conducted where stocks are assigned to quantiles based on an 
information uncertainty proxy. Based on this test, Table 22 shows the characteristics of the 
five uncertainty portfolios for each proxy. For each, the mean and median values of the other 
five variables are reported. Table 22 shows that irrespective of the chosen variable, high-
uncertainty portfolios contain stocks with the lowest market value, the lowest book-to-market 
value, the lowest ratio between the 52-week high and low, the highest stock price volatility, 
the highest cash-flow volatility and stocks of the youngest firms. Low uncertainty portfolios 
in opposite contain large and old firms with the highest book-to-market values and with the 
lowest stock price and cash flow volatility as well as the lowest distance between the 52-week 
high and low. Hence, when stocks are sorted on one information uncertainty variable, they are 
at least partly ranked according to other proxies as well. 
 
Moreover, Table 22 reports the fraction of loser returns on the 52-week high profits within a 
given information uncertainty groups. This allows examining whether winners or losers 
 
83
 Examining stock price momentum, Jegdeesh (2001, p.707) and Rouwenhorst (1998, p.278) also document higher returns 
when controlled for the Fama-French factors. They also show that this increase is due to loser stocks that load more on beta 
and the SMB factor than winners do. 

Results are not reported for consideration of space. They are available on request.
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mainly contribute to the profitability of the strategy. In the test of in Section 4.1, within an 
uncertainty group, stocks are sorted into five portfolios based on the 52-week high measure. 
The top (bottom) 20% are assigned to portfolio H1 (H5). The fraction 
P 
  #A
	  #A
	A
gives information about the share of the losers on the 52-week high profits. Consider for 
example column 1 for the MV proxy in Table 19. The 52-week high profits (H5-H1) are 
0.88% per month. Of that, about 0.74% per month (or 86% of the total profits) comes from 
the difference between the average performers and the losers (H3-H5). For all proxies except 
for the B/M ratio, the performance of the 52-week high is mainly due to the short side when 
limited to low-uncertainty stocks. This might indicate that the profitability of the 52-week 
high for low-uncertainty stocks is due to short-sale constraints as not all stocks can be easily 
borrowed (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999, p.1272). The large 52-week high profits for high-
uncertainty stocks, however, are both due to the winner and to the loser stocks and are not a 
loser stock phenomenon. For all proxies except for B/M, the fraction of Equation (31) does 
not exceed 0.55% for high information uncertainty groups which indicates that roughly half of 
the 52-week high returns is due to the winner part. 
 
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Table 22 
Characteristics of Information Uncertainty Portfolios 
This table gives information about the characteristics of the portfolios constructed based on an uncertainty proxy. MV is the 
firm’s market capitalization (in millions of Pounds) at the beginning of month t. Book-to-market value (B/M) is the book 
value of shareholders equity plus deferred taxes divided by its market value at the end of the last fiscal year. LHR is the 
quotient of the lowest price of a stock within the last one year and the highest price of the stock within the last 52 weeks. 
Stock volatility (VOLA) is the standard deviation of weekly market excess returns over the year ending at the beginning of 
month t. Firm age (AGE) measures the number of months since the firm was first covered by Datastream. Cash-flow 
volatility (CFVOLA) represents the standard deviation of the net cash flow from operating activities standardized by average 
total assets in the past 3 years. As the stocks are equal-weighted in the portfolio, the simple cross-sectional averages over 
time for the respective values are reported below. On the left hand side, the table shows the means, on the right hand side, the 
median values are reported. Within the uncertainty portfolios, stocks are sorted based on the 52-week high ranking criterion. 
The top (bottom) 20% are included in the winner (loser) portfolio H1 (H5). Hence, the fraction (H3-H5)/(H1-H5) gives the 
differences of the returns between the middle (H3) and the loser (H5) portfolio in relation to the total 52-week high returns 
and shows the loser proportion of the 52-week high profits. 
                        
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 
MEAN MEDIAN 
	F 
F  6,418 352 124 57 44 1,960 315 118 55 38 
F  0.54 0.58 0.62 0.74 0.79 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.57 0.58 
D  0.65 0.61 0.60 0.57 0.57 0.67 0.64 0.62 0.60 0.59 
  3.31 4.01 4.47 5.33 6.01 2.86 3.41 3.71 4.27 4.92 
  167 135 116 107 99 168 130 107 95 84 
  0.03 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 
(H3-H5)/(H1-H5) 0.86 0.73 0.59 0.43 0.47 
	F 
F  2,738 713 886 679 3079 804 193 83 41 89 
F  1.48 0.78 0.52 0.33 0.15 1.26 0.74 0.48 0.32 0.14 
D  0.64 0.62 0.60 0.58 0.53 0.67 0.64 0.63 0.61 0.56 
  3.37 4.04 4.42 5.07 6.17 3.06 3.39 3.65 4.15 4.86 
  140 119 106 97 103 142 113 91 80 78 
  0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 
(H3-H5)/(H1-H5) 0.22 0.66 0.62 0.65 0.63 
1/D 
 F  2,716 1,870 1356 941 399 146 196 160 116 72 
F  0.77 0.69 0.64 0.59 0.54 0.60 0.54 0.51 0.44 0.37 
D  0.78 0.69 0.62 0.54 0.37 0.78 0.70 0.63 0.55 0.38 
  2.91 3.43 3.95 4.82 7.87 2.67 3.17 3.61 4.35 6.55 
  127 132 125 110 88 120 124 115 97 73 
  0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06 
(H3-H5)/(H1-H5) 0.68 0.72 0.68 0.62 0.44 
 
F  4,231 1,452 933 403 292 304 230 143 84 65 
F  0.75 0.66 0.64 0.60 0.58 0.55 0.53 0.51 0.46 0.39 
D  0.72 0.67 0.62 0.55 0.42 0.73 0.68 0.63 0.57 0.43 
  2.43 3.14 3.85 4.95 8.79 2.24 2.89 3.61 4.69 7.55 
  143 133 120 102 81 136 125 110 89 67 
  0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 
(H3-H5)/(H1-H5) 0.67 0.56 0.48 0.53 0.56 

 
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continued 
	 
F  2,858 849 2,200 654 536 699 134 96 78 73 
F  0.73 0.75 0.66 0.56 0.54 0.54 0.59 0.49 0.41 0.40 
D  0.64 0.62 0.60 0.56 0.56 0.66 0.64 0.62 0.59 0.59 
  3.53 4.20 4.54 5.16 5.70 3.06 3.59 3.83 4.23 4.31 
  212 158 107 63 26 211 153 108 62 25 
  0.03 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 
(H3-H5)/(H1-H5) 0.82 0.68 0.67 0.62 0.55 
 
 F  7,537 1,773 1,564 822 1,025 571 267 205 153 122 
F  0.93 0.70 0.65 0.61 0.48 0.71 0.56 0.51 0.48 0.35 
D  0.64 0.60 0.58 0.55 0.50 0.66 0.63 0.61 0.58 0.53 
  3.83 4.37 4.74 5.22 6.21 3.36 3.87 4.07 4.44 5.14 
  179 177 163 147 112 193 185 167 149 102 
  0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.10 
(H3-H5)/(H1-H5) 1.95 0.73 0.73 0.34 0.36             
 
 
The ratio of Equation (31) also allows a closer look at the LHR measure. Instead of being a 
proxy for information uncertainty, the LHR ratio could also just mechanically hint the 52-
week high criterion from picking the right stocks, especially for the low information 
uncertainty groups. In those portfolios, only stocks with a large LHR are considered. Since: 
5 !"
6. 
5 !"
 !"
6.
Q 
 !"
 !"
6.
  !"A 
it is possible that the 52-week high strategy cannot choose stocks with a low D
-	
BC
 for loser 
portfolios within the U1 group as 5 !" Q  !". If this is the case, the low 52-week high 
profits in the U1 portfolio compared to the U5 portfolio can be explained by a limited access 
of the 52-week high criterion to loser stocks and might not be due to low information 
uncertainty. Then, within the U1 group, winner stocks should largely generate the 52-week 
high profits. Table 22, however, shows that, with a value of 32%, loser stocks contribute to a 
substantial part to the 52-week high returns in the U1 portfolio. Compared to other proxies, 
this percentage is not particularly low. Furthermore, the return of winner portfolios is larger 
within the LHR U5 group with 1.35% than within the U1 portfolio with 0.68%. As this 
potential problem of the LHR variable only applies to loser stocks, the higher predictive 
power of the 52-week high ranking criterion for winners in U5 compared to U1 cannot be 
explained by a limited access of the 52-week high ranking criterion to stocks in U1. 
Consequently, the P measure of Equation (31) and the higher monthly returns for winner 
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stocks from U1 to U5 indicate that the positive relationship between the profitability of the 
52-week high strategy and 1/LHR is explained by something different (e.g. information 
uncertainty) than the limited access of the 52-week high criterion to loser stocks. 
 
Table 22 documents a weakness of the two-way sorts conducted in Section 4.1. The ultimate 
goal of the tests is to examine the effect of one variable on the 52-week high profits given that 
all other variables are constant. However, Table 22 shows that a sort on one specific 
uncertainty measure leads to an implicit ranking based on all other uncertainty proxies as 
well, which brings along two potential problems: 
 
First, the similar relation of the six variables on the 52-week high profits might be only due to 
one characteristic as each variable does implicitly sort stocks based on other proxies. For 
example, all proxies group stocks implicitly based on firm size into five portfolios (as well as 
based on other variables; see Table 22). Stocks with the smallest market value are assigned to 
portfolio U5, where the 52-week high profits are largest. If only a single variable is behind the 
relation of the six measures on the 52-week high profits, it seems rather arbitrary to explain 
the relation with information uncertainty. If for example firm size is the single variable behind 
the documented relation, other explanations exist. A large body of research documents a 
negative relationship between firm size and momentum returns for which various theories are 
proposed: Lo and MacKinlay (1990, p.178) and Grundy and Martin (2001, p.31) argue that 
lead-lag effects are larger for small stocks. Hong (1999) and Hong et al. (2000) claim that 
firm size is a proxy for the speed of the diffusion of information and that for small firms 
information comes out more slowly, which leads to higher future momentum returns. Fama 
and French (1993) view a risk factor in firm size. Lesmond (2004) and Roll (1983) find a 
relationship between firm size and the bid-ask-spread which itself is employed as a proxy for 
trading costs. With high trading costs, investors are unable to realize the theoretical 
momentum profits. In summary, if firm size is behind the relation between the variables and 
the 52-week high, other explanation attempts than information uncertainty exist and the 
findings are not necessarily in line with my hypothesis. 
 
As one specific proxy does not exist for information uncertainty, I employ a bundle of 
variables and argue that the common element of them is information uncertainty although 
each also captures other effects. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that the third variable 
behind the six proxies is information uncertainty and not one of the variables itself.  
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Secondly, the two-way sorts do not ensure that each employed variable is worth to be used as 
proxy for information uncertainty and not subsumed by another variable. Especially for LHR, 
it is important to justify its consideration, as it has not yet been employed as proxy for 
information uncertainty. Specifically, it is necessary to show that LHR is not subsumed by 
stock price volatility. Table 22 does not exclude this possibility as the portfolios sorted on 
LHR also differ in VOLA.  
 
To address both potential problems, I conduct conditional sorts by two information 
uncertainty variables. First, stocks are sorted into five portfolios based on one uncertainty 
measure. Then within each of the five portfolios, stocks are further subdivided into three 
portfolios according to the second uncertainty measure. Subsequently, stocks of each portfolio 
are sorted into three portfolios on the 52-week high measure (D
-	
BC ). Stocks within these 45 
portfolios are equal-weighted and held over six months. Between the ranking and the holding 
period, a skip period of one month is included. The 52-week high profits are calculated by 
subtracting the average monthly loser portfolio return from the average winner portfolio 
return within each of the 15 double-sorted uncertainty portfolios. This test examines the effect 
of one uncertainty proxy on the 52-week high profits by keeping another uncertainty variable 
fixed. Hence, this method allows to pairwise test whether the effect of one proxy on the 
strategy’s profitability is subsumed by another variable. Ideally, it would be wishful to 
examine this relationship when all other variables are kept fixed. Yet, the problem is that each 
further sorting level substantially reduces the number of stocks in the portfolios. Therefore, a 
further subdivision or a more precise one is not possible without the loss of diversification in 
the portfolios. 
 
Table 23 reports the average monthly 52-week high profits for all potential uncertainty 
measure combinations. In order to ensure that the results are not influenced by the ranking 
order of the uncertainty level, they are reported for both sorting ways of the uncertainty proxy. 
For example, the 52-week high returns are calculated when stocks are first sorted on MV and 
then subsequently based on LHR, but the profits are also reported when stocks are first ranked 
based on LHR and then on MV.  
 
As it can be seen from the table, the effect of one information uncertainty proxy on the 52-
week high profits is not diminished when controlled for another information variable. When 
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stocks are first sorted on MV and then subsequently on LHR, the table reports that, within a 
size class, the LHR sort leads to significantly differences in the 52-week high profits. For four 
out of five size classes, the 52-week high generates significantly higher profits when limited 
to stocks with a low 1/LHR ratio than for stocks with a high ratio. The size matching is almost 
flawless. Within a given MV group, the stocks in the highest LHR ratio portfolio have a 
similar average market value compared to the stocks in the lowest LHR ratio group. For 
example, within the smallest size group, with 29 Mio. Pounds, the average market value of the 
stocks in the LHR low-uncertainty portfolio is almost identical to the average market value 
for stocks in the LHR high-uncertainty group. Only for the quantile of stocks with the largest 
market value, the size matching is not that good but the difference in firm size is much 
smaller between the LHR portfolios. The lowest 1/LHR ratio stocks have a median size of 
2.118 Mio. Pounds, while the 20% of stock with the highest ratio have a median of 1.783 
Mio. Pounds. 
 
Most importantly, the results in Table 23 exclude the possibility that firm size or the book-to-
market ratio is behind the relationship of the six variables on 52-week high profits. In the first 
column of Table 23, it is documented that each variable still has explanatory power on the 
profitability of the 52-week high strategy when stocks are first subdivided into five MV 
classes: For each variable, the return difference between high and low uncertainty groups is 
highly significant within most firm size groups.  
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Table 23 
Sorts on Two Information Uncertainty Variables – 5x3x3 Portfolios 
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns sorted by two information uncertainty proxies and by the 52-week high criterion. First, stocks are assigned into five portfolios based on one 
uncertainty measure. Then within each of the five portfolios, stocks are further subdivided into three portfolios according to the second uncertainty measure. Subsequently, stocks of each portfolio 
are sorted into three portfolios on the 52-week high measure. Stocks within these 45 portfolios are equal-weighted and held over six months. Between the ranking and the holding period, a skip 
period of one month is included. The 52-week high profits are calculated by subtracting the average monthly loser portfolio return from the average winner portfolio return within each of the 15 
double-sorted uncertainty portfolios. MV is the firm’s market capitalization (in millions of Pounds) at the beginning of month t. Book-to-market value (B/M) is the book value of shareholders equity 
plus deferred taxes divided by its market value at the end of the last fiscal year. LHR is the quotient of the lowest price of a stock within the last one year and the highest price of the stock within the 
last 52 weeks. Stock volatility (VOLA) is the standard deviation of weekly market excess returns over the year ending at the beginning of month t. Firm age (AGE) measures the number of months 
since the firm was first covered by Datastream. Cash-flow volatility (CFVOLA) represents the standard deviation of the net cash flow from operating activities standardized by average total assets in 
the past 3 years. Stocks are equal-weighted and held in the portfolio over six months. Between the ranking date and the formation period, a skip period of one month is included. The table reports the 
overlapping holding period returns. 1/MV, 1/LHR and 1/AGE are the reciprocals of MV, LHR and AGE. Each month, all actively traded UK stocks on Datastream with a market value above 20 
Million Pounds are considered. The sample period is between January 1989 and August 2008 except for CFVOLA, which is not available before January 1996; t-statistics (two-tailed) are reported in 
parentheses. 
 
                                          
First sort 
  	F 	F  	D 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
	
F

 
U1 -0.0019 0.0063** 0.0077*** 0.0086*** 0.0139*** 0.0032** 0.0032* 0.0060** 0.0102*** 0.0165*** 
U2 0.0037 0.0102*** 0.0114*** 0.0143*** 0.0230*** 0.0074*** 0.0076*** 0.0126*** 0.0162*** 0.0176*** 
U3 0.0047 0.0163*** 0.0172*** 0.0228*** 0.0259*** 0.0100*** 0.0124*** 0.0190*** 0.0187*** 0.0238*** 
U3-U1 0.0066* 0.0100*** 0.0094*** 0.0142*** 0.0120*** 0.0068*** 0.0091*** 0.0130*** 0.0085*** 0.0073* 
 
1/
(
F
) U1 0.0016 0.0038 0.0072** 0.0025 0.0071** 0.0050*** 0.0061*** 0.0093*** 0,0092*** 0,0107*** 
U2 0.0064** 0.0086** 0.0125*** 0.0143*** 0.0193*** 0.0075*** 0.0081*** 0.0144*** 0.0178*** 0,0202*** 
U3 0.0125 0.0161 0.0227*** 0.0275*** 0.0220*** 0.0090*** 0.0134*** 0.0200*** 0,0217*** 0,0262*** 
U3-U1 0.0109*** 0.0123*** 0.0155*** 0.0250*** 0.0149*** 0.0040** 0.0072*** 0.0107*** 0,0126*** 0,0155*** 
	

D

 
U1 0.0030** 0.0040*** 0.0077*** 0.0130*** 0.0112*** 0.0038** 0.0078*** 0.0079*** 0.0084*** 0.0140*** 
U2 0.0042* 0.0064*** 0.0150*** 0.0178*** 0.0197*** 0.0063*** 0.0108*** 0.0122*** 0.0145*** 0.0230*** 
U3 0.0126*** 0.0190*** 0.0160*** 0.0168*** 0.0241*** 0.0067* 0.0181*** 0.0214*** 0.0218*** 0.0263*** 
U3-U1 0.0096*** 0.0149*** 0.0083** 0.0037 0.0129*** 0.0030 0.0104*** 0.0136*** 0.0134*** 0.0123*** 




 U1 0.0019 0.0054*** 0.0082*** 0.0146*** 0.0130*** 0.0029 0.0059*** 0.0066*** 0.0079*** 0.0111*** 0.0053*** 0.0058*** 0.0073*** 0,0134*** 0,0156*** 
U2 0.0053** 0.0074*** 0.0146*** 0.0183*** 0.0173*** 0.0041 0.0112*** 0.0138*** 0.0145*** 0.0191*** 0.0054*** 0.0082*** 0.0133*** 0.0125*** 0,0212*** 
U3 0.0113*** 0.0164*** 0.0129*** 0.0140*** 0.0209*** 0.0058 0.0141*** 0.0186*** 0.0187*** 0.0242*** 0.0097*** 0.0085*** 0.0137*** 0,0166*** 0,0201*** 
U3-U1 0.0094*** 0.0111*** 0.0047 -0.0005 0.0080** 0.0030 0.0082** 0.0120*** 0.0108*** 0.0131*** 0.0044*** 0.0026 0.0064*** 0,0032 0,0045 
 
	



 U1 0.0054* 0.0049* 0.0106*** 0.0111*** 0.0144*** 0.0004 0.0050* 0.0076*** 0.0073*** 0.0154*** 0.0024* 0.0037*** 0.0078*** 0,0108*** 0,0119*** 
U2 0.0062* 0.0120*** 0.0130*** 0.0186*** 0.0193*** 0.0018 0.0115*** 0.0130*** 0.0187*** 0.0208*** 0.0076*** 0.0069*** 0.0128*** 0.0174*** 0,0212*** 
U3 0.0123*** 0.0150*** 0.0206*** 0.0194*** 0.0180*** 0.0054 0.0162*** 0.0160*** 0.0191*** 0.0281*** 0.0104*** 0.0130*** 0.0187*** 0,0184*** 0,0222*** 
U3-U1 0.0070*** 0.0102*** 0.0100*** 0.0083** 0.0036 0.0049 0.0112*** 0.0084*** 0.0118*** 0.0128*** 0.0081*** 0.0093*** 0.0109*** 0,0076*** 0,0103*** 






 U1 0.0036 0.0024 0.0012 0.0109*** 0.0056 0.0014 0.0043 0.0068* 0.0035 0.0074 0.0053*** 0.0035 0.0106*** 0,0084** 0,0079 
U2 0.0063 0.0100** 0.0136*** 0.0095** 0.0113** 0.0019 0.0092*** 0.0092*** 0.0115*** 0.0178*** 0.0058*** 0.0059*** 0.0102*** 0.0174*** 0,0104** 
U3 0.0161*** 0.0193*** 0.0216*** 0.0135** 0.0026 0.0064 0.0090** 0.0140*** 0.0206*** 0.0281*** 0.0080*** 0.0101*** 0.0189*** 0,0147*** 0,0096 
U3-U1   0.0125** 0.0169*** 0.0204*** 0.0025 -0.0030 0.0050** 0.0047 0.0071 0.0171*** 0.0207** 0.0027 0.0066** 0.0083*** 0.0063 0.0017  
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continued 
                                          
  
 
  
	
 
 
  S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
	
F

 
U1 0.0033* 0.0046* 0.0093*** 0.0103*** 0.0156*** 0.0035 0.0072** 0.0124*** 0.0152*** 0.0138*** 0.0233*** 0.0144*** 0.0092* 0.0040 0.0032 
U2 0.0059*** 0.0080*** 0.0136*** 0.0137*** 0.0168*** 0.0060** 0.0133*** 0.0150*** 0.0186*** 0.0188*** 0.0238*** 0.0143*** 0.0109** 0.0051 0.0038 
U3 0.0101*** 0.0174*** 0.0155*** 0.0166*** 0.0194*** 0.0067** 0.0100*** 0.0174*** 0.0207*** 0.0192*** 0.0065 0.0132*** 0.0055 0.0057 0.0074* 
U3-U1 0.0068*** 0.0128*** 0.0062*** 0.0063* 0.0039 0.0032 0.0028 0.0050* 0.0055* 0.0054* -0.0168** -0.0012 -0.0037 0.0016 0.0042* 
 
1(
F
 U1 0.0030 0.0065*** 0.0071*** 0.0069** 0.0099** 0.0013 0.0005 0.0053 0.0122*** 0.0093** 0.0074 0.0092* 0.0002 0.0025 -0.0020 
U2 0.0062*** 0.0097*** 0.0140*** 0.0131*** 0.0196*** 0.0064*** 0.0118*** 0.0134*** 0.0178*** 0.0164*** 0.0183*** 0.0154*** 0.0105*** 0.0045 0.0048 
U3 0.0077*** 0.0125*** 0.0192*** 0.0196*** 0.0237*** 0.0070*** 0.0171*** 0.0196*** 0.0226*** 0.0291*** 0.0270*** 0.0225*** 0.0111** 0.0041 0.0070 
U3-U1 0.0047* 0.0060*** 0.0121*** 0.0127*** 0.0138*** 0.0057* 0.0166*** 0.0143*** 0.0104** 0.0197*** 0.0196*** 0.0133*** 0.0110** 0.0016 0.0090** 
	

D

 
U1 0.0057*** 0.0071*** 0.0091*** 0.0080*** 0.0082*** 0.0020 0.0068*** 0.0073*** 0.0108*** 0.0122*** 0.0147*** 0.0063*** 0.0076*** 0.0043** 0.0061*** 
U2 0.0054*** 0.0070*** 0.0141*** 0.0131*** 0.0108*** 0.0045** 0.0095*** 0.0108*** 0.0174*** 0.0180*** 0.0169*** 0.0126*** 0.0069** 0.0066*** 0.0032 
U3 0.0076*** 0.0120*** 0.0147*** 0.0130*** 0.0217*** 0.0073** 0.0140*** 0.0226*** 0.0207*** 0.0210*** 0.0109 0.0172*** 0.0090* 0.0063 0.0088* 
U3-U1 0.0019 0.0049*** 0.0056** 0.0049* 0.0135* 0.0053* 0.0072* 0.0153*** 0.0098*** 0.0088** -0.0038 0.0109* 0.0015 0.0019 0.0027 




 U1 0.0023* 0.0051*** 0.0072*** 0.0137*** 0.0124*** 0.0102*** 0.0082*** 0.0094*** 0.0046* 0.0017 
U2 0.0060*** 0.0093*** 0.0136*** 0.0167*** 0.0172*** 0.0205*** 0.0176*** 0.0098*** 0.0072* 0.0053* 
U3 0.0056 0.0126*** 0.0192*** 0.0195*** 0.0209*** 0.0091 0.0117* 0.0060 0.0041 0.0084* 
U3-U1 0.0033* 0.0074** 0.0120*** 0.0059 0.0086*** -0.0011 0.0036 -0.0034 -0.0005 0.0067* 
 
	



 U1 0.0017 0.0054** 0.0069*** 0.0098*** 0.0097*** 0.0197*** 0.0117** 0.0065* 0.0022 0.0031 
U2 0.0058*** 0.0083*** 0.0156*** 0.0139*** 0.0206*** 0.0188*** 0.0175*** 0.0110** 0.0043 0.0044 
U3 0.0103*** 0.0161*** 0.0168*** 0.0182*** 0.0205*** 0.0168** 0.0147*** 0.0085* 0.0080 0.0054 
U3-U1 0.0086*** 0.0107*** 0.0099*** 0.0084*** 0.0108** -0.0029 0.0030 0.0020 0.0058 0.0023 






 U1 0.0029 0.0036 0.0093*** 0.0007 0.0137* 0.0022 0.0082** 0.0017 0.0063 0.0087 
U2  0.0060** 0.0083*** 0.0103*** 0.0128*** 0.0027 0.0025 0.0102** 0.0151*** 0.0127*** 0.0185** 
U3 0.0078*** 0.0120*** 0.0243*** 0.0173*** 0.0131 0.0128*** 0.0187*** 0.0156*** 0.0152** 0.0074 
U3-U1     0.0049* 0.0085*** 0.0150*** 0.0166** -0.0006 0.0107*** 0.01054** 0.0140** 0.0089 -0.0014             


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This is crucial since, as mentioned above, the literature proposes several explanations for a 
relation between a strategy’s performance and the stock’s market value. Similarly, the book-to 
market ratio, which is employed by Fama and French (1993) to form a risk factor, does also 
not explain the effects of the variables on the 52-week high profits. Keeping the B/M ratio 
variation fixed does not lead to insignificant differences between high- and low uncertainty 
groups formed by other variables. 
 
Table 23 also justifies the choice of the LHR variable as information uncertainty. In four out 
of five stock price volatility portfolios, the 52-week high strategy is significantly more 
profitable within the highest 1/LHR ratio than in the lowest 1/LHR ratio. When stocks are 
first sorted on the LHR proxy, stock price volatility has a weaker but still substantial effect on 
the strategy’s performance. In all five LHR portfolios, the 52-week high strategy generates 
higher monthly returns for stocks with a high volatility; and in two out of five portfolios, the 
difference is highly significant. 
 
When stocks are first sorted into five groups based on cash-flow volatility, the difference in 
the 52-week high returns is not significant between high-uncertainty and low-uncertainty 
stocks based on most proxies. The weak significance could be explained by the shorter sample 
period. While the other information uncertainty proxies are calculated from January 1988, 
cash-flow volatility is not available before January 1996. 
 
It could be argued that the two-way sort conducted above leads to portfolios that are not well 
diversified as the number of stocks within a portfolio is small.84 In order to present evidence 
that the results are not biased by a lack of diversification in the portfolios, I repeat the two-
way sort, but reduce the number of portfolios: In this test, stocks are first sorted into three 
instead of five portfolios according to an uncertainty proxy. Then, as in the test above, the 
stocks are further subdivided into three groups based on a second uncertainty variable. 
Subsequently, within each portfolio, three 52-week high groups are formed. To assign stocks 
to three instead of five portfolios in the first sorting level heavily reduces the number of 
portfolios from 45 to 27 and increases the number of stocks within each portfolio. However, 
such a weaker sorting criterion limits the ability of the method to test whether one information 
uncertainty proxy has an effect on the 52-week high profits given that another variable is kept 
 
84
 The minimum number of stocks within a portfolio is at about 20 within the test. The number seems to be quite large. 
However, I measure equal-weighted portfolios and hence, it is safe to check the results of the test with a less strict 
subdivision procedure. 
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fixed. Forming three portfolios according to one proxy does not reduce the variation in the 
proxy as effectively as when five portfolios are built which implies that a rank based on the 
second proxy also is a partial sort based on the first measure. The test in Table 24 shows that 
the main findings remain unchanged and do not depend on the number of subportfolios. For 
this test, the relation between a variable and the 52-week high returns is not diminished when 
controlled for another uncertainty proxy. Yet, compared to the 5x3x3 test, the difference in 
the 52-week high returns between high- and low uncertainty stocks is statistically different 
from zero within more subportfolios. For this 3x3x3 test, the five variables do have a 
significant effect on the 52-week high profitability within cash-flow variation groups which 
was not the case in Table 23, where for LHR, AGE and VOLA, the return differences are not 
or only weakly significantly different from zero.  
 
In summary, all six examined information uncertainty measures seem to have influence on the 
52-week high profits. The difference in the 52-week high returns for high- and low-
uncertainty stocks is positive and significantly different from zero. Moreover, none of the six 
variables explains the documented effect of the other measures on the 52-week high profits. 
Hence, each variable appears to possess incremental information and is worth to be included 
in the tests. It is especially important for LHR to show that it is not subsumed by other 
proxies, as it has not yet been employed as information uncertainty variable. The relation 
between the six uncertainty proxies and the strategy is present if I control for industry effects, 
for risk-components and for the turn-of-the-year effect. These findings support the idea that 
the 52-week high profits are explained by a non-rational behavior called anchoring and 
present evidence to reject the null that the 52-week high is not explained by anchoring. 

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Table 24 
Sorts on Two Information Uncertainty Variables – 3x3x3 Portfolios 
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns sorted by two information uncertainty proxies and by the 52-week high criterion. First, stocks are sorted into five portfolios based on one 
uncertainty measure. Then within each of the three portfolios, stocks are further subdivided into three portfolios according to the second uncertainty measure. Subsequently, stocks of each portfolio 
are sorted into three portfolios on the 52-week high measure. Stocks within these 27 portfolios are equal-weighted and held over six months. Between the ranking and the holding period, a skip 
period of one month is included. The 52-week high profits are calculated by subtracting the average monthly loser portfolio return from the average winner portfolio return within each of the 15 
double-sorted uncertainty portfolios. MV is the firm’s market capitalization (in millions of Pounds) at the end of month t. Book-to-market value (B/M) is the book value of shareholders equity plus 
deferred taxes divided by its market value at the end of the last fiscal year. LHR is the quotient of the lowest price of a stock within the last one year and the highest price of the stock within the last 
52 weeks. Stock volatility (VOLA) is the standard deviation of weekly market excess returns over the year ending at the end of month t. Firm age (AGE) measures the number of months since the 
firm was first covered by Datastream. Cash-flow volatility (CFVOLA) represents the standard deviation of the net cash flow from operating activities standardized by average total assets in the past 
3 years. Stocks are equal-weighted and held in the portfolio over six months. Between the ranking date and the formation period, a skip period of one month is included. The table reports the 
overlapping holding period returns. 1/MV, 1/(B/M), 1/LHR and 1/AGE are the reciprocals of MV, LHR and AGE. Each month, all actively traded UK stocks on Datastream with a market value 
above 20 Million Pounds are considered. The sample period is between January 1989 and August 2008 except for CFVOLA, which is not available before January 1996; t-statistics (two-tailed) are 
reported in parentheses. 
                                    
	F 	F 	D  
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 
	
F

 
U1 0.0002 0.0074*** 0.0127*** 0.0032** 0.0059** 0.0172*** 0.0032 0.0082 0.0134 
U2 0.0068** 0.0123*** 0.0210*** 0.0075*** 0.0124*** 0.0177*** 0.0060*** 0.0090** 0.0157*** 
U3 0.0075** 0.0179*** 0.0243*** 0.0118*** 0.0169*** 0.0208*** 0.0116*** 0.0157*** 0.0194*** 
U3-U1 0.0074** 0.0105*** 0.0116*** 0.0086*** 0.0110*** 0.0036 0.0084*** 0.0075*** 0.0060* 
 
1/
(
F
 U1 0.0026 0.0064** 0.0062* 0.0048*** 0.0083*** 0.0107*** 0.0039** 0.0075*** 0.0065 
U2 0.0088*** 0.0147*** 0.0182*** 0.0071*** 0.0130*** 0.0216*** 0.0068*** 0.0132*** 0.0190*** 
U3 0.0132*** 0.0241*** 0.0227*** 0.0106*** 0.0186*** 0.0254*** 0.0096*** 0.0181*** 0.0223*** 
U3-U1 0.0106*** 0.0178*** 0.0166*** 0.0059*** 0.0103*** 0.0147*** 0.0057*** 0.0106*** 0.0158*** 
	

D

 
U1 0.0032* 0.0099*** 0.0053*** 0.0050*** 0.0060*** 0.0118*** 0.0056*** 0.0081*** 0.0126*** 
U2 0.0057*** 0.0158*** 0.0128*** 0.0086*** 0.0125*** 0.0211*** 0.0059*** 0.0122*** 0.0168*** 
U3 0.0176*** 0.0183*** 0.0192*** 0.0096*** 0.0214*** 0.0242*** 0.0084*** 0.0159*** 0.0210*** 
U3-U1 0.0144*** 0.0084*** 0.0139*** 0.0046 0.0154*** 0.0124*** 0.0028* 0.0078*** 0.0085** 




 
U1 0.0029* 0.0105*** 0.0138*** 0.0041** 0.0065*** 0.0103*** 0.0057*** 0.0072*** 0.0145*** 
U2 0.0063*** 0.0156*** 0.0170*** 0.0070*** 0.0125*** 0.0180*** 0.0063*** 0.0119*** 0.0169*** 
U3 0.0142*** 0.0145*** 0.0219*** 0.0082** 0.0185*** 0.0228*** 0.0089*** 0.0132*** 0.0193*** 
U3-U1 0.0112*** 0.0040 0.0081** 0.0041 0.0119*** 0.0124*** 0.0032** 0.0060*** 0.0047 
 
	



 U1 0.0045* 0.0099*** 0.0148*** 0.0014 0.0072*** 0.0119*** 0.0027** 0.0071*** 0.0126*** 0.0023 0.0076*** 0.0109*** 
U2 0.0074*** 0.0163*** 0.0184*** 0.0053* 0.0131*** 0.0209*** 0.0075*** 0.0115*** 0.0200*** 0.0059*** 0.0143*** 0.0181*** 
U3 0.0144*** 0.0204*** 0.0180*** 0.0094*** 0.0173*** 0.0268*** 0.0121*** 0.0178*** 0.0217*** 0.0119*** 0.0169*** 0.0197*** 
U3-U1 0.0099*** 0.0105*** 0.0032 0.0080*** 0.0101*** 0.0149*** 0.0094*** 0.0107*** 0.0091*** 0.0096*** 0.0093*** 0.0088** 






 U1 0.0039 0.0063* 0.0088 -0.0639 0.3986 0.4197 0.0036* 0.0074*** 0.0086 0.0019*** 0.0061*** 0.0020*** 
U2  0.0075** 0.0123*** 0.0049 0.5779 1.0595*** 1.8072*** 0.0055** 0.0095*** 0.0110** 0.0058*** 0.0119*** 0.0062*** 
U3 0.0193*** 0.0196*** 0.0231** 0.4713 1.8481*** 2.7050*** 0.0096*** 0.0157*** 0.0168*** 0.0093*** 0.0228*** 0.0076*** 
U3-U1 0.0154*** 0.0133** 0.0144 0.5352* 1.4495*** 2.2853*** 0.0060** 0.0083*** 0.0082 0.0074*** 0.0167*** 0.0057   

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        continued 
         

	  

S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 

	
(
L
R
 U1 0.0033* 0.0072*** 0.0150*** 0.0027 0.0094*** 0.0153*** 
U2 0.0070*** 0.0139*** 0.0170*** 0.0037 0.0130*** 0.0230*** 
U3 0.0078*** 0.0163*** 0.0182*** 0.0085** 0.0153*** 0.0198*** 
U3-U1 0.0045** 0.0091*** 0.0032 0.0058* 0.0059* 0.0045 


BC
M
(
L
A U1 0.0029 0.0072*** 0.0106*** -0.0016 0.0113*** 0.0169*** 
U2 0.0077*** 0.0137*** 0.0171*** 0.0048 0.0164*** 0.0247*** 
U3 0.0090*** 0.0195*** 0.0248*** 0.0100*** 0.0174*** 0.0237*** 
U3-U1 0.0061*** 0.0123*** 0.0142*** 0.0116*** 0.0061*** 0.0067*** 

	
(
O
N
S
 U1 0.0036*** 0.0080*** 0.0138*** 0.0054*** 0.0067*** 0.0093*** 
U2 0.0071*** 0.0129*** 0.0161*** 0.0032* 0.0094*** 0.0147*** 
U3 0.0087*** 0.0193*** 0.0218*** 0.0086 0.0118*** 0.0163** 
U3-U1 0.0051** 0.0113*** 0.0080** 0.0032 0.0051* 0.0070** 

R
T
O
U
 U1 0.0043*** 0.0079*** 0.0117*** 0.0013 0.0084*** 0.0089*** 
U2 0.0064*** 0.0133*** 0.0154*** 0.0057** 0.0108*** 0.0207*** 
U3 0.0063*** 0.0158*** 0.0212*** 0.0067 0.0124*** 0.0107* 
U3-U1 0.0020 0.0079*** 0.0095*** 0.0054* 0.0040* 0.0018 

	
(
U
V
W
 U1 0.0019 0.0074* 0.0172*** 
U2 0.0043 0.0112*** 0.0162*** 
U3 0.0060 0.0126*** 0.0165*** 
U3-U1 0.0041 0.0052* -0.0007 

X
Y
R
T
O
U
 U1 0.0048** 0.0050 0.0044 
U2 0.0065** 0.0100*** 0.0119*** 
U3 0.0104*** 0.0161*** 0.0127** 
U3-U1   0.0057** 0.0112*** 0.0083         
         
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5.2  Risk 
It cannot be excluded that the variables represent a risk factor instead of information 
uncertainty. However, Table 18 shows that, except for B/M, the variables do not have a 
significant effect on unconditional expected returns (on the 1% and 5% significance level). 
Combined with the fact that the proxies are associated with both higher returns for winner 
stocks and with lower average returns for loser stocks makes it more unlikely that the 
variables reflect missing risk factors.85 This diametrical effect of the variables on winner and 
loser stocks makes it difficult to implement a risk-based theory for this pattern. Moreover, 
Zhang (2006) examines the market reaction to subsequent earnings announcements and shows 
that the variables still have an effect on the subsequent daily returns. This is clear evidence 
against risk factors behind the proxies as risk-based models would predict a zero returns for 
this short period (Fama, 1998). 
5.3  The Persistence of the Information Uncertainty Effect 
Further, to ensure that the six variables proxy information uncertainty, I examine the long-
term effect of the variables on the 52-week high returns. Therefore, the profits to the 52-week 
high strategy with a holding period of one month are measured for each of the first 36 months 
after the portfolio formation. If the variables are in fact proxies for the ambiguity about 
information, I expect the information uncertainty effect to disappear within the first months. 
As described above, this paper builds on the insights of psychologists that behavioral biases 
have more room when uncertainty is large (see also Hirshleifer, 2001 and Daniel et al., 2001). 
Combined with the definition of information uncertainty (the doubt about the implication of 
news on a firm’s value), it implies that greater information uncertainty leads to a reduced 
speed until news is completely incorporated into the stock price. Yet, after a certain time, the 
information should be completely incorporated into the stock price. In this line of 
argumentation, the return differences between high-uncertainty winners (losers) and low-
uncertainty winners (loser) should become insignificant in the long run. This implies that the 
difference in 52-week high returns between high- and low-uncertainty stocks should disappear 
after a couple of months following the formation of the portfolio. 
 
 

The Information uncertainty effect is also present when stocks are first sorted on the 52-week high criterion and then 
subsequently based on the uncertainty variable.
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Figure 6 shows the average monthly return differences between high and low-uncertainty 
stocks in the 52-week high winner and loser portfolios. They have a holding period of one 
month and are implemented with a lag of Z months after the ranking date, where Z can take 
values between zero and 1286. The figures show that for the winner portfolio, the return 
difference between high and low-uncertainty stocks becomes insignificant after one or two 
months for all variables except for LHR. The difference between high and low-uncertainty 
loser stocks is not significantly different from zero on the 5% level after three to five months 
for most variables. The differences are largest in the first month after the ranking date for both 
winners and losers. The pattern that the return difference quickly disappears after the ranking 
date is consistent with the information uncertainty story. 
 
 
Figure 6 
Uncertainty Effect in 52-week High Portfolios across Time 
At the beginning of each month, stocks are ranked based on the information uncertainty proxy into five groups with a certain 
lag. Within each group, stocks are further subdivided according to the 52-week high measure. The ranking is executed with a 
certain lag measured in the number of months. The top (bottom) 30% are assigned to the winner (loser) portfolio. Stocks are 
equal weighted and held in the portfolio for one month. In the figures below, the return differential between the highest- and 
the lowest uncertainty portfolios are documented for winners and losers, respectively. The broken lines indicate the 95% 
confidence interval. The sample consists all actively traded UK stocks on Datastream with a market value above 20 Million 
Pounds are considered. The sample period is between January 1989 and August 2008 except for CFVOLA, which is not 
available before January 1996. 

 
D
As mentioned above, the returns are calculated for the first 36 months after the ranking date. For a better illustration, the 
figures are limited to the first 12 months after the ranking date.
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Furthermore, the finding that the uncertainty effect has a longer persistence in the loser 
portfolio compared to winners stocks might explain a finding of Table 19-21: it is shown that 
the 52-week high return increase in uncertainty is to a larger part due to the decrease in loser 
returns than due to the increase in winner returns. In these tables, the returns to 52-week high 
portfolios are reported on an overlapping holding period basis for a holding period of six 
months. Consequently, the average monthly winner and loser portfolio return in month % is 
composed of portfolios that are formed between %  & to %  	. Hence, according to Figure 6, 
the uncertainty effect has already disappeared for the subportfolios implemented furthest in 
the past. Therefore, such a portfolio construction implicitly considers the length of the 
uncertainty effect when comparing the return differences between high and low uncertainty 
stocks for losers with those for winners. In opposite, Figure 6 presents evidence that the 
positive relation between uncertainty and 52-week high returns is due to winners and losers as 
the absolute difference between high and low-uncertainty stocks is of similar magnitude for 
the uncertainty measures LHR, AGE and CFVOLA. Only when information uncertainty is 
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measured by B/M, the 52-week high increase in uncertainty seems to be largely a loser 
phenomenon.87 
 
Figure 7 
The 52-week High Difference in Uncertainty 
At the beginning of each month, stocks are ranked based on the information uncertainty proxy into five groups. Within each 
group, stocks are further subdivided according to the 52-week high measure. The top (bottom) 30% is assigned to the winner 
(loser) portfolio. The ranking is executed with a certain lag measured as the number of months Stocks are equal weighted and 
held in the portfolio for one month. In the figures below, the return differential of the 52-week high strategy between the 
highest- and the lowest uncertainty portfolio is documented, respectively. The broken lines indicate the 95% confidence 
interval. The sample consists of all actively traded UK stocks on Datastream with a market value above 20 Million Pounds. 
The sample period is between January 1989 and August 2008 except for CFVOLA, which is not available before January 
1996. 
  
  
 
All obtained findings in Figure 6 remain merely unchanged if returns are controlled for the turn-of-the-year effect. Results 
are not reported for consideration of space. The figures are available on request.
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Figure 7 illustrates the difference between the profitability of the 52-week high strategy when 
limited to high-uncertainty stocks and the strategy’s profits when limited to low-uncertainty 
stocks. It supports the findings from above and shows that only within the first three to four 
months after the ranking date the uncertainty effect leads to significant differences in the 52-
week high returns. For larger portfolio formation lags, the profits to the 52-week high strategy 
do not depend on the level of information uncertainty. Consequently, the relation between the 
six variables and the 52-week high profits is not a permanent phenomenon, which is strong 
support that the variables do indeed measure information uncertainty and do not represent a 
compensation for risk. 
6. The Information Uncertainty Effect and Anchoring 
So far, the finding that higher information uncertainty leads to higher 52-week high returns is 
interpreted as evidence for anchoring. However, in the framework of anchoring, the 
profitability of the 52-week high strategy does not represent the level of underreaction caused 
by this behavioral heuristic. The profits rather document the correction that follows to the 
initial underreaction. Hence, it is concluded from the profitability of the 52-week high 
strategy that represents the intensity of the correction on the initial underreaction due to 
anchoring.  
 
This approach implicitly assumes that the strength of underreaction differs across the level of 
information uncertainty, while the manner how investors correct the bias remains unchanged. 
However, it cannot be excluded that the subsequent correction is (also) driven by a 
psychological bias. For example, the model of Barberis et al. (1998) shows that, after an 
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initial underreaction, a behavioral phenomenon called representativeness heuristic leads 
investors to overreact. Based on the insight that psychological biases increase in uncertainty, 
it might also be that the representativeness heuristic gets more room in uncertainty. This 
implies that not only the initial underreaction, but also the correction might be influenced by a 
behavioral pattern that depends on the level of information uncertainty. Consequently, the 
positive relation between the 52-week high profits and information uncertainty might also be 
due to a psychological bias that leads to a more biased correction behavior beside or instead 
of a higher degree of anchoring. 
 
In order to ensure that that this is not the case, I examine the long-term performance of the 52-
week high strategy for different levels of information uncertainty. In Table 25, the long run 
profitability of the 52-week high strategy is reported for different levels of information 
uncertainty. U1 (U5) refers to the lowest (highest) uncertainty level. The averages of five 
lagged portfolio returns are documented. As above, the 52-week high winner and loser 
portfolios are formed after a lag of Z months and are held over one month, where Z can take 
values between one and 48. It is necessary to point out that the number of monthly 
observations decreases in Z: The sample starts in January 198988, but if the 52-week high 
strategy is examined with a lag of 48 months, the first monthly return is not obtained before 
the end of January 1993. 
 
Irrespective of the level of information uncertainty, the 52-week high strategy does not yield 
significant negative returns within the examined four-year period. Only for LHR and for 
VOLA, the 52-week high strategy generates weakly significant negative returns across the 
highest uncertainty stocks. Yet, this is only the case for one single sub-period respectively. 
However, in general, for all information uncertainty levels, the profits to the 52-week high 
strategy are not significantly different from zero after the first 12 months. Furthermore, there 
is no evidence that high uncertainty stocks experience a stronger reversal in the long-term as 
the returns of the 52-week high strategy are in general not lower when limited to high 
uncertainty stocks. For MV, B/M and AGE, for example, the 52-week high strategy generates 
higher negative returns within the U1 group than in the U5 group for most intervals between 
month 12 and 48 after the portfolio formation. 
  
 
88
 The sample starts in January 1989 for all variables except for CFVOLA that starts in 1996. 
	A139 - 

Table 25 
Long-term 52-week High Profits 
The table reports average monthly returns for portfolios formed based on information uncertainty and the 52-week high 
criterion with a certain lag. First, stocks are sorted into five portfolios based on one uncertainty measure. Then within each of 
the three portfolios, stocks are further subdivided into three portfolios according to the second uncertainty measure. The top 
(bottom) 30% is assigned to the winner (loser) portfolio. Stocks within a portfolio are equal-weighted and held over one 
month. The ranking is executed with a certain lag, which is denominated in the number of months. The table shows the 
average monthly returns of the 52-week high strategy within a certain holding period interval. MV is the firm’s market 
capitalization (in millions of Pounds) at the beginning of month t. Book-to-market value (B/M) is the book value of 
shareholders equity plus deferred taxes divided by its market value at the end of the last fiscal year. LHR is the quotient of 
the lowest price of a stock within the last one year and the highest price of the stock within the last 52 weeks. Stock volatility 
(VOLA) is the standard deviation of weekly market excess returns over the year ending at the beginning of month t. Firm age 
(AGE) measures the number of months since the firm was first covered by Datastream. Cash-flow volatility (CFVOLA) 
represents the standard deviation of the net cash flow from operating activities standardized by average total assets in the past 
3 years. 1/MV, 1/(B/M), 1/LHR and 1/AGE are the reciprocals of MV, B/M, LHR and AGE. Each month, all actively traded 
UK stocks on Datastream with a market value above 20 Million Pounds are considered. The sample period is between 
January 1989 and August 2008 except for CFVOLA, which is not available before January 1996; t-statistics (two-tailed) are 
reported in parentheses. 
                    
Months Months Months Months Months Months Months Months 
1-6 7-12 13-18 19-24 25-30 31-36 37-42 43-48 
	F U1 0.0087 0.0054 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0032 -0.0034 -0.0036 -0.0037 
(2.42) (1.74) -(0.32) -(0.29) -(0.82) -(1.06) -(1.92) -(0.81) 
U2 0.0146 0.0101 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0015 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0009 
(4.19) (3.58) -(0.40) -(0.50) -(2.15) -(0.42) -(0.14) -(0.13) 
U3 0.0197 0.0081 -0.0018 -0.0043 -0.0028 -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0006 
(5.85) (2.70) -(0.75) -(1.89) -(1.55) -(1.22) -(1.71) -(0.77) 
U4 0.0211 0.0099 -0.0021 -0.0026 -0.0014 0.0001 -0.0010 -0.0009 
(6.00) (3.48) -(0.79) -(1.11) -(0.74) -(0.72) -(1.43) -(0.68) 
U5 0.0230 0.0103 -0.0010 0.0010 -0.0039 0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0016 
(6.77) (3.50) -(0.37) (0.49) -(0.48) -(0.85) -(0.27) -(0.47) 
	F U1 0.0022 0.0015 -0.0024 0.0009 0.0002 0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0028 
(0.59) (0.48) -(0.91) (0.41) (0.24) (0.56) -(0.63) -(1.41) 
U2 0.0136 0.0067 -0.0019 -0.0011 -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0051 -0.0022 
(3.94) (2.59) -(0.82) -(0.52) -(0.79) -(0.83) -(3.40) -(2.01) 
U3 0.0176 0.0073 -0.0031 -0.0029 -0.0050 -0.0026 -0.0031 -0.0006 
(6.36) (2.58) -(1.35) -(1.41) -(2.32) -(1.00) -(1.55) -(0.99) 
U4 0.0213 0.0112 -0.0002 -0.0029 -0.0036 -0.0046 -0.0038 -0.0022 
(7.12) (4.52) -(0.09) -(1.26) -(1.66) -(2.04) -(2.29) -(1.45) 
U5 0.0293 0.0156 0.0046 0.0009 -0.0039 -0.0019 -0.0021 -0.0001 
(2.93) (5.11) (1.66) (0.35) -(1.33) -(0.56) -(1.07) -(0.18) 
	D U1 0.0092 0.0066 0.0006 -0.0009 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0009 
(7.07) (5.27) (0.49) -(0.77) (0.35) (0.23) -(0.31) -(0.95) 
U2 0.0109 0.0070 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0029 0.0002 -0.0038 -0.0005 
(7.06) (5.13) -(0.13) -(0.77) -(2.25) -(0.27) -(3.15) -(1.02) 
U3 0.0156 0.0102 0.0010 -0.0020 -0.0013 0.0018 -0.0039 -0.0013 
(8.39) (6.13) (0.67) -(1.24) -(1.08) (1.05) -(3.14) -(1.02) 
U4 0.0197 0.0105 -0.0019 -0.0033 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0029 -0.0021 
(8.83) (4.72) -(1.10) -(1.86) -(1.11) -(0.85) -(2.37) -(1.64) 
U5 0.0254 0.0065 -0.0072 -0.0043 -0.0061 -0.0020 -0.0032 -0.0042 
(6.64) (2.25) -(2.71) -(1.82) -(2.61) -(0.40) -(1.17) -(2.06) 
 
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continued 
Months Months Months Months Months Months Months Months 
1-6 7-12 13-18 19-24 25-30 31-36 37-42 43-48 
           U1 0.0078 0.0055 0.0004 0.0008 0.0000 -0.0013 -0.0010 0.0007 
(4.46) (3.54) (0.24) (0.60) -(0.10) -(0.81) -(0.87) (0.62) 
U2 0.0116 0.0081 0.0000 -0.0007 -0.0028 0.0008 -0.0016 0.0006 
(5.28) (4.37) (0.01) -(0.50) -(2.09) (0.74) -(1.49) (0.46) 
U3 0.0157 0.0086 -0.0006 -0.0023 -0.0038 -0.0011 -0.0042 -0.0016 
(6.19) (4.15) -(1.23) -(1.31) -(2.60) -(0.60) -(2.82) -(1.21) 
U4 0.0173 0.0084 -0.0024 -0.0031 -0.0036 -0.0006 -0.0023 -0.0009 
(5.97) (3.52) -(1.23) -(1.56) -(2.05) -(0.02) -(1.53) -(0.60) 
U5 0.0237 0.0060 -0.0070 -0.0047 -0.0032 -0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0037 
(5.85) (2.01) -(2.68) -(2.10) -(1.32) -(0.02) -(1.72) -(1.71) 
	 U1 0.0056 0.0030 -0.0016 -0.0012 -0.0032 -0.0034 -0.0036 -0.0037 
(1.86) (1.20) -(0.67) -(0.67) -(1.87) -(1.70) -(2.10) -(2.17) 
U2 0.0147 0.0086 -0.0001 0.0029 -0.0015 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0009 
(4.57) (3.06) -(0.05) (1.22) -(0.66) -(0.04) -(0.47) (0.30) 
U3 0.0188 0.0082 -0.0027 -0.0031 -0.0028 -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0006 
(5.87) (2.99) -(1.10) -(1.40) -(1.36) -(0.82) -(0.88) -(0.33) 
U4 0.0226 0.0098 -0.0025 -0.0020 -0.0014 0.0001 -0.0010 -0.0009 
(6.29) (3.07) -(0.84) -(0.81) -(0.44) (0.18) -(0.54) -(0.36) 
U5 0.0239 0.0085 -0.0045 -0.0054 -0.0039 0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0016 
(6.39) (2.99) -(1.29) -(1.64) -(1.59) (0.52) -(0.44) -(0.61) 
U1 0.0039 0.0025 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0043 0.00021 0.00014 0.00249 
(1.00) (0.61) -(0.23) -(0.31) -(0.23) (0.05) (0.12) (0.62) 
U2 0.0061 0.0045 0.0005 0.0014 -0.00358 -0.00189 0.00002 0.00157 
(1.35) (1.18) (0.14) (0.56) -(0.29) -(0.46) (0.65) (0.71) 
U3 0.0099 0.0032 -0.0057 -0.0030 -0.00417 0.00033 -0.00020 -0.00057 
(2.37) (0.86) -(1.41) -(0.90) -(1.45) (0.08) -(0.13) -(0.11) 
U4 0.0199 0.0113 0.0067 0.0010 0.00258 -0.00191 -0.00109 0.00235 
(4.31) (2.88) (1.66) (0.28) (1.02) -(0.73) -(1.42) (1.12) 
U5 0.0231 0.0122 0.0042 0.0002 -0.0021 -0.00120 -0.00400 0.00177 
    (3.86) (2.32) (0.95) (0.05) -(0.49) -(0.73) -(1.42) (0.29) 
 
 
Moreover, for all levels of uncertainty, the persistence of the profitability of the 52-week high 
strategy is similar. This is documented in Figure 8, where the 52-week high profits for the 
first 20 months after the ranking date are illustrated for different information groups sorted 
based on AGE. The returns to the strategy are only reported for AGE as the results for the 
other measures are similar and do not contain additional information. Irrespective of the level 
of information uncertainty, the 52-week high portfolios only generate significant positive 
returns within the first twelve months and turn negative in month 13 to 14 after the ranking 
date (Yet, the negative returns are not significantly different from zero). This implies that the 
relation between the 52-week high returns and information uncertainty can also not be 
explained by a different speed to correct the initial bias across uncertainty groups. 
 
The results related to the long-term performance of the 52-week high strategy might be biased 
towards zero due to the assumption89 that stocks, which are delisted during the holding period 
 
89
 This assumption is also employed in Agyei-Ampomah (2003, p.780). 
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generate an average return of zero. With an increasing number of months between the ranking 
date and the portfolio formation, the fraction of delisted stocks is expected to grow. However, 
it is ensured that the results are not biased by this assumption: the drawn inferences are not 
different if the portfolios are constructed under Forner’s (2003, p.72) assumption that the 
proceeds of delisted stocks are at once equally invested in the remaining stocks of the winner 
or loser portfolio. The findings of this section are also not influenced by the turn-of-the year 
effect. Measuring the long-term performance of the 52-week high strategy in non-January 
months does also not change the pattern observed for the total sample.90  

Figure 8 
Long-term Performance of the 52-week High Strategy across AGE Groups 
The figure shows the average monthly return of the 52-week high strategy within an information uncertainty portfolios based 
on AGE within the first 20 months after the ranking date. At the beginning of each month, stocks are ranked based on the 
information uncertainty proxy AGE into five groups with a certain lag. Within each group, stocks are further subdivided 
according to the 52-week high measure. The top (bottom) 30% are assigned to the winner (loser) portfolio. The ranking is 
executed with a certain lag, measured as the number of months. Stocks are equal weighted and held in the portfolio for one 
month. The sample consists of all actively traded UK stocks on Datastream with a market value above 20 Million Pounds are 
considered. The sample period is between January 1989 and August 2008. 

Hence, the variation of the strategy’s profits in information uncertainty seems not to be driven 
by a different manner to correct the initial bias and further confirms the idea that it is 
anchoring and hence the level of underreaction which varies with information uncertainty. 
Moreover, the finding that long-term reversals seem not to occur when stocks are ranked 
based on the 52-week high strategy contributes to a growing controversial literature. It is 
consistent with the finding of George and Hwang (2004) and provides further evidence that 
separate theories for the intermediate-term and the long-term predictability in prices are 
 
90
 Results are not reported for consideration of space. They are available on request. 
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necessary. Yet, it contradicts the behavioral models of Barberis et al. (1998), Daniel et al. 
(1998), Hong and Stein (1999) and the empirical findings for momentum strategies on 
international stock indexes of Du (2007). 
 
Table 26 
Momentum Profits for Different Information Uncertainty Groups 
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns sorted by an information uncertainty proxy and by the (6/1/6) momentum 
criterion. Each month, stocks are assigned to one of five portfolios based on the value of the uncertainty variable. The 20% of 
stocks with the highest variable value (and with the highest degree of information uncertainty) is included into U5 while the 
20% of stocks with the lowest value (and hence with the lowest level of ambiguity) is assigned to group U1. Within each 
information uncertainty quantile, I further sort stocks based on the (6/1/6) momentum criterion. The top (bottom) 20% are 
included in the winner (loser) portfolio. MV is the market capitalization (in millions of Pounds) at the beginning of month t. 
Book-to-market value (B/M) is the book value of shareholders equity plus deferred taxes divided by its market value at the 
end of the last fiscal year. LHR is the quotient of the lowest price of a stock within the last one year and the highest price of 
the stock within the last 52 weeks. Stock volatility (VOLA) is the standard deviation of weekly market excess returns over 
the year ending at the beginning of month t. Firm age (AGE) measures the number of months since the firm was first covered 
by Datastream. Cash-flow volatility (CFVOLA) represents the standard deviation of the net cash flow from operating 
activities standardized by average total assets in the past 3 years. Stocks are equal-weighted and held in the portfolio over six 
months. Between the ranking date and the formation period, a skip period of one month is included. The table reports the 
overlapping holding period returns. 1/MV, 1/(B/M), 1/LHR and 1/AGE are the reciprocals of MV, B/M, LHR and AGE. 
Each month, all actively traded UK stocks on Datastream with a market value above 20 Million Pounds are considered. The 
sample period is between January 1989 and August 2008 except for CFVOLA, which is not available before January 1996; t-
statistics (two-tailed) are reported in parentheses.  
                  
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U5-U1 
	F Winner 0.0063 0.0098 0.0104 0.0122 0.0110 0.0047 (2.34) 
Loser -0.0020 -0.0023 -0.0051 -0.0064 -0.0103 -0.0083 (-2.91) 
Wi-Lo 0.0084 0.0121 0.0155 0.0186 0.0213 0.0129 (3.98) 
t-stat (2.56) (3.88) (5.33) (6.44) (7.07) 
	F Winner 0.0093 0.0111 0.0118 0.0105 0.0111 0.0018 (0.94) 
Loser 0.0039 -0.0022 -0.0058 -0.0092 -0.0123 -0.0162 (-7.09) 
Wi-Lo 0.0051 0.0134 0.0176 0.0197 0.0233 0.0183 (5.50) 
t-stat (1.66) (5.53) (7.43) (7.06) (6.96) 
	D Winner 0.0072 0.0085 0.0102 0.0105 0.0104 0.0033 (2.24) 
Loser 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0036 -0.0045 -0.0095 -0.0096 (-2.28) 
Wi-Lo 0.0071 0.0084 0.0138 0.0149 0.0200 0.0128 (3.99) 
t-stat (6.20) (5.80) (8.03) (7.08) (5.63) 
 Winner 0.0058 0.0111 0.0121 0.0095 0.0098 0.0040 (2.44) 
Loser -0.0020 -0.0014 -0.0024 -0.0050 -0.0091 -0.0071 (-3.15) 
Wi-Lo 0.0079 0.0125 0.0144 0.0146 0.0189 0.0110 (3.44) 
t-stat (4.49) (6.24) (6.27) (5.53) (5.32) 
	 Winner 0.0063 0.0101 0.0116 0.0108 0.0105 0.0041 (2.12) 
Loser 0.0008 -0.0030 -0.0046 -0.0100 -0.0101 -0.0109 (-3.97) 
Wi-Lo 0.0056 0.0130 0.0162 0.0208 0.0206 0.0150 (4.91) 
t-stat (2.23) (4.89) (5.92) (6.71) (5.66) 
 Winner 0.0064 0.0087 0.0112 0.0125 0.0093 0.0029 (1.54) 
Loser 0.0012 0.0030 -0.0002 -0.0060 -0.0084 -0.0096 (-2.26) 
Wi-Lo 0.0052 0.0057 0.0114 0.0186 0.0177 0.0125 (2.56) 
  t-stat (1.50) (1.68) (2.99) (4.45) (3.44)     
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7. Information Uncertainty and Stock Price Momentum 
George and Hwang (2004) show that the 52-week high profits largely explain the profitability 
of stock price momentum. In order to examine whether the two strategies are closely linked, I 
extend my analysis and test whether the information uncertainty proxies are also linked to 
momentum profits. A positive relation between momentum returns and information 
uncertainty would further support George and Hwang’s (2004) hypothesis that the two 
strategies are closely connected since it implies that both are related to the same variables. 
Table 26 reports the average monthly (6/1/6) momentum returns within different uncertainty 
groups. The (6/1/6) strategy is constructed as described above. It is preferred against other 
momentum strategies simply as it is the most commonly examined.  
 
In Table 26, stocks are sorted into five portfolios according to the uncertainty proxy each 
month. U1 represents the group of stocks with the lowest degree of information uncertainty 
while U5 captures the high information ambiguity stocks. Within each of the five portfolios, 
stocks are further sorted based on the momentum criterion into a winner portfolio (the top 
30%) and a loser portfolio (the bottom 30%). The momentum return is the difference between 
winners and losers. As the table shows, for each proxy, momentum returns are larger for high-
uncertainty stocks than for low-uncertainty assets. While the average monthly momentum 
return is 0.56% within the U1 group according to AGE, it is with 2.06% per month 
substantially larger for the highest uncertainty group. The positive relation between 
information uncertainty and momentum profits is due to winner and loser stocks. The future 
return of past winner stocks is higher and that of past loser stocks lower in the highest 
uncertainty stock group than in the U1 portfolio. 
 
The effect of the uncertainty variables on the performance of the (6/1/6) momentum strategy 
and of the 52-week high strategy is quite similar. A larger degree of information uncertainty 
implies a similar increase in the predictive power of both ranking measures and leads to a 
similar increase in the profitability of both strategies. While the difference of the 52-week 
high strategy is 1.37% between the U1 and the U5 group sorted by AGE (see Table 19), it is 
with 1.50% only slightly larger for the momentum strategy. For the 52-week high strategy, the 
difference of 1.37% consists of a return difference of 0.41% for winners and -0.97% for losers 
while for the momentum strategy, it is composed of 0.41% for the winner and -1.09% for the 
loser portfolio. For other information uncertainty proxies, the magnitude of the information 
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uncertainty effect on the strategies’ returns is also quite comparable. As both, the (6/1/6) 
momentum and the 52-week high strategy seem to depend similarly on the same variables, 
further support for the hypothesis of a close relation between the two strategies is presented. 
 
Moreover, as the momentum and the 52-week high strategy seem to depend on information 
uncertainty further supports the idea that momentum is explained by anchoring. Similar to the 
52-week high measure, the momentum ranking criterion improves its forecasting power when 
information uncertainty is larger. In line with the psychological insight that behavioral biases 
increase in uncertainty, it provides further evidence that stock price momentum is driven by 
the anchoring bias. Documenting the relationship between the uncertainty measures and the 
(6/1/6) momentum strategy alone91 leaves the door open for other behavioral explanations 
such as conservatism and representativeness (Barberis et al., 1998), loss aversion (Grinblatt 
and Han, 2002) or overconfidence and the “self attribution bias” (Daniel et al., 1998). 
8. Robustness Tests 
The robustness of the finding that the performance of the 52-week high strategy is positively 
related to information uncertainty is checked across different subperiods. Table 27 shows the 
average monthly 52-week high returns for different uncertainty groups between January 1989 
to December 1998 (Panel A) and between January 1999 and August 2008 (Panel B). The table 
shows that the documented relation is not time-specific. In both subsamples, a zero-cost 
portfolio that is long in stocks with a price close to their 52-week high and short in stocks far 
from their 52-week high generates higher returns for high-uncertainty stocks than it does for 
low-uncertainty portfolios.  
  
 
91
 See for example Zhang (2006). 
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Table 27 
Subperiod Analysis 
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns sorted by an information uncertainty proxy and by the 52-week high 
criterion. Each month, stocks are assigned to one of five portfolios based on the value of the uncertainty variable. The 20% of 
stocks with the highest variable value (and most information uncertainty) is included into U5 while the 20% of stocks with 
the lowest value (and hence with least information uncertainty) are assigned to group U1. Within each information 
uncertainty quantile, I further sort stocks based on the 52-week high ranking criterion. The top (bottom) 20% is included in 
the winner (loser) portfolio H1 (H5). ). MV is the market capitalization (in millions of Pounds) at the end of month t. Book-
to-market value (B/M) is the book value of shareholders equity plus deferred taxes divided by its market value at the end of 
the last fiscal year. LHR is the quotient of the lowest price of a stock within the last one year and the highest price of the 
stock within the last 52 weeks. Stock volatility (VOLA) is the standard deviation of weekly market excess returns over the 
year ending at the end of month t. Firm age (AGE) measures the number of months since the firm was first covered by 
Datastream. Cash-flow volatility (CFVOLA) represents the standard deviation of the net cash flow from operating activities 
standardized by average total assets in the past 3 years. Stocks are equal-weighted and held in the portfolio over six months. 
Between the ranking date and the formation period, a skip period of one month is included. The table reports the overlapping 
holding period returns. 1/MV, 1/(B/M), 1/LHR and 1/AGE are the reciprocals of MV, B/M, LHR and AGE. Each month, all 
actively traded UK stocks on Datastream with a market value above 20 Million Pounds are considered. In Panel A, the 
sample period is between January 1989 and December 1998 except for CFVOLA, which is not available before January 
1996. Panel B reports returns for the period between January 1999 and August 2008; t-statistics (two-tailed) are reported in 
parentheses.  
              
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 t-stat 
Panel A: Feb 1989-Dec 1998 
	F  0.0080 0.0111 0.0149 0.0190 0.0204 0.0124 
(2.79) (3.67) (4.02) (4.63) (5.35) (3.93) 
	F  0.0046 0.0153 0.0149 0.0178 0.0255 0.0209 
(0.74) (4.11) (5.75) (7.77) (8.78) (4.66) 
	D  0.0081 0.0102 0.0156 0.0189 0.0257 0.0176 
(4.73) (5.69) (6.97) (6.95) (5.88) (4.80) 
  0.0078 0.0117 0.0134 0.0157 0.0220 0.0142 
(3.92) (4.75) (4.67) (4.94) (5.22) (4.02) 
	  0.0069 0.0103 0.0189 0.0205 0.0205 0.0136 
(1.45) (2.77) (5.59) (5.45) (5.84) (4.93) 
  0.0002 0.0159 0.0184 0.0259 0.0272 0.0270 
(0.07) (2.50) (3.46) (2.82) (3.46) (2.13) 
Panel B: Jan 1999-Aug 2008 
	F  0.0097 0.0165 0.0184 0.0173 0.0190 0.0094 
(3.59) (2.78) (3.31) (3.19) (3.59) (2.79) 
	F  0.0002 0.0102 0.0160 0.0199 0.0266 0.0264 
(0.08) (2.26) (3.33) (3.64) (4.16) (4.76) 
	D  0.0083 0.0096 0.0146 0.0165 0.0177 0.0094 
(4.28) (3.94) (5.02) (4.70) (3.11) (1.79) 
  0.0069 0.0107 0.0160 0.0138 0.0176 0.0107 
(2.49) (3.16) (3.95) (3.00) (2.78) (1.93) 
	  0.0046 0.0164 0.0155 0.0191 0.0184 0.0138 
(0.88) (3.17) (2.97) (3.21) (2.91) (2.77) 
  0.0034 0.0037 0.0057 0.0148 0.0206 0.0173 
  (0.74) (0.77) (1.17) (2.79) (2.75) (2.54) 
 
 
A further proxy for information proxy might be analyst coverage. According to Zhang (2006), 
with an increasing number of analysts covering a firm, more information about the company 
is available, which implies less information uncertainty. Like Hong et al. (2000), each month, 
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I measure analyst coverage as the number of I/B/E/S analysts providing fiscal year one 
earnings estimates that month.92 If the number of analysts is not available, as Hong et al. 
(2000), I set the coverage for these stocks to zero. However, as there are many stocks each 
month with zero analysts, the stocks are divided into only four groups according to the 
variable.93 The breakpoints are 0.25%, 0.50% and 0.75%. Stocks with the lowest number of 
analysts are considered high-uncertainty stocks (U4) while stocks with a high number of 
analysts are low-uncertainty stocks (U1). Within each uncertainty portfolio, stocks are further 
sorted into a 52-week high winner and loser portfolio. The average monthly returns are 
reported in Table 28. Similar to the other six variables, the 52-week high measure has a higher 
forecasting power of future stock returns when limited to high-uncertainty stocks. While the 
52-week high return is 0.91% for stocks in the U1 group, it is 2.22% in the U4 portfolio. The 
higher profits in the U4 group are due to winners and losers. In opposite to other variables, the 
increase of the winner returns in analyst coverage is with a t-statistic of 0.99 not statistically 
significant. Yet, this might also be due to the reduced sample period since analyst coverage is 
not available before September 1999. 
 
Table 28 
52-week High Profits for Groups sorted by Analyst Coverage 
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns sorted by the information uncertainty proxy analyst coverage and by the 
52-week high criterion. Each month, stocks are assigned to one of five portfolios based on the value of the uncertainty 
variable. The 20% of stocks with the highest variable value (and with the highest degree of information uncertainty) are 
included into U5 while the 20% of stocks with the lowest value (and hence with the lowest level of ambiguity about 
information) is assigned to group U1. Within each information uncertainty quantile, I further sort stocks based on the 52-
week high ranking criterion. The top (bottom) 25% is included in the winner (loser) portfolio H1 (H5). Stocks are equal-
weighted and held in the portfolio over six months. Between the ranking date and the formation period, a skip period of one 
month is included. The table reports the overlapping holding period returns. Each month, all actively traded UK stocks on 
Datastream with a market value above 20 Million Pounds are considered. The sample covers the period between January 
2000 and August 2008; t-statistics (two-tailed) are reported in parentheses. 
              
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5-U1 t-stat 
Winner 0.0055 0.0064 0.0076 0.0087 0.0032 (0.99) 
Loser -0.0036 -0.0113 -0.0103 -0.0136 -0.0100 -(2.16) 
Wi-Lo 0.0091 0.0177 0.0178 0.0222 0.0132 (2.96) 
t-stat (1.75) (2.99) (2.30) (4.55)     
 
 
However, the obtained results for analyst coverage must be considered with caution. First, as 
mentioned, the sample period for this proxy is much shorter than for other variables. Second, 
the number of stocks within the four portfolios varies since the distribution of analyst 
 
E
After an extensive search, I obtained these data from an anonymous source.
93
 For the other variables in the tests above, stocks are assigned to five uncertainty groups.  
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coverage is heavily skewed to zero. In each month, the 0.25% quantile corresponds to zero 
analysts. Yet, in some months, more than 30% of all stocks have coverage of zero and are 
therefore included into the group U4. This explains why the 52-week high return in the U4 
group has a higher t-statistic compared to the profits of the strategy in U1, U2 or U3. Due to 
the high percentage of stocks with zero coverage, it cannot be excluded that the results for this 
variable are biased. Therefore, I only shortly discuss this proxy for information uncertainty. 

Another potential measure for information uncertainty would be the dispersion in analyst 
forecasts. A large body of literature has employed this variable for the uncertainty about 
future earnings (e.g. Diether et al., 2002, Imhoff and Lobo, 1992, Lang and Lundholm, 1996). 
Dispersion in analyst forecast is also considered in Zhang (2006). However, for my UK 
sample, using I/B/E/S data, information about the standard deviation of analyst forecasts 
exists for less than 500 stocks each month starting from January 2000. As this type of 
information is only available for a part of the sample, results might be heavily biased. 
Therefore, this variable is not considered in the study. 
9. Conclusion 
As the second part of my thesis, this work examines whether the profitability of the 52-week 
high strategy is due to anchoring – a behavioral phenomenon documented in Kahneman and 
Tversky (1982). In order to test the hypothesis, I examine the effect of information 
uncertainty on the profitability of the 52-week high strategy. An insight of the psychological 
literature is that psychological biases increase in uncertainty. Hence, if the behavioral 
phenomenon called anchoring explains the 52-week high returns, the 52-week high ranking 
criterion should have more predictive power in cases of larger uncertainty. To proxy 
information uncertainty, I use firm size, a firm’s book-to-market value, the distance between 
the 52-week high and low price, stock price volatility, firm age and cash-flow volatility. 
 
The core finding of this part of my thesis is that the profitability of the 52-week high strategy 
varies with the level of information uncertainty. Consistently for all six proxies, greater 
information uncertainty leads to higher future returns for stocks with a price close to their 52-
week high price and to lower future returns for stocks with a price far from their 52-week 
high. Hence, higher information uncertainty seems to have an impact on both the 52-week 
high winners and losers. The diametrical effect of larger uncertainty on 52-week high winner 
	A148 - 

stocks and on 52-week high loser stocks leads to higher 52-week high profits in information 
uncertainty. This presents evidence against the null hypothesis that the 52-week high is not 
explained by anchoring. The positive relationship between uncertainty and the 52-week high 
profits is also robust when it is controlled for risk (the three Fama-French factors), for 
industry effects and for the turn-of-the-year effect. 
 
Moreover, this part shows that the employed six variables do also have an impact on 
momentum returns. As for the 52-week high strategy, a greater level of uncertainty implies 
higher future returns for winner stocks and lower future returns for loser stocks. Momentum 
portfolios generate two times larger profits when limited to high-uncertainty stocks than for 
low-uncertainty stocks. Since both the momentum strategy and the 52-week high strategy 
react similarly to the same variables, further evidence for a close connection between the two 
strategies is provided. This makes it more likely that the strategies have the same drivers and 
supports the view that anchoring is also the explanation of the price momentum effect. 
Documenting the effect of information uncertainty on momentum profits alone would have 
left the door open for other psychological biases such as overconfidence, representativeness or 
conservatism94 as explanation for the momentum returns. 
 
Some models of the momentum literature argue that short-term momentum co-exists with 
long-term reversals. Many theoretical papers in the field of behavioral finance propose models 
in which short-run underreaction and long-term overreaction are components of the same 
process (Barberis et al., 1998, Daniel et al., 1998, Hong and Stein, 1999). An examination of 
the 52-week high strategy in the long run reveals that the 52-week high profits do not reverse 
in the post three years. Irrespective of the information uncertainty level, the 52-week high 
strategy does not generate significantly negative returns in the 36 months after the portfolio 
formation date for all six uncertainty proxies. Hence, subjects seem not to overreact when 
correcting their anchoring bias. This indicates that short-term momentum and long-term 
reversals are not part of the same phenomenon and that separate theories are necessary. 
 
 
94
 Overconfidence belongs to one of the most often examined patterns in the behavioral finance theory. It is employed in the 
model of Daniel et al (1998) which can also be applied to the momentum literature. It shows that these patterns might arise 
due to investors who are overconfident about their private information and suffer from a biased self-attribution. According to 
Barberis et al. (1998), the momentum effect can be explained by two other behavioral phenomena found by psychologists 
about the way people form beliefs: representativeness and conservatism. For an overview of different psychological biases 
documented in the literature and for a description, see Barberis and Thaler (2002). 
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This work also provides support for the finding of Zhang (2006) that higher information 
uncertainty leads to more predictability. Greater information uncertainty leads to higher future 
stock returns following good news and lower future stock returns following bad news. As a 
measure of news, Zhang (2006) uses post-analyst forecast revision drift and stock price 
momentum. This work provides further evidence for this theory in different aspects. First, I 
show that the information uncertainty effect is also present when another measure for news is 
employed: the distance of a stock’s price to its 52-week high price. Using this proxy in order 
to differentiate between good and bad news is new to my knowledge and seems quite 
intuitive. For a stock whose price is at or close to its 52-week high price, good news has 
pushed the price of the stock to such a high price. For a stock that trades at a price far from its 
52-week high price, bad news has recently arrived95. Hence, a small distance between a 
stock’s price and its 52-week high is classified as good news and a large distance as bad news. 
Secondly, this study examines the robustness and the persistence of the uncertainty effect. For 
two measures of news (the distance of a stock’s price to the 52-week high price and for 
Zhang’s (2006) past six-month return), it is shown that the effect is not driven by other 
phenomena and that it is robust to the turn-of-the-year effect and to industry effects. It also 
seems less likely that the uncertainty proxies reflect missing risk factors as they do lead to 
higher future returns for 52-week high winners and lower future returns for 52-week high 
losers but are except for the book-to-market ratio not related to unconditional expected 
returns. Furthermore, the uncertainty effect is not permanent and disappears after several 
months. The return difference between high-uncertainty and low-uncertainty stocks becomes 
insignificant after, on average, two months for the 52-week high winners and after, on 
average, five months for the 52-week high losers. Third, employing a UK sample, this paper 
is the first to document the existence of the uncertainty effect for non-U.S. data. This reduces 
the likelihood that the effect documented in Zhang (2006) is due to data mining. 
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 George and Hwang (2004, p.2146) use a similar explanation to justify their choice of employing the 52-week high price of 
a stock in the ranking criterion and show that their 52-week high strategy dominates the momentum strategy. However, they 
do not explicitly employ this proxy as a measure for good and bad news. 
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SUMMARY 
This work examines the stock price momentum effect and the cause for its existence. 
Specifically, my thesis can be linked to the behavioral finance field and tests whether the 
momentum effect is caused by the non-rational behavior of at least some investors that suffer 
from the anchoring bias. 
 
In the first part of my thesis, the current stand of the literature about the momentum effect is 
presented. The different methods to measure momentum returns are evaluated and compared. 
It is documented that there is broad consensus among researchers about the existence of the 
momentum effect. However, nearly all studies employ a similar method to obtain momentum 
returns. Hence, finding a weakness in the methodology could put into question the apparent 
strong evidence for the existence of the momentum effect. Subsequently, the current stand of 
the literature about the drivers of the momentum effect is documented. The explanation 
attempts can be divided into two broad groups. One the one hand, the rational-based approach 
assumes that momentum profits represent a compensation for risk. Studies that belong to this 
group aim to identify additional risk factors and/or attempt to implement a richer risk model. 
Within the rational-based field, four subgroups can be formed by employing a theoretical 
decomposition of momentum profits. On the other hand, the behavioral explanations assume 
that momentum strategies are profitable since at least some investors do not behave 
completely rational. The various approaches are arranged under only four hypotheses, a way 
that is new to structure the behavioral finance momentum literature. It becomes clear that all 
behavior studies have in common to explain momentum profits with investors that do not 
adequately react to new information; they either overreact or underreact to news. In summary, 
the first part of my thesis presents, evaluates and compares both the rational and the 
behavioral approach and shows that none of the two groups has yet succeeded in fully 
explaining the existence of the stock price momentum effect.  
 
In the second and third part, my study examines whether a specific non-rational behavior of 
investors explains the returns of momentum strategies. The null hypothesis states that 
momentum cannot be explained by anchoring. This behavioral heuristic is first documented in 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and implies that subjects orientate too much on a reference 
point when making estimates. The null hypothesis goes back to George and Hwang (2004) 
supposing that momentum profits are explained by another strategy called the 52-week high 
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strategy, which itself is assumed to be profitable due to investors’ anchoring bias. In order to 
test the null, these two connections need to be examined. For a sample composed of all traded 
stocks in Germany between 1980 and 2008 with a price above one Euro and a market value 
above 20 Million Euro, the second part of my thesis presents evidence for the first assumed 
relation. With three different tests it is documented that momentum profits can largely be 
explained by the returns to the 52-week high strategy, which is long in stocks with a price 
close to their highest price within the past 12 months and short in stocks with a price far from 
their 52-week high price. Given this finding, searching for an explanation for the momentum 
effect implies identifying the driver of the 52-week high strategy. George and Hwang (2004) 
assume that the profitability of the 52-week high strategy can be explained by investors 
suffering from the anchoring bias: They orientate too much on the 52-week high price – a 
widely available piece of information as it is published in many newspapers – when 
estimating the impact of news on the stock price. My study is the first to formally test whether 
anchoring qualifies as explanation for the 52-week high returns. Therefore, three different 
tests are introduced. In summary, the main finding of the second part is that anchoring cannot 
be rejected as driver of the momentum effect: First, the dominance of the 52-week high 
strategy over the momentum strategy is documented for the sample and secondly, it cannot be 
rejected that anchoring explains the profits to the 52-week high strategy. 
 
While the third part of the thesis tests the same hypothesis as the second one, the approach is 
quite different. The procedure is built on an insight of the psychological literature that 
behavioral biases increase in uncertainty. According to this insight, the anchoring bias should 
have more room in cases of larger information uncertainty. Hence, if the 52-week high 
strategy and the momentum strategy are due to anchoring, their profitability should increase 
in information uncertainty. Based on this, it is tested whether the ranking criteria of the 52-
week high strategy and of the momentum strategy have a higher predictive power when 
information uncertainty is larger. This is conducted for a sample that consists of all traded UK 
stocks between 1989 and 2008 with a market value above 50 Million Pounds. To measure the 
relation between the predictive power of the ranking criteria and information uncertainty, six 
different variables are chosen as proxies for information uncertainty. Although each of the six 
variables might also capture other things than information uncertainty, their common element 
should be ambiguity. I find strong evidence for anchoring as explanation of the momentum 
and of the 52-week high strategy. For all six variables, a positive relation between information 
uncertainty and the predictive power of the ranking criteria is documented. With larger 
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ambiguity, the winner portfolios yield higher returns while loser portfolios generate lower 
returns. The difference between high information uncertainty and low information uncertainty 
stocks is statistically significant at conventional levels. Moreover, as both, the 52-week high 
profits and the momentum returns, are similarly related to the same variables, a close relation 
between momentum and the 52-week high strategy is further confirmed.  
 
My thesis contributes to the behavioral finance literature. This field of research departs from 
the traditional assumption that investors are fully rational and views it more fruitful to assume 
that at least some investors behave in a non-rational manner in order to explain many patterns 
in finance. Documenting that the momentum strategy is profitable due to a non-rational 
behavior of at least some investors would represent a serious challenge to the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH) as it suggests that investors can earn superior returns by considering this 
behavior without bearing additional risk. Yet, one major weakness of the behavioral finance 
approach is to document empirically that stock prices reflect such a non-rational behavior of 
traders. Most empirical behavioral studies – as well as this work – find certain evidence for 
their theories, but fail to exclude other interpretations for their results. Although my study 
relates to the behavior finance literature, I am extremely careful to interpret my findings as 
strong evidence against the EMH since it cannot be excluded that one day, a risk model is 
implemented and/or a risk factor is found that captures the profits to momentum strategies. 
Furthermore, my study suffers from the same problems as all other behavioral finance 
theories so far: I cannot offer a specific alternative theory for the efficiency of markets instead 
of stating that markets are “not efficient”, which seems to be a rather weak hypothesis. 
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